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AMERICAN OPINION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

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AMERICAN OPINION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

By Meno Lovenstein, Ph. D.

INTRODUCTION

By Broadus Mitchell



American Council On Public Affairs
WASHINGTON, D. C.

American Council On Public Affairs

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■

TO
MOTHER AND DAD
FOR MANY OPINIONS

■

INTRODUCTION

THIS book might be called "*A Mirror for America.*" What we saw in the Soviet Union was the reverse image of our own economy and polity. When we were crying up democracy, albeit with arms, the Bolshevik Revolution was detestable. When we were of the Allies, Brest-Litovsk was traitorous. While American capitalism continued to surge forward in the first brief post-war boom, Russian collectivism seemed maniacal; men had best look quickly before the fantastic image vanished. As we swung into the New Economic Era, we were satisfied that Russia's New Economic Policy was a confession of Communist failure, and presaged reconstruction on familiar lines. Then, as America toppled on the brink in 1929 and descended, despite Hoover, into the chasm of paralyzed industry, the American financial baron lifted up his eyes in torment and began to suspect that he saw the beggar Lazarus in Abraham's bosom. In all the Western World only the Soviets were using their resources, employing their workers. For a brief period, voluntary cooperatives—as witness Sweden—gave the comfort of a "middle way." But Russia, however accursed, loomed as the one thing needful, a customer. The Russian Embassy in Washington should be reopened, though a genuine Communist minister plenipotentiary was to be installed amidst faded Czarist grandeur, for coffer dams on the Dnieper yawned for Pittsburgh steel, and Ukrainian fields, broken by peasant plows, called for Detroit tractors.

And so, again, nothing had succeeded like success. Material advantage is the solvent of hate. It is also the tutor of ignorance. As Dr. Lovenstein shows, our first condemnations of the Soviet Union were based on slender knowledge. One might expect the pen of columnist or financial editor to be dipped in the ink of American complacency, but the small number of serious, competent analyses appearing in our professional economic journals prompts more surprise and regret. There were notable exceptions, underscored by the author, in which American scholars—in several instances, distinguished women who found their economics in people rather than in prejudices—recognized the greatest development since the Industrial Revolution.

From the day when reports of Bolshevik feet wrapped in jute bagging for want of shoe leather promised imminent collapse of a reck-

AMERICAN OPINION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

less experiment to the time that a democratic-capitalist world trembled more than it fumed at a Nazi-Communist trade pact, is a far cry indeed. Pictures of Russian children with distended abdomens (ironic proof of starvation) have faded, to leave us with the sober suspicion that the choice of the Kremlin in the present war may be decisive in history.

The writer of this introduction has been privileged to see the present study in its inception and progress. Dr. Lovenstein has mastered difficulties. Not the least of these was the objection of friends at the outset that accounts of mass opinion had gone out of fashion with scholars—for good reasons. How reach quantitative measure where so much is ignorance, passion, propaganda? How apply a yardstick to an image, composite by definition, refracted through rays laden with the dust of distance, a language as alien as the hieroglyphs, and American pre-occupation so very opposite to that of Russia? But Dr. Lovenstein could not be balked in trying to picture the reaction of America, with the most declarative capitalism, to another great country launched upon collectivism. The duration of two decades worked in his favor, witnessing as this span did the rapid changes both there and here. The lapse of time furnished its own means of comparison if not of measurement.

Dr. Lovenstein recognized the similarities between the Soviet Union and the United States which did something to build bridges between. We too, began with revolution, we, too, have been possessed by ideals, and the Yankee affinity for the machine is matched by Russia's craving for dynamo, cog, and ball-bearing. The two are young countries, each with belief in its meaning for the world.

The author's talents were equal to his vexations, as the text abundantly shows. Within the wide limits which he set, Dr. Lovenstein read practically everything written or published here about the Soviet Union. With justice as well as economy in summary, he has reduced much to little, and has contrived to let report upon report, from this angle and that, tell the story with minimum injection of his own interpretation. In order to see two sides of the shield, he taught himself Russian, and—a greater feat—learned to pronounce it without his native Virginia accent. Could there be better proof of lack of bias!

So this study is a chapter added to the greatest theme in human history, the entrance of a new cultural stream into the tide of accumulated practice and thought. Before Lenin men came to scoff and stayed to pray. The French Revolution elevated the political claims of the individual. Who shall say but what the Russian Revolution did as much to contribute the economic rights of man?

BROADUS MITCHELL

PREFACE

ON June 22, 1941, the Second World War thrust Soviet Russia upon the side of the democracies and subjected the American people to the impact of another tremendous shock. Far-reaching in its significance and unexpected in its nature, the event introduced a new and strange equation into our minds. Never adequately informed about Soviet Russia, American public opinion was completely unprepared for so sharp a reversal of direction.

The question of public opinion is, of course, a matter of deep concern to those who are loyal to the democratic process. For while a free public opinion is the heart of democracy, an intelligent and informed opinion is its brain. Using the approach of an economist cognizant of the influence of public opinion, I have endeavored to ascertain the nature and quality of the information which forms the basis of our opinions concerning Soviet Russia—the great enigma of the present war.

Let me emphasize that I have always been most guarded in my judgments of Russia. Objectivity is a constant struggle and, like many others who have pursued it, I have endeavored to avoid both the acceptance or the denial of anything either romantically or with prejudice. However, I should like to point out that although I am deeply interested in Russia's planned economy, I wish to see it developed under the tradition of democratic principles we practice and enjoy in America.

Soviet Russia has, of course, afforded an excellent opportunity to watch economic laws operating through new and different institutions. Here was much to study and learn. Major Socialist principles were being put to the test for the first time. The New Economic Policy, for example, offered valuable knowledge in the politics and strategy of a changing society. Planned production, as exemplified by the several five-year plans, presented unique ideas as to techniques of developing a new state.

The United States was the first nation to extend recognition to the Russian Provisional Government—doing so seven days after its establishment in February, 1917. But on October 25, 1917, the Provisional Government was supplanted by the Soviet regime. Not until sixteen years later did the United States formally recognize the U.S.S.R. The period between the first and second recognitions thus forms an in-

teresting period in which to observe American opinions about Soviet Russia. This study seeks: (1) to show that opinion did shift from 1917 to 1933; (2) to describe the content of this opinion and the nature of the shift; (3) to characterize, both as to quantity and quality, the sources in which the opinion appeared; (4) to draw some conclusions concerning the quality of the opinion as a whole; (5) to test these conclusions by applying them to a recent event—the Nazi-Soviet pact—to see whether the study of the opinion from 1917 to 1933 can aid in judging the probable nature of American opinion on Soviet Russia; and (6) to offer a few suggestions for improving the quality of such opinion.

What this study is obligated to consider is not whether American opinion of Soviet Russia has been right or wrong. That is not the real problem. The words "right" and "wrong" indicate a simple judgment based upon objective truth otherwise determined. The value of a study such as this depends upon its appraisal of that complicated state of mind called opinion in order to perceive the degree of care with which evaluations are weighed, the measure of consciousness in which connotations are absorbed, the grade of awareness by which implications are accepted. In brief, the effort is not to characterize opinion as right or wrong, but to appraise its quality as good or bad.

It is not a difficult task to perform. The standard is that which distinguishes all competent thinking: the judicious and ample consideration of all factors—if not without emotion, at least with equanimity. A careful reader can readily detect the propaganda tricks of omission and commission. But even more important is the possession of insight into economic institutions. And it must be remembered that most discussion of Russia has suffered the same inadequacies that afflict consideration of our own institutions and problems.

Entirely apart from the current opinions about Russia's pact with Germany, three periods are analyzed in some detail: 1917-1921, 1921-1929, 1929-1933. Opinions do not, of course, shift completely at the end-years of each of these periods. There is no sudden change, for example, from a violent disapproval to an enthusiastic accord. Only in the sense of a prevailing opinion can one period be considered to contain a different attitude from another. In each of these periods, however, the United States and Soviet Russia are to be compared or differentiated through some definite central idea or mood: from 1917 to 1921, through war and its repercussions; from 1921 to 1929, through the optimistic, expansive activity in the United States, and in Russia the apparent moderation of economic control under the New Economic Policy; and lastly, from 1929 to 1933, the doldrums of depression in the United States as against the vigor of the first Five Year Plan.

The material in this study has been gathered from the major sources of information: magazines, books, newspapers, Congressional hearings, and governmental pronouncements. For the practical sake of clear-cut distinctions, the following magazine groupings have been made: labor organs, business and financial magazines, trade periodicals, economic magazines, learned journals, and general magazines. After each type of publication is treated, there is given a brief summary and comment. There is also a broad summary and inclusive comment on each class in Part IV. At the end of Parts I, II, and III, there is a recapitulation of the opinion of the respective period involved.

Of the mass of books published in English, one hundred volumes were chosen because, with few exceptions, they were by American authors, had a wide appeal, and covered economic conditions. To keep the study strictly within the limits of American opinion, British books and magazines, as well as those published in foreign languages, were excluded even though they may have contributed to American opinion.

Newspapers necessarily present a perplexing problem in an examination of opinion. It has been deemed sufficient for the purposes of this study to show how they have reflected American opinion. Congressional hearings and executive pronouncements presented an interesting problem. Are they cause or effect? Apparently they are both, and since they definitely constitute a channel of opinion, pertinent brief summaries have been included.

Variety has been assured by examining every major type of publication. Adequate sampling was achieved by reading thoroughly the files of each type of publication until the writer felt certain his sample was a just representation. It should be noted that opinion of the extreme left has been omitted not only because its content is obvious, but also because it represents so small a part of total American opinion. Thus, with the exceptions of the stalwartly liberal *Nation* and *New Republic*, the information recorded is drawn from sources which can be generally described as conservative.

I want to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Broadus Mitchell of Occidental College, who first suggested to me the subject of this study and whose kindness and intelligent criticism has been most encouraging. I am much indebted to my brother, Harold A. Lovenstein, for proofreading the entire manuscript and for invaluable suggestions. To Marius Maken, editorial director of the American Council on Public Affairs, I am grateful for invaluable editorial assistance.

MENO LOVENSTEIN

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Part One

WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

1917 - 1921

I: LABOR ORGANS

FOR A LARGE number of people, Soviet Russia represents primarily the outcome of a struggle between "the workers" and "business." In view of this, it is important to know what American workers and business men think of events in Russia.

American labor cannot, of course, be viewed as a single entity. The official position of the American Federation of Labor has been, for example, quite different from that of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. It might be fruitful to make a thorough survey of American labor sentiment regarding Russia, but that is beyond the scope of this work. A summary of the opinion of major labor groups is sufficiently representative for the purposes of this study.

The majority of organized workers in the United States from 1917 to 1933 were members of the American Federation of Labor. Their position expressed in the organization's official organ, the *American Federationist*, in numerous editorials by Samuel Gompers, Matthew Woll, and other leaders, was enthusiastically favorable to the Provisional Government but intensely and consistently hostile to the Bolsheviks. Samuel Gompers hailed the Provisional Government as "The Dawn of Russia's Freedom," and rejoiced in the opportunity which had now come to men who had fought for liberty and democracy.¹ Also writing in the *Federationist*, Gertrude Barnum was careful to note that President Wilson's Committee to Russia, headed by Elihu Root, had been appointed to share with the leaders of the new republic the experiences of the United States and was sent "rather to the Russian people than to the Russian government."² Gompers feared that in their new freedom the Russian people might give ear to those "who would align the newly born republic with the genius of autocracy."³ Moreover, it was explained that while conditions at the time

tended to excesses they were a natural result of new freedom. Gompers compared Russia's travails to those of America's formative years: "There were blunders; there were internal conflicts; there was refusal to recognize the federal government; there was sectional organization, and separatist theories of taxation which often resulted in riots and bloodshed."⁷

The increasing importance of the Bolsheviks was first discussed in the *Federationist* by A. J. Sack, Director of the Russian Information Bureau in the United States. He described the Bolshevik position as "a pure expression of anarchistic ideology." It was his contention that years of misrule had resulted in so much economic disorganization that Lenin's offer of immediate peace and his demand for dictatorship by the laboring class was bound to appeal sharply to the Russian masses. Sack believed the Provisional Government would be strong enough to stave off the Bolsheviks and that the clash, were it to come, would only serve to strengthen both Russian and world democracy.⁸

Gompers continued to express confidence that the Russian people would stand by the Allies. Urging support of the democracies, he issued such open letters as: "To the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council of Delegates" (Nov., 1917), "To the Workers—the People of Russia," (Nov., 1917), "To the Russian People," (April, 1918).⁹ He insisted that the United States aid in rebuilding Russia's industrial and commercial life through the export of capital. Thus rallied, he declared, Russia would come back into the struggle for freedom with a truer realization of the meaning of that struggle.¹⁰ Even after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, continuous appeals to the Russian people and insistence on aid for them were made in the belief that the Bolsheviks would not be able to maintain power for long.

The *Federationist* never abated its hostility to Bolshevism. Gompers cried out against the alliance between the French Socialists and the Bolsheviks, claiming that the latter endangered the achievements of the democratic revolutions of France and England. In his opinion, the alliance would set French labor back many years and perhaps wreck the League of Nations.¹¹ Charging that American employers were using Bolshevik methods against the workers here, Matthew Woll asserted that the American trade union movement was "opposed alike to Bolshevism among employers as well as employees."¹² The *Federationist* of March, 1919 pointed out that "It is not improbable that this country will have its labor troubles, but it is improbable that this will take the form of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.¹³"

In its convention of June, 1919 the American Federation of Labor overwhelmingly refused to endorse Russia's Soviet Government or, for that matter, "any other form of government in that country until the peoples of Russia, through a constituent or other form of national elections, shall have established a truly democratic form of government."³³ Gompers felt confident that if there had been a well-organized trade union movement in Russia, there never would have been a Bolshevik victory.³⁴ Moreover, in replying to the plea that judgment be suspended because so little was known about Russia, Gompers, quoting a list of Russian sources concerning economic chaos and violence under Bolshevism exclaimed:

We know about Russia. We know about Bolshevism. We know the piteous story of cruelty and intolerance and we know the autocratic concept that underlies the minority dictatorship which is hailed to the world by its dupes and advocates as the most perfect state of society yet devised. We know about it and we condemn it completely, finally and for all time . . . What a wonderful vision of freedom, justice, and humanity is portrayed in the above picture of Russian Sovietism. Who among the anti-Americans, the pro-Soviets and the "intellectual" Soviet apologists would not wish to rear a similar structure in the Republic of the United States.³⁵

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers' official publication, *Advance*, hailed the Provisional Government but it differed from the beginning with Gompers and other Federation leaders in its attitude to the Bolsheviks.³⁶ *Advance* admitted that conditions in Russia were "sad, indeed," but insisted that not enough was known to warrant condemnation. The publication advised critics to be patient.³⁷ In 1920 it editorially hit Gompers and other Federation leaders because the American Federation of Labor's annual convention had refused to go on record against the American blockade of Russia. *Advance* pointedly remarked that the blockade was shortly afterwards lifted despite the convention's silence. It took occasion to state that the United States had tried to crush Russia but the Bolsheviks had overcome all opposition.³⁸

Justice, the official publication of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, occupied a position between that of the American Federation of Labor and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. It regarded Bolshevism as a scourge but it thought the term was chiefly used in America to break up labor's progress.³⁹ It felt that the struggle between Russia and the Allies represented the struggle between capital and labor.⁴⁰ In an effort to show that intervention was unprofitable, *Justice* used an argument calculated to impress businessmen when it impatiently asked whether the United States would allow others to get Russia's business.⁴¹ Attack-

ing Gompers and those who claimed that the workers in Russia were slaves, *Justice* declared, "The fact that the question whether the unions are to absorb the state or whether the state is to swallow the unions is so vehemently discussed at present in Russia, shows so strikingly what a dazzling height of power the unions have reached there. No wonder they are determined to bear so bravely all the misery that has fallen to their lot."²²

The organ of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the *Locomotive Engineers' Journal*, which rarely concerned itself with Soviet affairs, made this editorial comment in its January, 1919, issue:

In Russia, the Bolsheviks are repeating history, both in the beginning and the end. They dethrone autocracy and substitute for it the denial of the liberties of all classes. They kill, confiscate property without warrant of law, moral or written, and by their acts defend the principle that "Might is Right."²³

The magazine was against admitting Bolsheviki-minded persons into the United States and it approved of the action of the United Miners of America in barring Communists from membership.

Such, in short, was the opinion of labor toward Russia from 1917 to 1921. The American Federation of Labor was bitterly opposed to the Bolshevik Government. Although the Amalgamated Clothing Workers lamented conditions, they believed Russia's critics should be patient and favored lifting of the blockade. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union held a much milder position. It opposed Bolshevism but thought we should do business with Russia; it felt sympathetic to the extent that it believed Bolshevik Russia was basically an advance for labor. On the other hand, the *Locomotive Engineers' Journal* showed hardly any interest in Russian events although it did on one occasion express extreme distaste for Bolshevism. Generally speaking, American labor was either opposed to Bolshevism or sympathetic with qualifications. (The opinion of the extreme left in the labor movement, like other extreme left sentiment, is not treated in this study.)

II: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL MAGAZINES

SCATHING comments on early phases of Russian development was also forthcoming from business and financial publications. Some of these publications looked upon Russian labor conditions as merely typical of that country's industrial backwardness; other publications held up the plight of Soviet workers as a general warning to labor everywhere.

The *Annalist*, in a series of articles entitled "Russia, the Paradox of Nations," attempted to show the tremendous economic disorganization which had begun in Russia many years before the revolution, tracing the long process of the concentration of wealth, the tremendous growth of consolidation and monopoly, and the decreasing standard of living of the worker. The series concluded on this note:

The Russian industrial worker is a revolutionist through and through . . . Class struggle for him means no compromise but a battle to the bitter end. He will not be content with the revolution unless it is industrial as well as political, resulting not only in the overthrow of the Czar, but also in the overthrow of capital and of every other institution allied with it. That is Bolshevism.¹

Shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported that chaos had been caused by the demands of workers unable to support themselves adequately under existing conditions. It was stated that demands were made that wages be raised 100% to 150% during a period when output of manufactured products declined 40%. The problems of Russian manufacturers brought this comment from the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*: "An ironical feature of the difficulties confronting employers (was) the fact that though suffering serious loss, they (did) not dare to close the establishments owing to threats of bodily harm and material vengeance."² Such chaos roused the *Annalist*, in an article by Edward A. Bradford, to urge American labor to heed the Russian example and to declare that headstrong unionism would not only bring down capitalism but its own house would collapse about its head. Bradford pleaded for cooperation between labor and capital as the only sure means of civilized progress.³

Concurring with general opinion, Rodney Dean, writing in the *Bankers Magazine* in 1917, summarized the financial position of Russia as extremely weak. Income from the government railways and from taxation was very low, prohibition had taken away the vodka taxes, and the progressive income tax of 1917, because of business conditions, had yielded very little. Moreover, prices were

high because of a general shortage of supplies and there had been a slow depreciation of currency ever since 1893. Dean hoped that a deliberate devaluation was not contemplated and that the development of natural resources would restore the value of the currency.⁴ To some it was obvious that after the war immense reconstruction would be necessary and the United States could help with capital, brains, and foresight. Writing in the *Bankers Magazine* in 1918, A. O. Corbin, head of the foreign department of A. B. Leach & Company, pointed out that the Russian banks were centers of industrial life—that they were engaged in actual management as well as in banking operations. If, in his opinion, the United States cooperated it would be able to share the Russian market which Germany was anxiously waiting to exploit.⁵ On the other hand, Leo Pasvolzky, editor of *The Russian World*, declared in the pages of the *Annalist* in 1919 that the banks were helpless to stem financial chaos or to cooperate with business or government because the Bolsheviks had brought about inflation of the currency. He asserted that Soviet money, rendered worthless by excess printing, had inundated the money market and that commerce invariably dried up in territory occupied by the Bolsheviks during the civil wars but resumed activity the moment the Bolsheviks left.⁶

Meanwhile, Russia's finances showed an enormous and growing deficit. The worth of the ruble became a matter of speculation. The Allies allowed no exchange transactions with Soviet Russia and private trade reported offers of five to seven cents, the figure depending upon the varying degrees of faith entertained in the future of the Lenin-Trotsky regime. Although in 1919, according to a German report, the Russian government's income increased seven times and expenditures only three times over 1918 figures, there were still not enough funds for administrative expenses.⁷

While editorially questioning whether Germany was going the financial way of Soviet Russia, the *Annalist* quoted an unnamed defender of the revolution who asserted that the Bolsheviks deliberately encouraged the depreciation of their currency because they believed all money bad and to render it worthless a public service.⁸ In the *Bankers Magazine* of October, 1920, Paul Einzig, a British economist, contended that it was the intention of Bolshevism to remove banking from economic life because it tended to create a wealthy class.⁹

This gloomy picture of the financial situation in Russia, for the most part accurate, would have been far more adequate if an

attempt had been made to describe the government's financial difficulties under the stress of economic disorganization.

Writing in the *Bankers Magazine*, as early as October, 1917, A. J. Sack, Director of the Russian Information Bureau, voiced what became the constant theme of the war years and immediately afterwards when he declared that American capital needed Russia as a market. He pointed out that Russia had raw materials and could furnish hides, skins, and the full resources of her mines; she needed, in turn, machinery and technical supplies.¹⁰ Irving Narodny, vice-president of the Russian-American Asiatic Corporation, remarked in the *Journal of the American Bankers Association*, that one had only to await the end of the war to find in Russia a vast market for American products.¹¹ A month later Rodney Dean, representative of the National City Bank in Russia, enthusiastically greeted the "emancipation" effected by the Provisional Government and looked forward to an era of development offering great possibilities of trade with the United States.¹² "There is no question," the *Annalist* commented, "that business men share with bankers the hope and expectation that rejuvenated Russia will, with the end of the war, become a far greater factor in the American market than ever before."¹³ The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* in this connection called attention to a statement of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce revealing that there were 2,500 American firms interested in Russia.¹⁴

Shortly after the October Revolution, William C. Redfield, former Secretary of Commerce, averred in *Nation's Business*, that the Bolsheviki would fall and huge Russia would soon awaken anew. He asserted that it was just because economic cranks were running the government that the blockade should be removed; he believed the Soviet would be able to remain in power as long as the chaotic conditions imposed by the blockade served Bolshevik propaganda purposes.¹⁵

The Rumanian Minister to the United States, Martin Husso-bee, violently denounced the Bolsheviki, in *Printer's Ink*, saying they had no business morality and would try to cheat capitalists in every way possible.¹⁶ But B. F. Castle, of the foreign department of the Irving National Bank, contended in the *Annalist* that the Soviet Government had kept all of its treaties with the nations of the Baltic and that by her position and economic endowment was the key to the commerce of the Baltic States.¹⁷ Writing in the *Annalist* about a month later, another writer thought that the new Baltic States would be included in the democratic Russia which it was believed would ultimately follow the Soviet régime.¹⁸

American business men foresaw great possibilities of investment in Russia under the Provisional Government. "In the long run," said Rodney Dean in *Bankers Magazine*, "America's opportunity in Russia will be along the lines of investment of surplus capital in the various Russian industries."⁷⁸ Boris Bakhmeteff, Ambassador to the United States from the Provisional Government, informed the readers of *Nation's Business* that America was Russia's hope.⁷⁹

Addressing exporters in April, 1917, Boris E. Shatsky, a former professor of the University of Petrograd who had been sent here to establish a bureau of financial and commercial information, was equally polite: "I can assure America that its capital will receive the warmest welcome in Russia. We depend not only on it but also on American organizing genius."⁸⁰ A few months later C. H. Boynton, President of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, assured American business men that the Provisional Government would do all it could to make investments safe, would remove restrictions preventing the inflow of capital, and abolish burdensome royalties, taxes, and regulations.⁸¹

The *Annalist* periodically reported the fluctuations in the ruble and Russian bonds after the February Revolution. It noted a four point decline in two issues during the first week of May, 1917, and observed: "Bankers would give a great deal to know what is simmering behind the Russian borders." Towards the end of the month the United States loan to Russia of \$100 million caused the ruble to rise 1.6%. In July the ruble hit a new low of 22.85 cents; by September 10, 1917, it was down to 16½ cents. There was a complete absence of bids at the news of Kerensky's overthrow. Bonds dropped almost out of sight. Yet the *Annalist* stated that Petrograd dispatches indicating that the Bolshevik leaders planned to repudiate Russia's external debts failed to force the exchange backward. Bankers did not take the rumor seriously.⁸² The *Annalist* discussed at length the report that Russia was planning to repudiate her debts, and told of how France, then among the foremost of bondholding nations, had passed through a similar readjustment period which almost destroyed faith in government obligations. The magazine expressed the belief that Lenin and Trotsky would soon follow a sane course.⁸³

After the repudiation, feelings were quite unpleasant. According to *Bankers Magazine*, Prince George Lyoff, first Premier of the Provisional Government, speaking at a dinner in his honor sponsored by the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, appealed to the United States for help to crush the Bolsheviks so

that American capital, so long awaited, could come to Russia and aid in her reconstruction.⁸⁶ The whole difficulty, *Nation's Business* explained, was the existence of the Bolshevik Government. It was upsetting historic business traditions and turning things topsy-turvy. Russia's chances to get foreign capital depended completely upon the fall of the Bolsheviks.⁸⁷

Professor J. Y. Simpson, quoted in the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* of 1916, summarized the attitude towards Russia's economic status which prevailed before the war and on into the period of the Provisional Government. He expressed the opinion that Russia, awakened by the Russo-Japanese War and carried on by the impetus of the World War would reach new heights of economic development.⁸⁸

A few months after the establishment of the Provisional Government, the *Annalist* observed that the new republic was still paralyzed from past German economic domination and could not yet command her "unsurpassed resources."⁸⁹ However, the *Annalist* declared, "broken and economically helpless as she appears, the new Democracy stands forth as the only possible rebuilder of war-battered Europe, her timber lands exceeding those of any other European nation by millions of acres."⁹⁰ The magazine further noted that the attitude of Russia towards the war would have to depend upon the attitude of the peasants and their hunger for land. Excessive taxes and rent had driven them into debt, and unproductivity. The communal form of ownership known as the *mir* never gave them the feeling that the land was theirs and thus inspired no efforts towards a higher degree of cultivation. The promises of change under the Provisional Government gave the peasants new hope. The *Annalist* declared that it shared this hope, stating that "nothing but a decisive transition from the communal regime to a system of private ownership will ever release the productive energies of Russia's fertile soil."⁹¹

Reaction to the Soviet Government and its effect on economic progress, however, was overwhelmingly unfavorable. W. S. Kies, chairman of the board of the First Federal Foreign Banking Association, expressed a feeling which was not unusual when he declared in the *Annalist*, "The real facts concerning the Soviet misgovernment of Russia have been brought home to the workers of Europe through reports made by delegates who have visited Russia."⁹² A few weeks later, Prof. William E. Chancellor, writing in the *Annalist* on economic objections to government ownership, laid down a severe choice—that we must either limit ourselves to helping the states through taxes or turn to central control such as

that prevailing in Soviet Russia.³³ *Nation's Business* grimly stated that hunger had overthrown the Czar, had crushed Kerensky, and now "its lean legions (were advancing) against the mobs of Bolsheviki." Famine was the major problem and the Bolsheviki were not solving it.³⁴ More emphatic was the statement of Robert S. Binkerd, assistant to the chairman of the Association of Railway Executives, in the *Annalist*:

I believe the day will come when the disillusioned people of Europe will wake up to find that they have partially escaped from one tyranny only to fall into the toils of a tyranny stronger still. Europe is marching on the high road to producing the overweening State. From this point of view Bolshevik Russia is already an object lesson.³⁵

Manifestly, the few articles which appeared in the business and financial magazines were somewhat more analytical than those to be found in labor organs. The confusion in Russia's economic status was sharply, if sketchily, reported. In nearly every article the opinion was expressed that the democratic principles of the Provisional Government would reassert themselves, that the Soviet Government could not long survive.

III: TRADE PERIODICALS

A specialized approach might be expected from the trade journals: for example, discussions of a technical nature, production problems, industrial psychology in a new economy, factory organization, the handling of raw materials, methods of coordination, etc. Actually the opinion expressed by the trade journals was practically identical in content and attitude to that of the business and financial magazines. A few did discuss the technical organization of factories and the industrial plans of Soviet Russia but they did so without any appreciation of the significant differences in the basic institutions.

Early in 1917, *Iron Age*, expressed an opinion characteristic of that of similar publications, when it spoke of Russia as the most promising after-the-war market for American products.¹ In the same magazine a month later, D. L. Hough suggested that Russia would buy from the United States such merchandise as cotton goods, agricultural and roadmaking equipment, special machinery for manufacturing clothing, and even foodstuffs. Hough prophesied

that a considerable amount of skilled labor would have to be imported.⁶ An article in *Electrical World* of the same month advised that preparation was needed for Russian trade and suggested the establishment of trade agencies.⁸ Several months later *Industrial Management* pointed out that 1913 import figures for Russia totaled \$630 millions.⁴ *Railway Age* reported that Russia wanted 2,000 locomotives from the United States.⁵ *Machinery* expressed concern because the United States machine tool industry developed during the war would have to compete with Germany for Russian business.⁶ The October Revolution darkened considerably the outlook for trade. George H. Brigham, a representative of the Jones and Lamson engineering firm, who had been in Russia during the revolution, warned in *Machinery* that the future of the machine tool industry there was imperiled by radical trends.⁷ Writing in *Iron Age* D. L. Hough felt that the Soviet Government was hindering production and foreign trade.⁸

But the great needs of Russia were always a more prominent theme than the existing chaos. Sterling H. Bunnell, chief engineer of R. Martens & Company, outlined, in *Engineering News*, the tremendous need for municipal improvements.⁹ Six weeks later he told the readers of the *American Machinist* that the products "required to refit the population of 170 millions will tax our utmost production for several years to come." An editorial in the same issue warned that we should not allow our opinions of Soviet institutions bring about a severance of relations with Russia and the loss of a great opportunity.¹⁰

Occasionally, sympathetic material crept into print. For example, in an article in the *Textile World* the secretary to the United States Representative of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, noted that the frequently predicted fall of the Bolsheviks had not taken place and pointed out that "The nationalization of industry and commerce in Russia, whatever one may think about it politically, presents inviting features to a foreign exporter, inasmuch as in selling to the Russian Government as the sole purchasing agent of Russia, the necessity and the cost of finding individual purchasers in Russia is eliminated."¹¹

In the early part of 1920, *Iron Age* frequently commented on the lifting of restrictions against trade with Russia. It reported that leading American machinery exporters had been instrumental in extending trade with Russia.¹² An editorial observed that an organization of business men with trade interests in Russia had forced the hand of the United States Government.¹³ However, the magazine also declared that Russian economic conditions promised

little trade," and much risk and difficulty."

What did the trade journals think of Russia's resources?

In an article based upon Russian sources, Eugene M. Kayden reviewed in *Engineering and Mining* the status and history of all the major Soviet oil fields. He recorded that a decline in production had set in by the second half of 1917, that this decline reached its depth in 1918 when boring activities ceased because of a shortage of money and provisions, and that 1919 saw considerable improvement." A. Beeby Thompson, a British geologist, noted in the *National Petroleum News* that civil disturbances were causing the world's richest oil fields to be neglected."

The status of iron and steel in Russia was given a gloomy summary. *Iron Age* placed the cause of the decline in production on the lack of discipline and stated that normalcy would only be possible if social order were restored, ("and it is admittedly a large 'if,'") and a strong government emerged." Two years after Keren-sky's downfall, an article in *Mining and Scientific Press* told of chaotic conditions as the Soviet leaders seized power—of men forced to work mines, of managers being arrested and forced to work." J. P. Hutchins, also writing in *Engineering and Mining*, saw no hope except to have Americans return to run the smelting plants." An article by Oswald F. Schuette in *Iron Age* spoke of the ruin of the metal industries. Quoting figures from the report of the special mission sent by the International Labor Office to Russia to find out the effect of Bolshevism on industry, Schuette stated that there was almost a complete collapse of the metallurgical industry and that locomotive labor costs had risen 1300%."

Before the October uprising, M. A. Oudin, manager of the foreign department of the General Electric Company declared in the *Electrical World* that he foresaw a great market in Russia for electrical equipment," and after Lenin came to power V. V. Tschikoff, a California consulting civil engineer, described in the May 29, 1919 *Engineering News*, the water-power possibilities at the Dnieper River Rapids. 'He believed the hydraulic and canalization project, which had been interrupted by the war, could, with the erection of four dams and power plants, give about 600,000 horsepower normally."

Some speculation on the causes of Russia's industrial chaos was made in the trade journals. Sterling H. Bunnell noted in *Iron Age* that men taken from the farm to work in factories during the war caused a great food shortage, resulting in much disorder." Moreover, he observed that the revolutionary spirit made it impossible to maintain discipline among the workers and that

concessions to their demands ended in a decline of production and a rise in prices." The *American Machinist* agreed with this analysis, pointing out that the exorbitant demands of the workers, the high cost of raw materials, the decline of effective demand, and terrorization by workers and revolutionaries were robbing industry of every desire to continue manufacturing." *Engineering & Mining* was certain that the "absurd anarchists and traitors" would soon be put in their place." Later it commented on Russian conditions in highly unfavorable terms." Writing in *Mining and Metallurgy*, Walter G. Perkins, designer and builder of the Slepcoe and Kyshlim smelters in the Ural region, said that only the Russian type of cooperation could resolve the differences of capital and labor. To him Bolshevism was a tragic failure, the peasant was being crushed by an "idealistic despotism." The *American Machinist* observed that the Bolsheviki could not solve vital transport problems and that goods could not be distributed."

It can be seen that the trade journals expressed opinions that were almost identical with those of the business and financial magazines. These journals saw a chaotic Russia, needing everything, rich in natural resources, poor in industrial technique, and thwarted by a government whose future was unpredictable. One might have expected a somewhat more technical interest in specific problems, and some consideration of economic matters. If anything, there was a shade more despair in trade journals than in the business and financial organs.

IV: ECONOMIC MAGAZINES

To find an opinion of an economic nature concerning the economic upheaval in Russia one naturally turns to the more or less official organs of economic opinion. And one naturally expects to find a good deal of material in these publications because of the tremendous importance, for good or for ill, of Russia's efforts to reorganize its institutions around a new and revolutionary set of principles.

But in turning to the major economic magazines—the *American Economic Review*, the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* and the *Journal of Political Economy*, it is astonishing to find that from

1917 to 1921 these journals carried only one article on Russia—a short note by Amy Hewes reviewing a report of the International Labor Office on labor conditions in Soviet Russia.¹ A year prior to the February Revolution, the *American Economic Review* contained an article by Richard T. Ely entitled, "Russian Land Reform."² Since these articles are excellent examples of the kind of comment which ought to have been forthcoming in greater quantity, they are summarized here at length.

Ely contended that Americans did not realize what a land problem was since they had begun their separate existence at a favorable period in agrarian history. Our agricultural life was, said Ely, so simple that the land laws of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sufficed for our needs. A typical example of our naivete was our conception of the word farm. To the American it meant a single enclosed piece of land adequate in area to support a family—in brief, an economic holding. Nowhere else in the world would this definition hold true. To millions of Russians, Germans and Irishmen, the word meant long and narrow strips of land intermingled with strips belonging to another, strips often a hundred times longer than broad and often so small the average area hardly exceeded an acre. Moreover, the word connoted the vast number of obstacles in the way of good farming, strips difficult to reach, the working of the fields in common, the difficulties of differentiation and improvement in culture.

K. A. Wieth-Knudsen, whose work Ely was reviewing, discussed in detail the land changes in Russia, and Ely himself gave a full summary of the important aspects of these developments. For example, he depicted the breaking up of the *mir* or commune (*obstchina*) under the *ukase* of November 9, 1906, and the law of May 29, 1911. The word enclosure gave the impression that land was actually fenced in, although enclosure often took place without it. The German terms used by Wieth-Knudsen, said Ely, were more accurate—*Auseinandersetzung und Verkoppelung*, separating and putting together. Wieth-Knudsen described conditions prior to enclosure in the village Pogost. Scattered and intermingled strips made excellent agriculture impossible. After enclosure the plan had been simplified but the villagers still had to go some distance to reach their land. Ely predicted that this breakdown of the *mir* would have considerable effect on the Russians. Designed to save the country from "The pauperization and the proletarian disasters that threaten the rest of the world," the breakdown not only ended the hopes which were entertained for a solution of agricultural difficulties but, more important, destroyed the *mir* as

a small republic in which Russians learned self-government. The *mir* had been regarded both politically and economically as the peculiarly Russian institution which would be the salvation of the country.

The effects of the collapse of the *mir* on urban development were remarkable. Here the economic development of Russia was following that of England, Ireland, and Germany, all older than Russia in their economic life. The changes wrought were tremendous, so much so that Ely planned a survey trip along the German and Russian frontier in East Prussia. He believed that much could be learned that would be instructive to an American economist, though he failed to say precisely in what way. Involved in the break-up of the *mir* were the multiple attempts to solve the problems of the emancipated serfs, including assignments of lands and state credit for the purchasing of lands through long-time loans. Following the *ukase* of 1906, the principle of individual property and cultivation prevailed, followed by many measures designed to enable the peasants to become independent, successful farmers. "It is difficult to think of any measure, which has been suggested in this country, which has not been tried and is not now being tried in Russia." Ely cited state credit, peasant banks, agricultural commissions and lands of large proprietors and nobles bought for peasants. Nevertheless, it remained impossible for the peasant to secure an adequate standard of living.

The result was a division of the peasants into two classes—a strong, land-owning class of farmers, and a class of peasants economically deteriorating into the proletariat. Some of the latter peasants emigrated to the city, others went to Siberia. The migrations to the city could have been industrially beneficial and those to Siberia of other economic advantage—had Russian agriculture and industry been able to absorb the emigrants. As it was, great discontent prevailed everywhere and even uprisings occurred.

The *mir* still occupied the peasants' minds as a solution to their ills. They wanted to confiscate the lands of the large proprietors and nobles. Wieth-Knudsen found this solution reactionary, saying that the next step should be forward not backward. The crux of the problem, Ely believed, was that corresponding changes in human nature had not kept pace with economic changes. The peasant was not ready for the change from nature economy to money economy. He did not understand the money economy. He did not realize the import of selling his land and laws had to be passed to prevent excessive partition of the soil. The

problem was the converse of that in America, where efforts were made to prevent excessive large holdings, not small holdings.

Little accurate information existed about Russian land problems, and while Wieth-Knudsen spoke with authority, Ely felt he was too optimistic about the progress then being made. An upward movement was apparent and if fostered by modern measures and education, might lead to real improvement. The war would, of course, disturb the progress of land reform. The solution lay in intelligent reforms bringing more land to the peasant, in education both general and technical, in more capital to enable industries to absorb the landless peasants, and in increasing provincial autonomy. Wieth-Knudsen believed, and from the long quotation Ely gives we may assume he concurred, that the period was witnessing an awakening of the Russian colossus and that it was "the beginnings of a powerful movement of the centre of gravity of the European economic system toward the East."

In her short note in the *Journal of Political Economy*, Amy Hewes reviewed a four hundred page report prepared by the International Labor Office in an attempt to present, free from all prejudice and political consideration, evidence concerning labor conditions in Russia.* The report was based upon information available in western Europe since it was impracticable to investigate in Russia until peace was declared. Miss Hewes briefly summarized some of the leading economic factors: compulsory work, unemployment, the length of the working day, etc.

On coming into power, the Bolsheviki enacted a large amount of legislation resulting in an intense regulation of business. The immediate need was increased production, which led to compulsory labor, a phase often discussed in regard to labor conditions in Soviet Russia. To European trade unions, the abrogation of the right to strike has been especially unacceptable. At first generally stated in the Russian Constitution of July 10, 1918, under the motto of "He who does not work will not eat," the Bolshevik attitude toward labor soon became "Human labor is the property of the State."

Articles two and three of the Russian Labor Code of 1919 listed a few permanent exemptions from compulsory labor: persons under sixteen or over fifty and those disabled by accident or illness. Temporary exemptions were granted to those who were ill and to pregnant women. "Persons subject to compulsory labor have the right to apply their labor in accordance with their specialty

... but if this class of work is not available . . . must accept the work offered."

The Government, sole organizer of industrial life, laid claim to the absolute control of economic forces and, of course, of labor. Trotsky was quoted in support of the militarization of labor when he said, in effect: until education had trained the people to regard labor as habitual and necessary, coercion—that is, the armed forces of the State—must be employed. The extent of application of this theory was not known. At first it seemed to have been confined to the important industries: lumber and transportation of fuel and military supplies. The work done by the first labor army was said to have been extraordinary. Four of Trotsky's six armies were turned into labor armies. Though penalties were imposed and discipline strictly exacted in theory, it was impossible to say to what extent they actually existed, nor were the relations between the directing commission in charge and the unions known.

Unemployment ceases to exist when labor becomes compulsory, but refusals to work became increasingly numerous so laws were passed denying the right to refuse work. Harvest and food transport work became obligatory regardless of the particular trade of the workers. Penalties, including monetary fines and abrogation of the right of registration in a labor exchange, were imposed. Unemployment funds were established by contributions from employers paying a minimum of three percent of wages. Daily payments equal in amount to wages were to be made provided that unemployment lasted longer than three days. This practice was continued afterwards even in nationalized industries. Here again the extent of application and its effects were not definitely known. While the eight-hour day was adopted in general principle by the 1919 Labor Code, practically all the provisions regarding overtime and suspension of work could be set aside until the end of the hostilities of the period. This was determined by the will of the workers in the particular undertaking and their trade unions. Caprice dictated much irregularity. Under the necessity of increasing production the government experimented with several methods of increasing the amount of labor expended. Voluntary work on Saturday and even Sunday was inaugurated. Vague reports indicated that voluntary work was of a different nature than ordinary work and was undertaken "to assist the nation."

Although women were stimulated to work by offering them the same wages as men for work of equal quality and quantity, there were more restrictions for women than men. Women could

not work overtime or at night and were exempt from compulsory labor eight weeks before and after confinement. Children under fourteen could not be employed; those under sixteen not more than four hours a day; those under eighteen not more than six hours a day. Children under sixteen could not be employed at night or at compulsory labor. But war conditions caused the removal, temporarily, of these restrictions.

The problem of wages was a trying one. A decree fixing a basis for wage scales was published by the Supreme Council of Popular Economy on December 19, 1917. The basis considered as factors, the cost of living, the professional ability of the wage-earner, the danger incurred, and general economic conditions. Since these elements varied in different parts of the country, a commission with representatives from the central professional organizations was set up to determine regional and fundamental rates. Later, the trade unions or the Soviet Central Executive Committee worked out an arrangement which the Commissariat of Labor confirmed. Payment was generally on a time-basis but piece-work also existed. The latter type of work was approved when it was found "expedient to employ this system in the interests of normal production and (when found) technically possible." The remuneration for piece-work was determined by the calculation of the daily tariff rates divided by the quantity of pieces constituting the standard production.

The position of the trade unions was the least clearly reported. After the Bolshevik Revolution unions became very lively and by January, 1918, represented four million workers. They were to send representatives to the Supreme Council of National Economy and to other governing bodies. Their function was both political (soviets) and economic (administration and management of factories and regulation of working conditions). Their organization was industrial in form. The fifty all-Russian unions were united in the Russian Central Council of Trade Unions. On the issue of nationalization sharp differences existed between Bolshevik sympathisers and the Mensheviks and Monarchist Syndicalists.

By 1919, 90% of the industries of the country had been nationalized. The Supreme Council of Popular Economy was the absolute authority for the regulation of economic life, subordinate only to the Council of People's Commissars. Election to the Supreme Council was from trade unions and local Councils of Popular Economy. In each factory a director and a manager were appointed by the Supreme Council of Popular Economy. The manager was in turn assisted by representatives of workers,

employers, the technical and commercial staff, the director, the local trade union, the worker's cooperative, and the Council of Peasant Delegates. Representatives of workers and employees could not exceed one-half of the total number on the councils. Practically nothing was known of the actual working of this organization.

The present demoralization of Russian industry is generally admitted. Those hostile to the Soviet System attribute this in large part to nationalization and the hasty and badly organized methods by which it has been carried out. The Bolsheviks "ascribe the catastrophe to causes wholly unconnected with nationalization." In their opinion these causes are the inheritance of five years of war, the Civil War instigated by the Allies, the demobilization of industry, and the blockade. The report states "that in the present state of documentary evidence, it is almost impossible to express a definite opinion on this question."

Certain large ideas were apparent: that the workers in one industry could by favoring themselves harm the community as a whole, that centralized control must replace local control, that the talents of individuals and specialists must be differentially rewarded, and that, as Lenin said in *Soviets at Work*, "Every reasonable man must agree that we cannot free ourselves of the evils of capitalism at one stroke."

Clearly, the economic data and opinions presented in the *American Economic Review*, the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, and the *Journal of Political Economy* were quite meager. Moreover, their only articles—the two just cited—had the characteristic failing of other "fair and full reports." By not consciously and clearly emphasizing the facts, they left the impression that events in Russia represented only intenser reforms and not that the intensity and thoroughness possibly constituted a new economy.

V: LEARNED JOURNALS

LET us now consider those miscellaneous magazines which, for want of a better title, can be called learned journals—i. e., magazines enjoying prestige as sources of authentic and authoritative statements and addressed to a public of assumed scholarly, reflective, or even impartial interest in world affairs. The most important of these magazines are the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*,

Foreign Affairs, the *Yale Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly*, and, in view of its peculiar position as a scholarly and yet popular chronicler of events, *Current History*. If the last mentioned publication is excepted, these magazines were on the whole almost as inadequate in their coverage of events in Russia in the years 1917-1921 as were the economic journals.

The Provisional Government was welcomed although (as in the case of the *North American Review*), only by reason of a vague approval of democracy.¹ Beginning in June, 1917, the *North American Review* was consistently hostile in its attitude. Its issue of that date contained an article by Charles Johnston explaining the first Revolution as the work of German agents.² In July he derived some comfort from the arrival in Moscow of the American Commission,³ and in September he urged that the United States be careful to encourage the "right" party.⁴ He believed that Russia needed a constitutional monarchy headed by a Romanoff.⁵ His antipathy toward Socialism and the Bolsheviki was violent and unceasing⁶ and he heartily endorsed American intervention.⁷ In the *North American Review* of August, 1919, Baron Rosen, former Russian Ambassador to the United States, added his approval to American intervention and urged that the nations of the world to unite and crush the Bolsheviki through force.⁸ Likewise in this magazine, Oliver M. Sayler urged the United States to crush the elements supporting Bolshevism but not the Soviets (by which he meant the workers' and peasants' councils). Sayler admitted that the Bolsheviki had enacted promised reforms and that no other domestic political group could defeat them.⁹ In none of these articles was there any attempt to analyze the philosophy of Bolshevism.

The only other source of comment of any consequence (excepting of course, *Current History*) was the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. In July, 1919, that journal contained a series of articles under the general heading "The Present and Future of Russia." (The volume in which they appeared was dedicated to the consideration of international reconstruction.) Prior to this series there had been but two articles in the *Annals*, one, a year before the October Revolution, the other in 1918. The former, written by Samuel McRoberts, vice president of the National City Bank, expressed the view that Russia was breaking away from community ownership and Socialist doctrines.¹⁰ The other article was by Boris Bakhmeteff, Ambassador to the United States from the Provisional Government. Bakhmeteff's opinions—published, ironically, in January, 1918—assured Americans that democracy was triumphing in Russia and that she would settle into "firm forms of democratic commonwealth," with great promise of economic development.¹¹

The series already alluded to followed the usual practice of the *Annals* in presenting various viewpoints, although there was on the whole

considerable judgment against the Bolsheviks indicated by the reservations of those who were even somewhat favorable in their attitude toward Russia. In his article, R. N. Story, a member of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association, stated that Bolshevism was not representative of the mild and patient character of the Russian people—though, with some contradiction, he believed the revolutionary bend would distinguish the future. Like other observers, he had faith in the Soviets, (i.e., the councils of workers and peasants) because struggle had taught the people cooperation.³² Considerably less calm was W. C. Huntington, formerly a Commercial Attache of the American Embassy at Petrograd and, at the time of his writing, in charge of the Russian Division of the United States Department of Commerce. To him events could best be described under the heading "The Russian Tragedy." Bolshevism was to him the result of Russia's complete lack of training in democracy; although fashioned by the mentality of the proletariat it was led by an intelligentsia which would inevitably fall because "Bolshevism is immoral in theory and an utter failure in practice."³³ In an article entitled the "Menace of Bolshevism" Baron Rosen insisted that there simply were not enough good things on earth to go around.³⁴ A. J. Sack likewise turned against the Bolsheviks, his chief criticism being that they were undemocratic because they did not permit a Constituent assembly.³⁵

There were those contributors to the *Annals* who, with different emphasis, defended the Bolsheviks. Santeri Nuorteva, Secretary of the Representative in the United States of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, contended that Kerensky could not handle Russia's basic problems.³⁶ M. J. Olgin, later a leading Communist in the United States, pointed out that the leadership of the Russian intelligentsia had been displaced by that of the average worker.³⁷

Of those participating in the discussion of Russia in the *Annals* who were somewhat favorable in their views of the Bolsheviks, two were members of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia. They were Thomas D. Thacher and Raymond Robins. Thacher believed the power of the Bolsheviks was increasing but that Bolshevism itself was on the wane. He thought the blockade had made it easy for the Bolsheviks to place on the Allies the blame for internal difficulties. Left alone, the absurdity of the Bolshevik position would become apparent to the people; moreover, if aided by American brains and capital, Bolshevism would either turn into democratic channels or pass away.³⁸ Robins drove a harder point. "The Russian Revolution," he contended, "was the first fundamental economic revolution in the history of the world and the forces that sprung from it will be challenging the world, particularly the western nations, for years to come." Nevertheless he regarded the formulas of

Trotsky and Lenin "as economically impossible and morally wrong." His proposals were quite liberal: to lift the embargo at once, declare an armistice on all fronts and leave American troops to enforce it, reorganize the railroads, send relief, and appoint a commission to study how social peace could be procured and economic reorganization effected. By so doing, America would in his opinion find recompense in Russia as a great market for consumers' goods.^{17b}

Thus nearly all of the articles in the learned magazines reacted to Bolshevism not by evaluation but by explanations of its causes, cures, pitfalls, etc. For a more adequate description of what was happening in Russia, one must turn to *Current History*. Although this magazine had its frailty (the sum total of its so-called impartial reporting left much to be desired), it did present the conservative side with something less than absolute blindness.

Before the February Revolution, Isaac Don Levine told the readers of *Current History* of starvation, misgovernment and political chaos.¹⁸ The turmoil of the February Revolution was fully reported, as was the sharp decline in production and the consequent commodity famine.¹⁹ It was only at the time of the October Revolution that the radical notions of the Bolsheviks were really presented to American readers. In December, 1917, *Current History*, after a detailed description of the Bolshevik seizure of power, came to this conclusion:

The only hope of the distracted country lay in the inability of the revolutionists to fulfill their promises. It was believed that the masses would soon realize the illusory dreams of the radicals, and turn en masse to the moderates, from whose number some strong man would emerge to save the country from complete anarchy and preserve for the nation its new democratic institutions.²⁰

Meanwhile a strong man had appeared in the person of Lenin, a name so little known to Americans that *Current History* could say, "Until a few weeks ago it did not matter who Lenin was."²¹ Mixed with the inadequate attempts to describe the causes of the revolution²² were continuous references to the war. For example, there were statements that the revolutionary developments had ended in the complete demoralization of the army from a military point of view.²³

In the Spring of 1918, Abraham Yarmolinsky reviewed the nationalization of land and production and indicated that seizure of power had not been followed by a plan for control and had therefore resulted in much confusion.²⁴

A complete translation of the first proclamation of the February Revolution was prefaced with the comment that "*Current History Magazine* herewith presents its own translation of these historic milestones on the road to Russia's present catastrophe."²⁵ The magazine also published the Declaration of Rights and the first draft of the Soviet Constitution,

explaining that in doing so "it leaves the reader to make his own comments on Bolshevik acts as compared with the principles and assertions contained in the document."¹⁰⁰ Later, Yarmolinsky presented a summary of Bolshevik legislation on control of production, distribution of land and compulsory insurance. He hesitated to say how effectively this legislation was working and concluded:

It is clear that the smooth working of a great number of cumbersome and wholly novel administrative agencies in a body politic torn by an unprecedented social upheaval amid the horrors of a twofold war would be little short of a miracle. Moreover, it appears that the Bolsheviks have already grown disappointed in some of their political dogmas, notably in the unrestrained and ubiquitous application of the elective principle.

Yarmolinsky did not know whether these principles would take root or remain merely "codified day-dreams."¹⁰¹

In April, 1918, *Current History* reported that conditions in Russia were desperate.¹⁰² In June, 1919, it said that the Allied and "Constitutional" forces were gradually closing in upon the Lenin-Trotsky stronghold and the Bolsheviks were losing power.¹⁰³ In December there appeared a vigorous article by Trotsky entitled, "How We Made the October Revolution,"¹⁰⁴ an article countered by talk of the Allies closing in on Russia and adverse reports on internal conditions. Later articles told of forced labor¹⁰⁵ and controlled trade unions.¹⁰⁶

The political relations of the United States with Russia from 1917 on were discussed fully in articles about the American Mission to Russia (headed by Elihu Root), intervention, and related matters.¹⁰⁷ Comparison of Russia with the United States evoked a raging response from Congressman Burton L. French, who informed the House of Representatives that there was a "deadly parallel" between institutions in Russia and the United States.¹⁰⁸ This speech, along with a Senate Committee's report, were published in *Current History*.¹⁰⁹ (French's speech and the Senatorial report are fully treated in the section on Congressional hearings and executive pronouncements; in this section there is also a summary of the U. S. inquiry into Bolshevism,¹¹⁰ the evidence presented,¹¹¹ and such official publications as Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby's note refusing to recognize Russia¹¹²—all matters chronicled in *Current History*.)

The destiny of Bolshevism in Europe and the world, except in the question of intervention, did not evoke much comment, probably because of the feeling that the Bolshevik seizure of power was temporary.¹¹³ Nor did the trade negotiations between the Soviet and the Allies in 1920 arouse much interest; these negotiations were heavily discounted by the reports of internal political and economic chaos.¹¹⁴

On the whole accurate and impartial in the way of facts, the opinions of the learned magazines were not quite profound in point of insight and

comprehension. The editors of these journals genially practiced the art of balance without realizing from what angle they were watching the scales. Their material was, on the whole, unfavorable toward Soviet Russia. It should be remembered, however, that a war psychology prevailed and that the Russian scene was not as familiar as it should have been. It is nonetheless significant to note that learned America was unprepared and unwilling to evaluate sudden and deep changes.

VI: GENERAL MAGAZINES

GENERAL magazines of broad circulation constitute an important group. The leading magazines to be considered here are the *New Republic*, *Nation*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Collier's*, *Atlantic Monthly*, and *Scribner's*. All have their habitual readers and nearly every subscriber has an opinion about the magazine he buys. Because of the distinctive nature of each of the general magazines, it is preferable to vary the treatment here by summarizing the tone and content of each separately.

The first magazine to be considered is the *New Republic*. It is not a simple matter to state precisely what the views of this magazine on Russia have been. It concurred to some extent with the general attitude of the times by approving of the Provisional Government and believing, during the early days of the Bolshevik regime, that its life was destined to be short. What it printed was distinguished by a calm and open-minded attitude, achieved partly by the sane expression it gave to its own views and partly by its willingness to publish the opinion of those who were pro-Bolshevik. Continuously sympathetic toward the Provisional Government, apologizing for, and explaining its difficulties and failings,¹ it informed its readers in May, 1917, that "For the time being, at least, the desperate alternative of a dictatorship has been avoided and Russia may yet be spared the convulsions which would inevitably result from the attempt to cure an autocratic Caesarism with a revolutionary Napoleonism."²

Immediately after the October Revolution the *New Republic* believed the Lenin-Trotsky regime would not last because, it said, "all the precedents of revolutionary history are against its long survival."³ The magazine approved Wilson's policy of helping Bolshevik opponents,⁴ although it sought to show, chiefly through signed articles, the depth of

the forces of the revolution and the desire for peace.⁵ When chided by a reader for not being more critical, the *New Republic* replied that it held "no brief" for the leadership of the Russian revolution. It considered Soviet social and political programs wholly unsound, and if put into practice, calamitous. It said it would oppose the Bolsheviks if they ever gained a foothold in America. It believed that, properly aided, the Russian people would achieve a real democracy. However, it decried violent attacks upon Bolshevism, saying such attacks made it easier for Lenin and Trotsky to remain in power.⁶

In 1919 there was a barely discernible shift of opinion. The *New Republic* began to take notice of European attempts to reach commercial understandings with Russia and it began to suggest that the Bolsheviks should be given a chance to prove whether they could produce.⁷ There was some disapproval of Wilson's attitude, especially of his refusal to see Colonel Robins, Colonel Thompson and Mr. Thacher.⁸ William Hard was no doubt expressing the magazine's attitude when he stated in its pages that Trotsky had proved "the anti-Bolshevist propaganda of the State Department was a multitudinous mis-statement of Russian realities."⁹

The main characteristic of the *New Republic's* post-war liberalism was its insistence upon truthful facts concerning Russia, climaxed by the publication of *Test of the News*, a special supplement by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz which examined the reporting of the *New York Times* from 1917 to 1920.¹⁰ Merz and Lippmann concluded that "on every essential question the net effect of the news was almost invariably misleading."¹¹ (Curiously enough, Charles Merz is today the editor of the *New York Times*). In 1920, the *New Republic* summarized its position as follows:

The Bolshevik method of establishing communism through a temporary dictatorship of a minority has always seemed to us without justification if it is intended to revolutionize the world for the better. The dictatorship in Russia has little to do with social progress. It has had an enormous amount to do with saving a demoralized people from complete disintegration. The dictatorship of Lenin is like the dictatorship of Clemenceau in 1918 or the dictatorship of Ludendorff. It belongs to the history of the war, not the annals of progress. It performs the same function and is to be judged by the same criteria. It has probably saved Russia from dismemberment and subjection. Considering the odds against it, the Russian dictatorship is one of the ablest in history, but it has no value as an example to any country that is not the victim of aggression or of subsidized civil war.

The magazine declared that peace and trade would reestablish a democratic order and that, as a result, the Third International would "fade and become nothing but a loose and not very significant collection of left-wing minorities."¹²

The *Nation* shared with the *New Republic* its liberal position, prac-

ting its liberalism, however, with a bit more abundance. It published substantially more technical information and was somewhat earlier in recognizing the nature of both Bolshevism and its leaders. Like the *New Republic*, it welcomed the Provisional Government to the family of democracies³⁷ and believed that the Russian people would continue fighting on the side of the Allies.³⁸ Immediately after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks Simeon Strunsky sought to separate for the readers of the *Nation* the actualities in Russia from the prevailing war psychology, endeavoring to show that the Bolsheviks had wider international intentions, namely, that of establishing a universal Socialism. However, he remarked, "The probability is strong that the peace issue has been employed by the Bolsheviks to seize control of Russia for the realization of their own schemes of internal improvement."³⁹ In explaining the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he declared that it was this principle which caused the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In Strunsky's opinion, the Bolsheviks believed that "if the masses unfortunately are not prepared to grasp this ideal, then it is the business of the intelligent leaders of the proletariat to think for them and to impose upon the Russian people what the doctor knows is good for it."⁴⁰

From the very beginning the *Nation* opposed military intervention in Russia.⁴¹ It early advocated recognition of the Soviet Government as the only possible way of securing economic rehabilitation for the Russian people.⁴² Like the *New Republic*, it continually criticized the policies toward Russia indicated by our State and Commerce Departments and Congressional investigations.⁴³ It persistently opposed propaganda directed against Russia and published translations of the Soviet Constitution and other documents likely to familiarize the American public with what actually was happening.⁴⁴ In describing conditions in Russia, it attempted to interpret the existing chaos in terms of the efforts that were being made to establish a new kind of economic life.⁴⁵ Shortly after it welcomed the return of Russia to world commerce in 1920,⁴⁶ articles began to discuss America's future trade with Russia and condemn the policy of the United States Government in not allowing closer relationships between two countries needing each other's trade.⁴⁷ There were repeated warnings that other nations were getting in a position to profit by Russian trade. The favorable attitudes of these countries were cited to illustrate the backwardness of Washington. When the State Department finally allowed trade relations, the *Nation* contended the delay had been fatal because British merchants and manufacturers had had ample opportunity to capture whatever was most lucrative in Russian trade, current or future.⁴⁸

Briefly describing the attitude of the two liberal weeklies, it may

be said that they early saw the deep meaning of the November Revolution and that while they reserved judgment upon or disagreed with its philosophy, they believed that recognition, peace, and trade would restore Russia to economic stability, and, as a corollary, moderate the extreme Bolshevik measures.

Nothing is easier to characterize than the attitude of the *Saturday Evening Post* toward Russia. It was continuously and unvaryingly hostile. The different articles and the various authors were only means to present new evidence of chaos and economic ruin.⁵² If possibilities of trade with Russia were discussed, it was with the carefully stated belief that Bolshevism would fall.⁵³ For the Bolsheviks, the *Saturday Evening Post* expressed loathing, both through articles and editorials.⁵⁴ One author spoke of the Bolshevik rule as "Despotism by the dregs, the very dregs, to be precise."⁵⁵ The Princess Cantacuzene, daughter of Ulysses S. Grant, vividly described her experiences in Russia in a special series.⁵⁶ Baron Rosen, Ambassador to the United States from Imperial Russia, wrote an article on "Why Bolshevism Dominated Russia."⁵⁷ The killing of the Czar and his family by the Red Guard was depicted in a playlet.⁵⁸ There was not a single relieving note.

The comment in *Collier's* from 1917 to 1921 was largely from one source, the reporting of Arthur Ruhl, who gave a straightforward account of general conditions.⁵⁹ Mark Sullivan's contributions, on the other hand, were highly opinionated. "It must be Bolshevism throughout the world, or nowhere," he declared in one of his articles.⁶⁰

During the war years and immediately afterwards *Harper's* offered only meager comment typified by a shallow account of the February Revolution⁶¹ and a nurse's experiences while watching street fighting.⁶² Accounts of Russia in the war⁶³ and the general chaos that prevailed⁶⁴ were followed by only two articles bearing directly on the theme of Bolshevism—both antagonistic. One of the latter articles, written by John Spargo, merely repeated charges the author had published in a book: Bolshevism was a tyranny, a mockery, a betrayal of Socialism, etc.⁶⁵ *Harper's* also published a novelette ("The Beauty and the Bolshevik") relating the adventures of a young American radical in love with the beautiful daughter of a capitalist; the author was Alice Duer Miller.⁶⁶

The *Atlantic Monthly* published more articles on Russia than *Harper's* but they contained the same type of bias and shallow journalism. The Provisional Government was hailed ecstatically⁶⁷ but there was hardly a good word for the Bolshevik regime. When the latter was not being directly condemned, conditions under its rule were described with condemnatory implications.⁶⁸ Most of the articles were written by wives of refugee Russian diplomats or by other Russians politically opposed to Bolshe-

vism.⁴⁸ In one of the few articles by a non-Russian, H. W. Stanley declared that "The real greatness of Lenin and his group is the greatness of demagoguery," that Lenin was the "master phraseocrat of the world," that his "abracadabra has seduced the workers of every race."⁴⁹ The hope of Russia, its workers and intelligentsia, lay in the probable fall of the Bolsheviks⁵⁰—this was the theme of another article. In only two articles was there the slightest note of appraisal. One of these articles spoke kindly of an old Commissar who, though a Bolshevik official, disagreed with much of their philosophy. The other article incidentally noted the chaotic conditions confronting the Bolsheviks.⁵¹

The barest reporting of events in Russia appeared in *Scribner's*. A general summary of the forces resulting in the February Revolution⁵² was followed by several articles against Bolshevism written by Meriel Buchanan, daughter of the British Ambassador to Russia,⁵³ a Dutchman,⁵⁴ and W. C. Huntington, commercial attache of the American Embassy in Petrograd.⁵⁵

What was true of the other monthlies was likewise true of *Forum*. From 1917 to 1921 its articles saw threats of Bolshevism in America,⁵⁶ told of chaos in Russia,⁵⁷ and urged the United States to aid those who were fighting Bolshevism.⁵⁸ These few articles were all quite typical of material published elsewhere during these years.

VII: BOOKS

THE February Revolution had hardly taken place before a flood of books on its causes and effects broke forth. Whether pro or con, biased or impartial, these books were for the most part distinguished by a certain emphasis on intangibles and potentialities, on the significance of political rather than economic events, on the character of men rather than the meaning of data, on economic possibilities rather than economic actualities. By and large they agreed that what was happening in Russia was of tremendous importance to the rest of the world. The diagnosis, however of so complex a nation at so close a range necessarily limited every critic, whatever his point of view, to a statement of generalities.

Isaac Don Levine, the foreign news editor of the *New York Tribune*, was among the very first to "explain" all. In *The Russian Revolution*,¹ he gave an account characteristic of the books of the war

years, depicting the background of the revolution and the series of Czarist measures which had alienated the peasants, the soldiers, the middle and upper classes, the Duma, and, indeed, even the diplomats of friendly foreign governments. Levine's book carried the story through only the first months of the Provisional Government.

In the same year William English Walling republished his earlier work, *Russia's Message*, describing the awakening peasants.⁸ And a year later, in 1918, the H. W. Wilson Company issued in its Handbook Series a volume of selected articles on Russia's history and the muzhik's habits and thoughts.⁹

The name of M. J. Olgin was to become in subsequent years familiar as that of a constant and able protagonist of Soviet Russia. His *Soul of the Russian Revolution*⁴ is a clear and scholarly account of the February Revolution, and while it contains very little of his later allegiance to Bolshevism, his description of the depth of the revolution gave forebodings of the extremes the situation contained. Russian by birth, Olgin had, as a student at the University of Kiev, been one of two hundred students sentenced to a year of military service as a punishment for political activity. His book was rendered all the more vivid by numerous drawings and posters culled from revolutionary literature which had not been allowed to circulate in Russia.

After the rise of Bolshevism, a large number of books were antagonistic to the Soviet Government. Emile J. Dillon, a scholar, who had for years lived in close contact with the liberal movement in Russia, and had been a close friend of Count Witte, told the readers of his book *The Eclipse of Russia*,⁶ that he believed that wise statesmanship on the part of the Allies could have prevented the crisis which existed in Russia. To him "Bolshevism is Tzarism upside down." A. J. Sack, erstwhile director of the Russian Information Bureau, vented his spleen against Bolshevism in the *Birth of Russian Democracy*,⁵ a book published by his agency. The American Institute of Social Service sent sociologist Edward Allsworth Ross to Russia to examine conditions. Upon returning from his travels, he wrote *Russia in Upheaval*.⁷ It was his belief that the existing chaos would inevitably end and a happier Russia arise. He warned American capitalists to learn from Russia and to deal more fairly with labor.

Perhaps the most prominent book of the period was a document entitled *Bullitt Mission to Russia*. This document contained information assembled by William C. Bullitt as Chief of the Current Intelligent Section of the Peace Conference and later, as special emissary to Russia.⁹ Submitted to the Senate in September, 1919, the document was surprisingly favorable. Admitting that the economic situation in Russia was serious, it carefully noted that "such essentials of economic life as are

available are being utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Government." Bullitt maintained that "the destructive phase of the revolution was over and all the energy of the Government was turned to constructive work." In his opinion the Soviet government was "firmly established" and the position of the Communist Party "very strong." Summarizing what might be expected as to Russian policy, Bullitt explained: "Lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical position all along the line. He is ready to meet the Western Governments halfway." Bullitt proposed lifting the blockade imposed by the Allies and advocated recognition of the Soviet Government. He felt that a return to moderation and better conditions would result if normal relations with the world were permitted. Bullitt was confident that Russia was ready to make concessions, because its leaders realized that removal of the blockade would mean nothing unless they were able to obtain foreign credits. Included in the document was a letter to President Wilson in which Bullitt said bitterly that "Russia, 'the acid test of good will,' for me as for you, has not even been understood."

In a statement appended to the report, Lincoln Steffens largely corroborated Bullitt's views. An associate of Bullitt in Russia, Steffens felt that Lenin and Trotsky were revitalizing their country. Moreover, it seemed to him that the Communist ideals, even when forced to compromise with realities, expressed the will of the majority of the Russian people. He, like Bullitt, testified to the ability, integrity and leadership of Lenin.

An even deeper insight into Lenin was afforded by Albert Rhys Williams in his sympathetic study, *Lenin, the Man and His Work*.⁹ Williams traveled with Lenin for several months, living with him in the same hotel. Supplementing his account were impressions of Lenin by Colonel Raymond Robins and Arthur Ransome. As head of the American Red Cross Mission and, for a long while, unofficial American ambassador to Russia, Colonel Robins saw more of Lenin than all of the Allied diplomats combined. The opinions of Lenin entertained by Williams, Robins and Ransome substantiated those of Bullitt and Steffens. Arthur Ransome, who had been in Russia during the revolution period, offered a detailed picture in *Russia in 1919*, a book based upon interviews with the Bolshevik leaders in February and March of that year.¹⁰ Like Bullitt, Ransome found that the revolution had passed out of the stage of destruction and violence and that the authority of the Soviet Government had been well established. War on all fronts, he felt, was the main factor retarding the economic regeneration of the country. The Russian correspondent of the Associated Press, Robert Edward Long, in his volume, *Russian Revolution Aspects*,¹¹ told a bitter story of revolution and the triumph of Bolshevism

but said the time had not yet come for treating the revolution in historical perspective or analyzing its finer elements.

Whatever his personal opinions and prejudices, John Reed succeeded brilliantly in describing as "intensified history" the dramatic moments of the November Revolution in *Ten Days That Shook the World*.²³ It was a swift, journalistic account from which emerged, abetted by Reed's complete acceptance of Communism, a romantic and yet realistic insight into the Bolsheviks' daring seizure of power.

A number of prominent American Socialists, particularly Charles Edward Russell and John Spargo, bitterly opposed Bolshevism. Spargo, who seemed to be antagonistic toward everything Bolshevik, published his views frequently. In *Bolshevism*, he endeavored to explain the origin, history and meaning of that movement as he saw it from the point of view of one sympathetic to the revolution but "absolutely opposed to the principles and practices of the Bolsheviks."²⁴ In the *Psychology of Bolshevism*, another book published during the same year, he expressed the belief that Bolshevism was a neurotic hysteria similar to unrestrained capitalism.²⁵ His main objection to Bolshevism was that it was undemocratic. Overwhelmed by what he felt to be the miscarriage of excellent intentions, he dramatically characterized the events in Russia in the title of his third book, *The Greatest Failure in All History*.²⁶ He dedicated the volume as follows:

To the misguided, the mistaken, and the misinformed who have hailed Bolshevism in Russia as the advent of a new freedom, I submit a part of the indisputable evidence upon which, as a Socialist, who believes in democracy and government in government and industry—and in the generous individualism which communism of opportunity alone can give—I base my condemnation of Bolshevism as a mad attempt, by a brutal and degraded tyranny, to carry out an impossible program.

Spargo's fourth book, *Russia as an American Problem*, was concerned with Russian-American relations.²⁷ His conclusions in this book were somewhat confused. He believed that America should help Russia retrieve herself economically, thus assuring the United States a share of Russia's future foreign trade. He did not, however, wish *de facto* recognition of Russia. And although he was disturbed by the Bolshevik military victories, he somehow felt confident that, aided by the United States, Russia would yet become a great democracy. On the whole, Spargo's keen insight into the economic possibilities of Russia for the United States, and complete lack of certainty with regard to the political probabilities involved, very nearly summarized American opinion from 1917 to 1921.

There were some efforts to present the Bolshevik position as free as possible from prejudice. Evans Clark, an economist who has enjoyed considerable repute in recent years, attempted to balance the picture in

his book *Facts and Fabrications About Soviet Russia*.²⁷ He recounted the astounding fabrications of American journalists, publicists, and officials during the war period and immediately afterwards. In his evidence he included the Sisson documents accepted by the United States after having been discredited by England and France; the *New York Times* reporting of Lenin and Trotsky as fugitives in Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, as hiding, as being inmates of asylums, as having arrested each other and as having frequently died; and the evidence used by the Lusk Committee. In order to help set things straight, Clark devoted the second part of his volume to a bibliography of books and pamphlets dealing objectively and sympathetically with Russia.

William English Walling, however, in his *Sovietism*²⁸ (and later in *Out of Their Own Mouths*,²⁹ a volume written in collaboration with Samuel Gompers) sought to discredit the Bolsheviki by quoting their own utterances and decrees. Bolshevik statements on world revolution, violence, agriculture, economic collapse, "fictitious" reforms, etc., were used by Walling to demonstrate the utter inadequacy and undesirable qualities of the Soviet leaders.

One of the clearest discussions during the immediate post-war years was Leo Pasvolsky's *The Economics of Communism*.³⁰ A native Russian, the author obtained his information from such official publications as *Izvestia* and *Ekonomicheskaya Zhisn*. (The substance of his findings, published in a series of articles in the *Annalist*, has been treated in the section covering business and financial magazines.) His material began with the revolution and ended with the close of 1920. In view of the approaching developments of the New Economic Policy he concluded that the situation had reached this dilemma: "Communism is impossible without the application of compulsion in the economic life of the country; but economic production is impossible with the application of such compulsion." He expressed this opinion after analyzing the profound difficulties encountered in the attempt to apply Communist methods and doctrine to problems of labor, management, agriculture, and transportation. He concluded that "the experiment and regime which is responsible for it show unmistakable signs of their approaching liquidation." Pasvolsky later became an expert on foreign affairs for Brookings Institution and the State Department.

The question of what should be the relations between the United States and Russia found a partial answer in *Raymond Robins' Own Story* by William Hard.³¹ Although Robins was anti-Bolshevik, he saw in Bolshevism a system demanding careful consideration. To a group of American business men, he had declared:

You believe that private property has a great and useful mission in the

world. So do I. You believe that free capital is absolutely necessary to the world's best progress. So do I. That is why I am talking to you to-day. There is a bomb under this room and under every other room in the world; and it can blow our system—your system—into the eternal past with the Bourbons and the Pharaohs.

I saw this bomb make its first explosion—in Russia . . . This bomb is a real bomb. It is not simply a great lot of riots and robberies and mobs and massacres. If it were, it would be no bomb at all. We are talking now of something that can destroy the present social system. Riots and robberies and mobs and massacres cannot destroy the present social system or any social system. They can be stopped by force . . . by the strong arm of government in command of the physical power of government. The only thing that can destroy a social system is a rival social system—a real rival system—a system thought out and worked out and capable of making an organized orderly social life of its own.

Gentlemen, this bomb is that kind of proposition. The danger of the Soviet system to the American system is that the Soviet system is genuinely a system on its own account.

Robins concluded that the United States had only one choice—not intervention but commercial intercourse. "A year of trade," he said, "will do more to harmonize Bolshevism with the rest of the world, and with the safety of the rest of the world, than a generation of invective and invasion." In other words, the United States should allow competition to demonstrate the supremacy of the American system.

Arthur Bullard, who had been in Russia in 1917 as head of American propaganda work for the Creel Committee on Public Information, and was highly critical of Bolshevism, agreed in his book *The Russian Pendulum*²² with the sentiments expressed by Robins. The way towards understanding, he said, was through open relationships. While he hedged on the question of recognition, he still thought that Russia would profit by American ways if allowed to learn of them.

Maurice Hindus, whose writings were for years to present vivid pictures of Russian character and events, enriched American understanding by brilliantly describing the life of the Russian peasant under the stress of abnormal times.²³ He showed the ignorant and oppressed peasant as a highly intelligent person with a will of his own, a marked self-interest expressed by hunger for land and a concern for the immediacy of better returns from his efforts.

In 1921, David R. Francis, last American Ambassador to Imperial Russia and a friend of the Provisional Government, published his memoirs, *Russia from the American Embassy*.²⁴ The book began with his arrival in Petrograd in 1916 and concluded with a speech he gave on the occasion of a banquet extended him on his return to St. Louis in October, 1919. The volume was marked by disapproval of Bolshevism and Soviet rule. It was Francis' forthright opinion that the peace of Russia and the world would have been better secured if Trotsky and Lenin had been executed.

English opinion is not American opinion—the jests to that effect notwithstanding—yet this study would be somewhat incomplete if it did not mention the American published works of such Englishmen as H. N. Brailsford, H. G. Wells, and Bertrand Russell. Brailsford was representative of the few who recognized Communism in Russia as the inevitable stage of a society in the process of dissolution and despair making a tremendous effort to reconstruct itself. In his *Russian Workers' Republic*, he sought to reveal the country's new spirit of creation.²⁸ Summing up his opinions, he declared, "It is, in a land where a feeble and dilatory civilization had touched as yet only a minute minority of a gifted population, a great and heroic attempt to shorten the dragging march of time, to bring culture to a whole nation, and to make a cooperative society where a predatory despotism, in the act of suicide, had prepared the general ruin." H. G. Wells wrote *Russia in the Shadows* after he had been in that country for six weeks as the guest of Maxim Gorky.²⁹ He believed that only the United States was in a position to prevent, through intelligent effort and cooperation, the collapse of modern civilization in Russia. Such a catastrophe, he felt, might seriously affect the rest of the world. "Possibly," Wells prophesied, "all modern civilization may tumble . . . So it is I interpret the writing on the Eastern wall of Europe."

Bertrand Russell, in his short volume, *Bolshevism*,³⁰ lamented the violence which the Bolsheviks used to enforce their ideas, citing it as the reason Communism had failed. Yet he recognized that "a fundamental economic reconstruction bringing with it very far-reaching changes in ways of thinking and feeling, in philosophy and art and private relations, seems absolutely necessary if industrialism is to become the servant of man instead of his master." In all this, he said, "I am at one with the Bolsheviks; politically I criticize them only when their methods seem to involve a departure from their own ideals."

To judge by the books published from 1917 to 1921, American opinion saw Russia in the hands of strong men fighting desperate odds with desperate means, and as events became critical, compromising reluctantly with their ideals. The books issued during the period did not foresee that the Bolsheviks would press forward despite the clash of peasant and worker, economic chaos, civil war and intervention. Nor did their authors realize that, however the Bolsheviks modified their first assumptions as to time and method, they were not in the long run to be distracted from their original intentions. Nevertheless, some of the books would have given the reflective reader a means of counter-balancing the propaganda and misrepresentation of current magazines.

VIII: NEWSPAPERS

IT IS, of course, almost impossible to study newspaper opinions without becoming involved in the problem of the honesty and fairness of reporting. Walter Lippman and Charles Merz tackled the problem superbly in their *Test of the News*, a supplement to the *New Republic* of August 4, 1920. They sought to determine how fairly and accurately the *New York Times* had reported Russian developments from March, 1917 to March, 1920. They selected the *New York Times* for analysis because of its standing as one of America's greatest newspapers and they paid special attention to coverage of the Russian situation because it "aroused the kind of passion which tests most seriously the objectivity of reporting." The major conclusion of Lippmann and Merz was that "on all the essential questions the net effect [of the articles in the *Times*] was almost always misleading." Their reasons for this conclusion were indicated by the following summary of the *Times* reporting:

1. *From the overthrow of the Czar to the failure of the Galician offensive in July, 1917.*

The difficulties in Russia, and especially in the Russian army, are not concealed from the attentive reader, but the dominant tendency of the captions and the emphasis is so optimistic as to be misleading.

2. *From the military disaster in July, 1917 to the Bolshevik revolution of November.*

The difficulties of the regime play a bigger part in the news, but a misleading optimism still continues. In this period, the tendency to seek a solution through a dictator-savior appears in the mistaken hope placed upon the Kornilov adventure, a hope quickly falsified by his collapse. It may fairly be said that the growth of the Bolshevik power from July to November must have been seriously underestimated in view of the success of the November coup.

3. *From the Bolshevik revolution to the ratification of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.*

This period is on the whole the best in the three years. Different points of view are given, and the emphasis is generally neutral. After the recovery from the shock of the second revolution, the reports are inspired by an eager curiosity about the diplomatic battle between the Bolsheviks and the enemy. At the height of this diplomatic battle the news is handled in a rather uncritically pro-Bolshevik fashion, as a result of the optimistic assumption that the Soviets would refuse to make peace with Germany.

4. *From the ratification at Brest-Litovsk, which coincided approximately with the Great German offensive in March 1918, to the decision for Allied intervention in August 1918.*

Under the stress of disappointment and danger the tone and quality of the news changed radically. Organized propaganda for intervention penetrates the news. This propaganda has two phases. There is a short and intense period in late March and early April, which stops rather suddenly with the announcement that the President has decided against intervention. There is a prolonged and intense period beginning about May which culminates in the American approval of intervention.

5. *The months immediately following the signing of the armistice.*

The Red Peril, which had hitherto played only an insignificant role, now

takes precedence in the news from Russia and serves as a new motive for Allied intervention.

6. *The Spring, Summer and Autumn of 1919.*

Kolchak, Deniken and Yudenitch are heralded as dictator-saviors of Russia: for their campaigns, extravagant claims are made when they are moving forward; in retreat there is a steady assurance that a better turn is coming. Meantime the world is warned against a Russian invasion of Poland—though Polish troops are as a matter of fact deep in Russian soil.

7. *The Winter of 1919-20 and the Spring of 1920.*

Once more, with the failure of the White Armies, the Red Peril reappears.

A good deal of the material covered by Lippmann and Merz in their *Test of the News* has been studied by the author and he agrees with them that "the Russian policy of the editors of the *Times* profoundly and crassly influenced their news columns," that "office handling of the news, both as to emphasis and captions, was unmistakably controlled by other than a professional standard."

For the purpose of analyzing the general tone of the country's newspapers the *Literary Digest* has been used to a considerable extent. It might be argued that the *Digest* was itself biased and, therefore, its selection of newspaper opinion was unfair. Actually it was far less biased than the newspapers. It printed the pro and con of most discussions, quoting both conservative and left-wing journals. It reprinted a good many articles from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, official Soviet organs. The writer sampled many articles and editorials summarized by the *Digest* by referring to the original and making comparisons. The *Digest's* reaction to several major events was studied especially carefully. Convincing proof of the *Digest's* fairness was found.

The February Revolution was welcomed as enthusiastically by the press as it was by the magazines already reviewed. The *New York Times* expressed what was very much in the air when it regarded events in Russia as "almost equivalent to bringing a new nation into the camp of the Allies."⁸ The *New York Tribune* felt the revolution would profoundly move German democracy.⁹

The *Dallas News* believed the revolution gave "a political and spiritual unity to the alliance of Germany's enemies that has heretofore been lacking, for the reason that democracy was in league with autocracy." Similar sentiments were expressed by the *Des Moines Capitol*, the *New Haven Journal Courier* and the *Springfield Republican*.⁸ Many papers agreed with the *Macon Telegraph* that the vital thing was the fact that "the last great, forbidding, seemingly impregnable stronghold of autocracy" had evidently been "taken in the twinkling of an eye—in a bloodless uprising."⁹ Jacob H. Schiff, the famous New York banker, answered an inquiry of the *New York Evening Post* by saying he was "quite convinced that, with the development of the country's enormous resources,

which, with the shackles removed from a great people, would follow present events, Russia would before long take rank financially among the most favored nations in the money markets of the world."¹⁰

Inquiring into the secret of the Russian revolution, the *New York Evening Post* found the answer in the development of the *Zemstvos*, of which it gave a full account.¹¹ The *New York Times*, supporting this view, went on to say, "Cooperation is so general and so inherently rooted in the Russian mind that results which would be impossible of attainment in this country were brought about with a minimum of disorder and waste of time."¹² The *New York World* compared the struggles of the Provisional Government to maintain itself in power to our own early difficulties, concluding that "A constituent assembly with a finished constitution as its work is Russia's vital need."¹³

At first the October Revolution aroused some fears as to the effect of Bolshevism on Russia's continued participation in the war. "No hopeless view of the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd is taken by American editorial observers,"¹⁴ said the *Literary Digest* of November 17, 1917. "There is little chance of an immediate peace," the *New York World* declared, "because there is no government with the authority or power to speak for the Russian people or the Russian nation."¹⁵ Some papers, like the *New York Tribune*, felt the reign of Bolshevism would be short and expressed the hope that the status of Russia in the war would not be affected.¹⁶ "God knows," the *Houston Chronicle* exclaimed, "the Bolsheviks are as dangerous to organized government as are the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs, and probably more so."¹⁷

The *New York World*, like the overwhelming majority of papers, believed Trotsky and Lenin were cooperating with Germany. "Civilization can be sold out by the Trotskys and Lenins," it declared "but they cannot make the delivery."¹⁸ Colonel William B. Thompson, who had been a member of the American Engineering Commission to Russia, defended Lenin and Trotsky in a series of articles in the *New York Post*. "Lenin and Trotsky are internationalists," he contended. "That is to say, they want their dreams to come true all over the world—dreams of a world run by workmen and peasants. Only experience and responsibility will show them that you cannot turn a factory over to the hands to run any more than you can a bank to the clerks."¹⁹

Intervention in Russia was supported by most of the papers. "Civilization," the *New York Times* observed, "will be endangered if the monster of militarism swallows Russia . . . It is the duty of the Allies to save Russia, not for Russia's sake so much as for the sake of the endangered world."²⁰ The *Boston Herald* asked, "Shall the poor Russian kiddyling be left to the fangs of the German wolf?"²¹ In July, 1918, the

Boston Transcript proclaimed that it was "perfectly plain the hour has struck for concerted Allied action in Russia."⁷⁴ Some papers, like the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, felt that too small an armed force had been sent to implement intervention; others, like the *Philadelphia North American*, declared that the delay had been too long.⁷⁵ The *New York Tribune*, however, claimed a new Russia was arising, "a thing of sanity, not of disordered imagination, a true realization of the hopes of the revolution."⁷⁶ Violent expressions against Bolshevism were uttered on all sides. The *San Francisco Chronicle* insisted we must consider the Bolsheviks as "the common enemies of mankind."⁷⁷ The *New York Times* thought the Bolshevik leaders should be treated as outlaws.⁷⁸ The *Boston Transcript* referred to them as "rascals."⁷⁹ The *New York World* referred to Russia as "the Judas of the nations."⁸⁰

After the Armistice, the attitude of most papers was that Bolshevism was threatening the world. The *St. Louis Star* described it "as the worst menace to democracy that now exists since autocracy has been overthrown."⁸¹ The *New York Tribune* told its readers, "There is more in common, emotionally and psychically, between Russian and German proletarians than has often been clear."⁸²

When in 1919 the idea arose that Bolshevism could best be fought by furnishing food to the starving multitudes of Russia, newspaper opinion was divided as to the efficacy of the plan. "American opinion is not likely to favor buying off anarchy with subsidies of meat and grain," the *New York Sun* thought.⁸³ The *Jacksonville Florida Times-Union* boldly suggested that starvation might help to kill Bolshevism.⁸⁴ It was generally agreed that any signs of Bolshevism in the United States should be met with a firm hand. "Beginning with *The Wall Street Journal*," said the *Literary Digest*, "and ending with the *San Diego Union*, a considerable proportion of the American press is convinced the rocks of Bolshevism loom menacingly ahead."⁸⁵ The *Manchester (N. H.) Union* believed "that not a minute too soon has the United States Senate authorized an investigation."⁸⁶ Most papers believed with the *Louisville Courier-Journal* that there was no fertile soil in America for Bolshevism.⁸⁷ In the opinion of the *Brooklyn Citizen* there was "no more danger in the shape of Bolshevism on this side of the Atlantic than there is that a majority of the American people will go insane."⁸⁸

However, the press was greatly excited by the reports obtained by the Overman Committee investigating propaganda in the United States. When Colonel Raymond Robins testified before the committee that although the Bolsheviks were sincere, their system was "economically impossible and morally wrong," the *New York World* remarked, "Out of the mouth of their favorite witness our parlor Bolsheviks stand refuted."⁸⁹

Many papers saw Bolshevik influence in the wave of American strikes in 1919. Moreover, at this time labor papers—particularly the *Pittsburgh Labor World*, the *American Coal Miner*, and the *Union* (Indianapolis)—became intense in their denunciation of Bolshevism.³⁸ The *New York World* declared editorially, "A nation-wide Bolshevik campaign is in progress in the United States."³⁹

There was considerable emphatic comment concerning the rumor that the Allied Powers were planning to extend *de facto* recognition to Russia. The *Washington Post*, echoing many papers, characterized proposals to recognize Lenin as "one of the most sinister developments of these strange times."⁴⁰ While most newspapers insisted at this point that intervention in Russia should be increased, a few, like the *Springfield Republican*, declared "Thus far force has worked very badly as an antidote to the revolution. Is it not time to change the prescription?"⁴¹

When in 1920 the Allied Supreme Council in Paris lifted the blockade against Russia, some papers disapproved, but the majority agreed in effect with the *Newark News* when it said "Until now Lenin and Trotsky have been living in a favorable artificial atmosphere with outside forces propping them up and helping them to retain their power . . . but now Russia will have to stand the test of international competition . . . subject to the laws of exchange and its industrial Communism will have to compete against the industrial individualism of other peoples."⁴² The policy of lifting the blockade against Russia appealed to both the *Cleveland Citizen*, a labor weekly, and the *New York Journal of Commerce*.⁴³

In 1920, for the first time, slightly favorable notes began to appear. Lincoln Eyre, a *New York World* correspondent, reported, "Among the Russian people the period of destruction has reached its end, and the period of reconstruction is at hand."⁴⁴ Said the *St. Louis Star*:

The Allies are not coming to love the Soviet. They are merely realizing at last that they have more need of relations with Russia than Russia has of relations with them. Russia is self-sustaining. The rest of Europe is not. That is the key to the gradual change of front. Lenin is a bitter dose, who has to be swallowed.⁴⁵

The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* stated:

Reason has come to both camps. The reign of blood has ceased in Russia because, having won complete political domination, the Russian dictators see the necessity of economic rehabilitation. They know they cannot long survive the ravages of cold and hunger.⁴⁶

The *El Paso Times* concluded, "No one is enthusiastic about recognizing Lenin and Trotsky. But Lenin and Trotsky are in the saddle. There is no use denying the fact."⁴⁷

The newspapers of the country responded to the note of Secretary of State Colby regarding the Polish-Russian crisis with the feeling that

the dream of peace had been shattered. There was a mixed response, however, to the note's attitude in view of the effect it might have on world affairs. The *New York Evening Post* approved, exclaiming, "At last we have a clear declaration of policy toward Russia and Poland."¹⁴⁸ The *New York Times* remarked the note was "an indictment as well as a declaration of policy."¹⁴⁹ The *New York Globe* looked upon the note as "morally irreproachable but practically meaningless"¹⁵⁰ because Russian forces were already "battering at the gates of Warsaw."¹⁵¹

By the early months of 1921, nearly the whole press encouraged a "hands off" policy as the best way to handle Russia and Bolshevism. The *New York Globe*, the *New York World*, the *Washington Herald* and others expressed this sentiment.¹⁵² "The less we meddle," declared the *Baltimore Sun*, "the sooner Russia will throw her pirates overboard."¹⁵³

This brief survey of newspaper opinion is not altogether adequate because it does not present fully the continuous war talk of the newspapers and the anxious way they interpreted every event in Russia in terms of war—even during American intervention. Moreover, their continuous coverage of Russia, from the welcoming of the Provisional Government to the final expressions of a "hands off" policy, was so extensive that a detailed analysis is impossible. There was, except in a few liberal and radical newspapers, no real attempt to explain Bolshevism as an economic philosophy or to interpret its leadership fairly. What was significantly perceptible in the newspapers of this period was a reluctant admission of the staying power and political tenacity of the Bolsheviks.

IX: GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS

A BRIEF glance at relevant Congressional hearings and executive pronouncements shows that the tone and content of this opinion was the same as that elsewhere expressed. Whether opinion from this source should be considered as cause or effect is, of course, a subtle problem. Essentially, it is both. It will be sufficient, then, just to indicate its general nature. (The task of presenting in detail the purely political relations between the United States and Russia has been performed by Frederick L. Schuman and others.)¹

Congressional hearings during 1917-1921 reflected the general hysteria. The anti-Russia phobia during these years was generated by gen-

eral distaste for that country's political system and not, as later, a fear that Russia might become a serious competitor in world trade. Senators and Congressmen attacked Communism with considerable vehemence. The nature of the attitude pervading the times can be deduced when one notes that on February 4, 1919 a resolution extending the authority of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the brewing and liquor interests and German propaganda authorized that committee to include Russian propaganda in its investigations.³ In analyzing the subsequent hearings, Schuman declared:

The subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, composed of Senators King, Wolcott, Nelson and Sterling, with Senator Overman as chairman, began taking testimony on February 11, and continued its work until March 10. Its labors, and the conclusions to which they led, were of such an extraordinary character as to justify a brief resumé. Some 1,200 pages of "evidence" were gathered from two dozen witnesses. Over half of these were violently anti-Bolshevik in sentiment—and, with a few rare exceptions, told tales that did more credit to their gullibility and their imagination than to their reason and judgment. W. C. Huntington, Commercial Attache at Moscow until August 16, 1918, asserted that only eight per cent of the Russian people were in favor of the Bolsheviks, and that the remainder were held in submission by the terrorism of Lettish and Chinese mercenaries. Catherine Breshkovskaya, "little grandmother of the Russian Revolution," assured the committee that more people had been killed in one year of Bolshevik rule than in three years of war. Roger E. Simmons, of the Department of Commerce, retailed blood curdling tales of butchery and horror. Withdrawal from Archangel, he said, would mean the murder of every man, woman, and child in the evacuated territory. Documents proving the nationalization of women were solemnly read and accepted. Other witnesses followed in similar vein. Those who were more favorably disposed toward the Soviet Government, such as Mr. and Mrs. John Reed, Bessie Beatty, Albert Rhys Williams and Frank Kiddie, received a very cool reception and failed to move the Committee. Raymond Robins, here presented with his first opportunity to tell his story, denounced Bolshevism as a world menace, but told in full of his activities in Russia, condemning falsification and misrepresentations as well as intervention as methods of treating the disease and urging an investigating commission. Ambassador Francis also presented his views, which remained unchanged.

The net result of these hearings before the Overman Committee was to picture Soviet Russia as a kind of bedlam inhabited by abject slaves completely at the mercy of an organization of homicidal maniacs whose purpose was to destroy all traces of civilization and carry the nation back to barbarism.⁴

Following the hearings a Senate subcommittee issued a report saying Russia was in a state of political and economic chaos.⁴ The committee noted with especial alarm the promulgation of both decrees relating to marriage and divorce which, it felt, "practically establishes a state of free love." The report went out of its way to illustrate "just what this new social order would accomplish if transplanted into the political, educational, industrial and religious life of the United States." Aside from provoking violence and bloodshed, Bolshevism would deprive the following persons of the right to participate in the affairs of government:

(a) Millions of farmers, merchants, and manufacturers, both large and small, employing persons in the conduct of their business, and all professional and business men utilizing the services of a clerk, bookkeeper, or stenographer.

(b) All persons receiving interest on borrowed money or bonds, rent from real estate or personal property, and dividends from stocks of any kind.

(c) All traders, merchants, and dealers, even though they do not employ another person in the conduct of their business.

(d) All preachers, priests, janitors, and employees of all churches and religious bodies.

It would result in the confiscation by the Government thus constituted of the land of the United States including 6,361,502 farms of which 62.1 per cent, or 3,948,722 farms, are owned in fee by the farmers who cultivate them and represent the labor and toil of a life time. On the farms of the United States there are improvements, machinery, and live stock to the value of \$40,991,449,090 (census of 1910), all of which would be confiscated with the land. The confiscation program would include the more than 275,000 manufacturing establishments, including the \$22,790,980,000 of invested capital, much of which is owned by the small investor whose livelihood depends upon the success of the respective enterprises. The confiscation would also include 203,432 church edifices . . . Dwellings to the number of 17,805, 845, of which 9,093,675 are owned in fee with 5,984,248 entirely free from debt, would be confiscated and the owners dispossessed at the pleasure of the government.

Both newspapers and banks (including 11,397,553 depositors drawing interest on accounts in savings banks), would be confiscated, according to the committee's report, which added:

"One of the most appalling, and far reaching consequences of an application of Bolshevism in the United States would be found in the confiscation and liquidation of its life insurance companies. There is 20 per cent more life insurance in force in this country than in all the rest of the world and nine-tenths of it is mutual insurance. Almost 50,000,000 life insurance policies representing nearly \$30,000,000,000 of insurance, the substantial protection of the women and children of the Nation, would be rendered valueless."

The committee concluded:

"The activities of the Bolsheviki constitute a complete repudiation of modern civilization and the promulgation of the doctrine that the best attainment of the most backward member of society shall be the level at which mankind shall find its final and victorious goal."

A special memorandum "on certain aspects of the Bolshevik movement in Russia" was sent by Secretary of State Lansing to Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. The memorandum had been prepared by the Division of Russian Affairs of the Department of State and consisted of translations from Russian newspapers and official Bolshevik organs, supplemented by reports of American representatives in Russia. Secretary Lansing's letter of October 27, 1919 to Senator Lodge, accompanying the memorandum, stated:

The study which has been made of the Bolshevik movement, some of the results of which are furnished herewith, show conclusively that the purpose of

the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of government and society the world over, including those countries in which democratic institutions are already established. They have built up a political machine which, by the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the ruthlessness of its methods, suggests the Asiatic despotism of the early Tsars. The results of their exercise of power, as shown by the documents presented in the accompanying memorandum, have been demoralization, civil war, and economic collapse.

Secretary Lansing's successor, Bainbridge Colby, answered an inquiry of the Italian Ambassador on the Russian-Polish crisis with a letter that became a basis of American foreign policy.⁷ Secretary Colby expressed his sympathies with the Russian people who, he said, were ruled by a tyrannical regime unapproved by the majority. Recognition of the Bolshevik government was not possible in his opinion because its regime was based upon "the negation of every principle of honor and good faith and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law." Moreover, the Soviet government's philosophy of world revolution was the basis of its existence in Russia and its continuance in power depended upon the "occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their governments and set up Bolshevik rule in their stead."

Bainbridge Colby's view that under Bolshevism there was and could be only political and economic chaos was the theme of all the congressional hearings and executive pronouncements of the period. It will be interesting later to contrast the nature of this attitude with that of subsequent years.

X: SUMMARY

THIS section has been entitled *War and Its Aftermath* because American opinion on most subjects during the years 1917 to 1921 was conditioned by a war psychology. Attitudes toward Russia were, of course, affected by this psychology.

American views on Russian developments may be summarized as follows:

1. The Provisional Government represented a new democracy.
2. The Bolshevik seizure of power was temporary.
3. Complete economic collapse had taken place.
4. Russia could never recover economically under the Bolsheviks.
5. Tremendously rich in resources, Russia was poor in capital endowment; a vast potential market could be opened if the

Bolsheviki were overthrown.

6. The United States was a friend of the Russian people but not of the Soviet Government.

The general attitude toward the Bolsheviki and Communism, except for that of a handful of books and the liberal weeklies, was overwhelmingly antagonistic. The wildest and vaguest notions concerning the nature of Communism existed. Communists were beasts, crack-pots, economic imbeciles, German agents. There was little analysis of Communism as a political and economic system, not even a modicum of description of the means by which it sought to control a vast economy. The few books and liberal weeklies, which sought to show the economic factors involved in Russia—such as the land-hunger of the peasants and the importance of the soviets (i.e. the workers' councils)—employed their material as arguments against the Bolsheviki. In 1920 and 1921 there was some reluctant admission that Bolshevism had "staying power"—attributable largely to the ill-advised blockade and foreign intervention.

It can be properly said that the American people from 1917 to 1921 did not know what was really going on in Russia. They did not understand the significance of the change in Russia, nor did they apprehend the meaning Russia could have as an economic symbol and social experiment. They interpreted the few economic ideas they did perceive in the simple terms of a minority ruling by violence and bloodshed. They weighed the possibilities of Communist effort in the United States not by its essential philosophy but by its apparent results in Russia.

Part Two

AMERICAN EXPANSION AND RUSSIA'S NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

1921 - 1929

I: LABOR ORGANS

DURING the 1920's the American Federation of Labor maintained an attitude of complete opposition to the Soviet Government. It felt outraged at the persecution of the trade unionists in Russia and at the forced subservience of the unions to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.¹ It issued an appeal entitled a "Cry For Help from the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Party" (then not completely suppressed), and endeavored to rally support for this cause.² The *American Federationist* published an account of conditions by George Stroomillo, one of four Russian unionists who had escaped from the country in order to present their cause to the international organizations of labor.³ In the same magazine William English Walling asserted that not only British labor but the entire Second International and the International Federation of Trade Unions were opposed to the Bolsheviks because of their treatment of Social Democrats.⁴

A British trade agreement with Russia was denounced by Gompers as meaningless, because, according to Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Russia had no trade to offer and never would have any as long as the present economic and political system continued.⁵ The United States was urged not to attend the Genoa Conference of 1922 because that would be a step towards recognition. If the Bolsheviks were recognized it would be impossible for the Russian people ever to achieve a free democratic state.⁶ In an article entitled "Why Labor Opposes Soviet Recognition," Samuel Gompers expressed the opinion that the Bolsheviks sought to rule in the United States, and he accused American bankers

of favoring Russian recognition for selfish trade purposes.' Surveying the trade union movement in Eastern Europe, the author of another *Federationist* article emphatically declared that labor organizations in Russia were not genuine and did not represent the workers.⁹

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, however, continued their sympathy toward Russia. *Advance* insisted that aid be rendered during the existing famine.¹⁰ It did not feel the unions had lost status in Soviet Russia but rather that they had triumphed because the existing government was their government (therefore workers could not very well strike against themselves). "Russia," an editorial exulted, "is greeted with genuine joy and enthusiasm by the enlightened workers of the world upon her entry into the fifth year of freedom and independence."¹¹ The Russian-American Industrial Corporation, set up in Russia through the Amalgamated Clothing Workers to manufacture clothing, became a prominent theme in the pages of *Advance* during the 20's. A regular column called R. A. I. C. reported results of the enterprise.¹²

Advance was, however, bitterly opposed to those who interfered with the Amalgamated unions for Communist purposes; loyalty to the Amalgamated came first. Moreover, the Amalgamated did not approve of the Communist Party in Russia. Approval was extended specifically to the efforts which the Russian workers were making to protect themselves and better their lives. To the extent that the Soviet Government was a labor government it enjoyed the Amalgamated's support though the union was opposed to that government's dictatorship methods.¹³

There was recognition in *Advance* of the great problems ahead—adjustment of relations between peasant and worker, inadequate machinery, lack of technical skill, and bad industrial habits. *Advance* lamented "the sordid story of factional fighting," but thought a great event had taken place in Russia, for "left to its own resources, a people politically ignorant, economically in ruins, encircled, blockaded, starved, exhausted, the workers and the peasants found their way to cohesion, to power, to social self-determination, to clear orientation."¹⁴ The Soviet Government had come to stay and it should be recognized.¹⁵

The International Ladies Garment Workers Union continued to oppose the Soviet regime although not as vehemently as the American Federation of Labor. In 1922, *Justice* editorially cried out against "the bloody spectacle which is being enacted these days in Moscow."¹⁶ The magazine derided Sidney Hillman's attitude toward Russia,¹⁷ although it was indignant at the "old and ear-fagged" arguments against Russia presented by Hoover and Hughes.¹⁸ Lenin's death in 1924 prompted a summary of the Russian Revolution as "an abortive child." Did Lenin on his death bed see the Promised Land? *Justice* did not think so:

If he saw anything at all, he must have seen how everything he had striven to build up was tottering into dismal failure. He must have surely observed that even the little he accomplished could not endure. It surely could not escape his vision that he had been building on sand, for his was a revolution of sheer despair, naked passion, and therefore an inevitable failure.²⁸

Justice observed that conditions under the New Economic Policy were deplorable. Among other things, workers were being dissuaded from asking for more wages yet these very workers were exploiting the poverty-stricken peasants.²⁹

The leaders of the I. L. G. W. U. opposed those activities in their union which they believed were directly inspired by Moscow.³⁰ As late as 1929, the union still felt that Bolshevism was the greatest calamity which could befall a nation, a calamity far worse than "plagues, famine or war."³¹

What favorable attitudes the *Locomotive Engineers' Journal* maintained toward Russia were based on "practical grounds." It felt that Russia was the key to the recovery of Europe³² and it criticized Gompers for his position in this connection.

We are rightly concerned when Mr. Gompers, claiming to speak for American labor, officially urges our government to adopt a policy toward Russia that will take bread and butter out of the mouths of American workers and sow the seeds of chaos in Europe.³³

The *Journal* urged recognition and international cooperation,³⁴ and editorially commended the Amalgamated for its efforts in Russia.

If an American labor union with several hundred thousand members actually carries on a great industrial enterprise in Russia, then perhaps common sense may replace fear and folly in the Russian policy of our Department of State.³⁵

During the twenties the *Journal* published continuous reports of progress in the cooperatives, improvement of wages, railway development, agriculture mechanization, etc.³⁶ Commenting on the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, it told its readers:

A reporter in Russia writes that the Russian courts are as severe on capitalists as American courts are on labor; convictions there are as common as injunctions in American cities.³⁷

The readers of the *Journal* were asked to imagine American workers sitting in the Senate Chambers discussing the economic fate of the country and questioning the directors of industry—as was happening in Russia.

II: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL MAGAZINES

DURING 1921 the *Annalist* published a series of articles by Leo Pasvolsky on labor conditions in Russia. The picture he presented was largely supported by later studies. He showed that the trade unions were controlled through carefully planned interpenetration by the Communist Party. The following statement of the Tenth All-Russian Congress of the Communist Party was quoted by Pasvolsky:

In a period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the role of the trade unions must be in the organization of production, in energetic participation in the central institutions of government, in control, registration and distribution of man power, in the organization and unification of the city and rural districts. The trade unions must be schools of Communism, charged with the task of looking after the interests of the masses of non-party members, who must be taught the advantages of common work.¹

In Pasvolsky's opinion, this policy reduced the role of the trade unions simply to that of the administration of orders and the enforcement of "repressive and punitive tasks." Reviewing conditions during the early 1920's, Pasvolsky was inclined to doubt that the Soviet Government would be able to weather the storms of labor troubles.² Shortage of food supplies had resulted in high prices, thus causing the workers to leave the cities and return to the farms. Labor productivity declined both because of inefficiency and absenteeism. Workers were forced to toil in their own vegetable gardens at night in order to get enough food. The Government finally resorted to measures of compulsion, but without improvement in results. Even when militarization of labor was attempted it was unsuccessful. Indeed, the Third Red Army, when turned into the First Army of Labor, produced five times less than civilians (according to official figures cited by Pasvolsky). The absence of a man from work for three days or more in one month became a criminal offense subject to prosecution on the high charge of sabotage.³

The comparatively few articles in American business and financial magazines during the middle and later 20's did little to change this gloomy picture. While such items as a note in the *Manufacturer's Record* of 1925 repeated the accepted viewpoint that Russian wages were extremely low,⁴ the *London Economist* indicated that real wages would probably exceed those of the pre-war level, although overtime and unemployment still existed.⁵ The general paucity of comment on Russian labor conditions in American business and financial magazines during the 20's may have been due partly to the domestic prosperity of the period which tempered the tendency to draw sharp comparisons. In this respect, the decade differed markedly from the depression 30's.

AMERICAN EXPANSION AND RUSSIA'S NEW POLICY 55

Although showing only a superficial interest in Soviet labor, American businessmen were well informed on Russian money and banking during the period of the NEP. During the first half of the NEP's brief existence the Russian Government was trying to lay the foundation for a stable currency. The *Annalist* contended that the small and decreasing Russian gold supply was being dangled before American businessmen to secure political and commercial recognition for the Bolsheviks.⁸ Less than six months later, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, quoting the *New York Times*, reported that the Russian gold supply had dwindled away.⁷

Alzada Comstock, writing in the *Annalist*, reviewed Russia's new financial policies. At first, this writer said, depreciation was deliberately used by the Government to undermine private financial interests in the country. The NEP, however, required a stabilized currency and efforts were made to achieve that end. Assurances were given that the printing of money would stop despite the fact that it had to continue until monetary taxes were more fully developed.⁹ For the first six months of 1922 new currency issues exceeded total revenue from all resources by almost 45 percent.⁹ The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* related that the Fidelity Trust Company of Philadelphia, as a combined object lesson and advertisement, distributed to its customers 100,000 ruble notes (formerly worth \$50,000) which had become worthless.¹⁰

As a concession to capitalism, the Soviet Government established the State Bank in 1921. This institution, which had no connection with the old Imperial Russian Bank, was under government control requiring that half its profits go into a surplus fund, not more than 20 percent of which could be used to improve the living conditions of its employees. The remainder went to the Government. Interest rates were initially from 8 to 12 percent, but private institutions charged even more. Then plans were laid for the establishment of a similar bank for foreign trade since foreign banks had begun to ask permission to open branches in Russia.¹¹ In the beginning, the inadequacy of banking facilities brought into existence such institutions as illegal banks, barter banks, and the use of pre-war gold rubles as standards for trading.¹²

Writing in the *Journal of the American Bankers Association*, Jerome Landfield agreed with others that the Bolsheviks could not last. They had used up the country's capital, gold, and agricultural reserves and were maintaining themselves by exporting food needed at home and by currency inflation.¹³ A degree of stabilization was somehow achieved in the year 1925-1926. But it remained dependent,

as always, upon the continued supply of manufactured goods for the peasants. Otherwise the latter would hide their grain from the Government and there would be nothing to export. The "scissors"—that is, spread or difference between the prices of industrial commodities and agricultural products—opened again during that year, but the promise of a good harvest, lowering the price of grain, gave some assurance that the financial storm would be weathered.¹⁴

Quoting the Russian Information Bureau in Washington, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported that the year 1925-1926 was the second in which the Government could meet all its expenses without paper issues or foreign loans. It reminded its readers that for twenty years before the war the Czar's Government was able to effect a balance only three times without borrowing from foreign bankers.¹⁵ The Russian State Bank, according to the same magazine, increased its capital from 10 to 25 million *chervonetzi*. The bank had 500 branches throughout the country and its undivided profits for the year were 36 million rubles.¹⁶ V. A. Korobhoff, a director of the bank, in an address before the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, explained that the Soviet Government, eager to co-operate with the world, had strengthened and broadened the base of the bank, the resources of which amounted to two billion dollars.¹⁷ Even before the advent of the Five Year Plan the bank was linked closely with the Council of People's Commissars, the Commissariat of Trade, the Commissariat of Finance, and other agencies in the planning of economic life. The new accounting of a state-owned economy offered some interesting peculiarities. For example, land and raw materials were not listed; good will, franchises and similar intangible assets were likewise excluded. The task of bookkeeping was directed at the "correct" application of capital.¹⁸

A reform in the tax system, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported, freed 35 percent of the peasantry—the poorest—from taxes. Another 53 percent—the middle peasants—would now have to pay only 38 percent, instead of half the whole revenue. The remaining group—the more wealthy peasants or kulaks—would shoulder 62 percent of the total tax burden. This class raised great protest, arguing the Government was putting a premium on the idleness of the poor peasants.¹⁹

During the period of the NEP, Russia stabilized its currency and achieved a closer integration of its financial structure. While not conveying a clear or complete picture of these developments, the business and financial magazines did give the broad outline of events.

In the *Journal of the American Bankers Association* of June,

1922, Ivan Narodny noted that English and German business men were trading with Russia even though their home newspapers opposed such relations. These business men felt that the Russia of 1922, under the NEP, was a long way from Communism as such, that old times were returning. Narodny was certain the new State Bank would stabilize the currency. German, English and Dutch entrepreneurs were already in Russia, awaiting her revival.²⁸

To others the prospects did not seem so bright. *Nation's Business* pointed out that Germany had re-entered Soviet trade only through allowing Russia credits.²⁹ The *Journal of the American Bankers Association* believed, too, that internal conditions in Russia were still unfavorable to foreign trade. True, a demand existed, but not an effective one. Imports were being paid for entirely out of gold reserves, which would soon be exhausted. There was little possibility of an export surplus; capital would not flow into mixed companies composed of government and private ownership. Furthermore, Soviet agriculture was declining.³⁰

Then followed sharply contradictory accounts of the situation. Some pointed to the developing foreign trade; others warned of economic collapse.³¹ The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported that in 1925 American-Russian trade had broken all records to date. Moreover, 69.8 percent of the transactions were effected through credits from banks or individual American firms, thus revealing a strengthening Soviet credit.³² The same year, it noted, Russian foreign trade had reached the total of one billion dollars, representing 75 percent of the annual volume of turnover during the five years prior to the World War.³³ Such figures did not convince those who contended that the forced liquidation of works of art and crown jewels was the basis for much of these credits.³⁴ Robert Crozier Long, in the *Journal of the American Bankers Association*, concluded that the possibilities of trade were highly exaggerated. One had only to recall that little Finland imported \$40 per capita as against Russia's import of only \$2.50 per capita.³⁵

Russian oil was a very prominent subject during the middle 20's, for it had become a world competitor of British and American oil. E. B. Dietrich, in the *Annalist*, stated that production had risen to 80 percent of the 1913 level and was being used by the Russians to establish vital credits.³⁶ *Index* thought that Royal Dutch Shell realized the growing importance of Russian oil reserves. Control of these reserves would be a dominant factor in the future world supply.³⁷ In the quarrels that ensued, the competing companies split in their policies on Russia. Standard Oil of New Jersey announced it would

shun the Soviet as long as private property rights were not recognized. Standard Oil of New York, on the other hand, renewed its contracts with the Soviet."⁹

Turning to other aspects of Russian trade, Alzada Comstock, in the *Annalist*, recommended that the United States extend credits and allow the Russians to export to us if they also bought here. A limit might be set, since our need of Russian products was not great, consisting chiefly of furs and other minor products."¹⁰ In 1928 the Treasury Department refused to permit the acceptance of Russian gold by the Assay office. In the complicated dispute which followed, the Equitable Trust and the Chase National Bank, agents in the transaction, would not admit ownership of the gold. The ultimate question consisted of establishing the fact that the Soviet Government itself was the owner. The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* quoted the *Journal of Commerce* as being surprised at the action of the Treasury Department, for gold shipments had become a regular transaction in Russian-American trade."¹¹

The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* listed the commercial and industrial concession agreements between Soviet Russia and foreign interests. The United States had 18.28 percent of the total; Germany had 27.12 percent; and England was third with 12.74 percent. At that time there were 758 additional concessions under negotiation."¹² The largest and most important concession since the revolution was that granted in 1924 to the W. A. Harriman interests in New York for developing 2,750,000 tons of manganese ore. Terms of the agreement included the right to employ local Russian labor and to bring in machinery and equipment free of duty.

The British and Germans tried to block this concession, arguing that non-recognition of Russia by the United States made it unfair to grant Americans any advantage. The article also cited the *New York Evening Post*, quoting a dispatch from a German correspondent that the concession contained clauses amounting to *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Union by the American company."¹³

The *Annalist* related that both the General Electric Company and the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company had formulated and submitted plans for complete electrification of the Ukrainian metallurgical industry. The *Annalist* commented that concessions seemed to have become a large part of Russia's economic life. The concessions were allowed twenty to thirty-five years for amortization; a minimum production requirement was usually agreed upon; full protection against loss due to legislation was assured; and at the expir-

ation of the concession the property was to return to the U.S.S.R., with the right to the concessionaire to sell the old equipment."³

The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* gave a detailed account of the first attempt of the Soviet Government to tap the American investment markets. In 1927, it offered for sale part of a 30-million dollar Russian railway bond issue. The interest and principal were payable in dollars and the bonds were to be delivered to the purchasers by mail from Europe. The Chase National Bank, long the correspondent for the Soviet State Bank, assumed the task of payment, assisted by the Amalgamated Bank of Chicago and the Bank of Italy in San Francisco (with which the Soviet Bank also held deposits for payment of interest and principal). The bonds, advertised in leading American newspapers, were to mature in five and one-half years and were offered at 95 with interest at 9 percent. In the first two weeks \$100,000 worth was sold. Lloyds and the Midland Bank handled the sale in England."⁴

However, the State Department, according to the same magazine, disapproved of any financial arrangements designed to facilitate the sale of Soviet bonds in the United States. The department brought pressure on the Chase National Bank to act in accordance with U. S. policy."⁵

In September, 1928, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* (quoting the Associated Press from Moscow) reported that Russia had greatly liberalized the field for concessionaires because of an urgent need for capital. Concession areas now covered mining, trading, and timber. Germany still ranked first with 31 concessions, while the United States had also increased its agreements. The Chief of the Concessions Commission announced that the net profit of 97 concessions in the fiscal year 1926-27 totalled 3 million dollars on an invested capital of 3.5 millions, or 85.5 percent of the total investment."⁶ Moreover, according to the *Magazine of Wall Street*, the Soviet Government was formulating a new policy of less interference and satisfactory profits."⁷

Meanwhile, European holders of Czarist bonds tried to recover their losses by forming the International Holders of Russian Bonds. American holders, represented by the National City Bank, refused to join in this plan."⁸ A decision of the Board of Tax Appeals denied the claim of the First National Bank of St. Paul to deduct losses involving Russian Imperial bonds. The Board said these bonds had not been proven worthless at the end of the taxable year 1921."⁹

In the *Annalist* of March 21, 1921, Leo Pasvolosky described the many economic problems that Russia had not solved during the early years of the NEP. One of the most vexatious seemed to be

that of industrial management, with romantic Communist doctrine causing conflict of authority, which led to a disproportionate growth of managing officialdom and lack of coordination. He told a fascinating story of the fight against committee management of factories, which was introduced to gain greater efficiency. The method was subsequently modified though Lenin and Trotsky continued to support the principle of individual management. The trade unions, however, maintained that the abandonment of committee control was a betrayal of the revolution."

Pasvolsky also wrote about the food crisis of 1921, caused by a combination of bad crops and peasant opposition to requisitions," a dilemma intensified by the almost complete chaos in transportation." Private trading, he said, was being restored as monopoly distribution by government gave way to barter. Nor did the past, Pasvolsky concluded, promise that the Bolsheviki would be able adequately to organize Russia's economic life." In 1922, Herbert Hoover, addressing the American Section of the International Chamber of Commerce, repeated his well-known statement that Russia was an "economic vacuum."" In the same year, the *Annalist* characterized conditions in Russia as demoralized and chaotic." Conceding that Russia's condition was not yet one of economic collapse, the magazine said it had reached a state of advanced decadence."

However, by the middle of the next year, the *Annalist* itself, like other publications, was giving more favorable reports. An article in the *Annalist* by Eugene M. Kayden stated that domestic trade was reviving and that, even allowing for inflation, purchasing power had increased. Kayden believed the revival was due to the stimulus of the NEP although, with some contradiction, he reported that the state trading trusts and syndicates were getting the lion's share of the volume." By 1925 the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, reviewing Hullinger's *The Reforging of Russia*, observed that "Russia with her great resources may easily become the leading economic force in Europe.""

There were many anti-Communists who insisted the future of Russia was being crippled by the Bolshevik die-hards who were not allowing the natural forces of the NEP to operate freely. In the *Journal of the American Bankers Association*, Robert Crozier Long pointed out that it was capitalistic banking, in itself a negation of Communist doctrine, which provided the main factor in the recovery." The *Manufacturer's Record* was still confident the Soviet would fall and be replaced by a "sound" government." Reports were contradictory. Some asserted that the trusts and syndicates were successfully

representing the state in limited competition with private trade," others were certain that Russia was reluctantly but inevitably being guided back to orthodox capitalism.¹⁴ Toleration of private trade, foreign concessions, failure of state distribution, and the nature of the State trusts as virtually private businesses—these were cited as instances of weakening Bolshevik morale.¹⁵

Returning to the subject of Russian oil, the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported that production in 1927 had reached the largest volume in twenty-five years.¹⁶ Russian oil, said *Index*, was becoming increasingly important, and would be the next reservoir which Europe could use.¹⁷

In January, 1928, the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce staged an exhibition of Russian education, science, and industry in New York City.¹⁸ The same year, *Nation's Business* found the Soviet workers non-committal. Even though hours were shorter, food was scarce and bread lines long.¹⁹ The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* published rumors of a Russian food crisis. But when the U.S.S.R. was said to be buying wheat in the United States, S. G. Bron, head of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, denied the report.²⁰

From 1921 to 1929, the opinion of the business and financial magazines shifted to a more dispassionate appraisal of Russia. Reports of general progress—improvements in labor conditions, money and banking, foreign trade, investments and varied economic activity—indicated that Russia was regaining health. Curiously, this conclusion was not reached through deliberate analysis. It was rather an impression resulting from the cumulative weight of the reported facts.

III: TRADE PERIODICALS

ALTHOUGH Russia's resources and industrial progress were under wide discussion, the trade journals during the 1920's devoted little attention to the subject. Like the business and financial magazines, the trade journals viewed the NEP as a return to capitalism. The *American Machinist* of August 4, 1921, was typical of many in seeing the NEP as proof that the Russians were "abandoning their absurd radical ideas."²¹ Meeting the great demand for goods was a problem that bulked large. *Machinery* thought the only way the

United States could furnish machine tools to Russia was through an extension of credit. Europe, it observed, was trying to solve the difficulty through barter.⁸

Nevertheless, J. A. Massel, in the same magazine of April, 1925, was able to report that Russia had acquired new agricultural machinery, had achieved much improvement in railroad equipment and was making strenuous efforts to get the most modern and efficient tools.⁹ *Iron Age*, too, reported that the demand for industrial machinery and agricultural equipment was growing. It published a long list of American exports to Russia, including oil-well supplies, typewriters and calculating machines, as well as heavy-duty industrial and agricultural equipment.⁴ Russia needed more of our cotton, said *Textile World*, and again emphasized the question of credits.⁵ *Iron Age* noted that Germany's 90-million dollar credit to Russia enabled her to secure orders for metallurgical, oil, mining and electrical equipment, paper, textile and chemical products.⁶ The trade journals joined the business and financial papers in saying that Russia's needs were vast and represented a great opportunity for the United States. All agreed that the basic difficulty was credits.

The early reports on the state of Russia's natural resources were very discouraging. The *Engineering & Mining Journal*, in 1921, quoted figures showing a marked decline in oil production in the Baku and Grosnyi districts, a condition intensified by the great lack of railroads and other forms of transportation.⁷ *National Petroleum News* saw no hope of development unless the Soviet offered concessions to trained foreigners.⁸ Describing the chaotic state of the oil fields, the same magazine minced no words:

It is clear that a laborer ill-clothed and badly shod, who does not eat enough to satisfy his hunger, and who quits his work at ten or eleven o'clock in the forenoon to form a line to get a popular soup, is not capable of steady work.⁹

A similar condition in the metallurgical industries was reported during the early 20's. *Iron Age* pictured almost a complete breakdown. It described the deterioration that began when "Lenin and Company" got on the "throne." Ignorant workmen were put in charge and discipline immediately disappeared. The "armored" plants were the leaders (composing only 10 percent of the whole) but even they were breaking down.¹⁰ L. A. Perret, in *Mining and Scientific Press*, thought Russia could be successful only if American energy and business insight were added to Russian experience.¹¹

Gradually a more favorable tendency developed. T. J. Jones, in *Mining and Scientific Press*, reported a rehabilitation of Russian mining. Lenin, he thought, was struggling toward a practical solution.¹²

The *Engineering and Mining Journal* saw production increasing, and even recommended careful investment in concessions.²³ *Coal Age* reported Soviet reforms in federal control of coal mining and pointed to an increased production per capita,²⁴ saying output was chiefly limited by a scarcity of markets.²⁵

By 1926 *Steel* found it necessary to record that Russian steel ingot production had increased from 5 to 21 million tons compared with a United States increase during the same period of but 7 million tons. *Steel* doubted, however, that Russia could continue production at such a level.²⁶ At that juncture came news of the discovery of large potash deposits in eastern European Russia.²⁷ The *Engineering and Mining Journal* deemed this discovery of world importance. In addition, a number of by-products had been found.²⁸ H. J. Freyn, president of the Freyn Engineering Company, saw great improvement in iron and steel under the NEP.²⁹ John A. Garcia, addressing the New York meeting of the American Institute of Mechanical Engineers in February, 1928, described working conditions at a Russian coal mine as follows:

It was my impression that the workers at and about the mine were a fairly contented lot of people, well housed in the district where the campaign of improvement had reached the state of town development, protected against physical injury at or in the mines by well-designed laws and local rules, guaranteed fairly regular work by a system of storage of output in the absence of railroad cars or orders, vacation periods on full pay, doctor and dental services for themselves and families, and all the various privileges that go with the so-called socialistic form of government.³⁰

Shortly afterward John B. Bubb, in the *Engineering and Mining Journal* decided that the Russian engineer was discarding his usual theoretical approach and becoming more practical. In platinum and gold mining the U.S.S.R. was replacing hand equipment with power methods and more efficient crews. Bubb predicted that costs of production in these fields would decrease.³¹ The next month the same magazine reported that the tungsten of Siberia had been opened to foreign exploitation³² and noted that the Lena Gold Fields, an English concession, were exceeding expectations and thereby allowing greater expenditures on development than were first estimated.³³ *Mining and Metallurgy* said Russia had raised domestic consumption of all metals above the pre-war level, especially of copper, tin, and aluminum.³⁴ *Iron Age* of November, 1928, reported the country approaching the pre-war level in steel output,³⁵ taking note four months later that steel production was still increasing.³⁶

Very early the great possibilities of power development in Russia inspired prophecies. Charles P. Steinmetz, in the *Electrical World* of

September 30, 1922, was enthusiastic. "Whatever else people may think of Lenin and his doctrine," he reflected, "it is evident that his scheme for the electrification of Russia is sane and far-reaching in its effect . . . who knows but that an electrified Russia may arise in the future due in part to the visions of a Moscow dictator?"⁷⁷ An editorial in the same issue, commenting on Steinmetz' remarks, admitted these possibilities but expressed doubt whether capital would be available. "At present," the editorial observed, "the situation looks to us more like poker than investment."⁷⁸ In 1924, however, a special correspondent of *Electrical World* was prepared to admit: "Even those who are severely critical of the Soviet regime concede that its officials are going at the great tasks which confront them and are showing some accomplishments."⁷⁹

There followed numerous accounts of developing electrification in Russia. In July, 1926, *Electrical World* gave in detail the plans for hydro-electric development on the Dnieper River. The territory around the Dnieper covered in the project was greater in area than Germany.⁸⁰ In March, 1927, the same magazine announced that Hugh L. Cooper & Co. had been retained to construct the plant. Cooper himself was quoted as saying: "The completion of this project will give Russia a vast unit of hydro-electric energy at a cost well below the average of hydro-electric energy in the United States and, at the same time, produce low costs of transportation for imports and exports through Kherson and east of Odessa."⁸¹

Iron Age reported that the steel industry of southern Russia would be co-ordinated with a super-power system.⁸² *Power* stated that "a second plant on the River Svir will be unique in that the water wheels will be, as far as dimensions are concerned, the largest ever manufactured."⁸³ According to *Electrical World* early in 1929, about 44 percent of Russian industrial plants during 1925-1926 were powered by electricity.⁸⁴ *Power* observed that State industries were now making electrical equipment formerly imported.⁸⁵

Although the trade journals were favorably impressed by Russia's use of her resources, their attitude toward her general industrial progress was more critical. As already noted, in the early years they reported chaos and ruin. In 1921 Sterling H. Bunnell, in *Iron Age*, wrote that Sovietism is "industrial freedom that is actual slavery."⁸⁶ *Engineering News* later that year felt that intensive nationalization coupled with greed and executive impotence had undermined economic stability.⁸⁷ One engineer, when asked the greatest need of his plant, reflected the discontent of labor and the lack of discipline in his terse reply, "A proprietor."⁸⁸ The NEP, according to *American Machinery*,

was the equivalent of admission by Lenin of the defeat of Communism." The future, maintained that publication, depended upon the fall of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁰ *Railway Age* and *Engineering News* likewise agreed Russia was bankrupt.⁴¹

While improvements in the U.S.S.R. were reported by *Textile World* in December, 1923, it nevertheless believed that the Bolsheviks, in order to achieve reconstruction, had "sacrificed all their theoretical doctrines . . . like real politicians."⁴² Samuel S. Shipman, in *Industrial Management* of October, 1925, said the disparity between skilled and unskilled workers at Kemerovo, in Siberia, was far greater than in the United States. Moreover, paternalistic and bureaucratic regulations were becoming increasingly irksome.⁴³ The *Engineering and Mining Journal* carried the news that a gold concession in the province of Tomsk had been returned to its owners and commented that this step appeared "to be the first of the de-nationalizing."⁴⁴

A few articles were mildly favorable. One by Stewart McCulloch Marshall in *Iron Age* of July 1, 1926, asserted that the condition of the plants was good in view of Russia's troubles during the past ten years.⁴⁵ H. J. Freyn, in the *Iron Trade Review*, said the industrial possibilities of Russia were practically untouched.⁴⁶ M. Sorokin, Chairman of the Soviet Automobile Trust, writing in *Automotive Industry*, urged the United States to cooperate with Russia's fast growing automobile industry and thus later earn the lion's share of the auto import trade.⁴⁷

It is curious to note the apathy of the trade journals from 1921 to 1929 on matters concerning Russia. The only aspect which seemed to attract their attention was the development of Russian resources. They left the problem of supplying Russia's industrial needs largely unexplored. Perhaps their attitude toward Russia's industrial progress may be explained by their preoccupation with the great activity here in America, backed by the confidence that Soviet competition need not be feared. It is surprising also that the small percentage of the basic industries restored to private ownership constituted enough evidence to convince the trade journals that the NEP was literally a return to capitalism.

IV: ECONOMIC MAGAZINES

MORE interest in Russia was displayed by the major economic magazines between 1921-1929 than the preceding years. In the first period these publications printed only one article on the U.S.S.R. In the next they published twelve articles (not counting book reviews). However, twelve articles in nine years can hardly be considered an adequate treatment of so vast and important a subject. These articles, though characteristic of all those published during the period, were fuller and more analytical. But there was still no special focus, nor the professionally expert discussion to be expected from specialists on economic matters.

One article, "The Commercial Importance of Russia," by A. E. Taylor, in the *American Economic Review*,² accounted for the Soviet post-war position by tracing the effects of the World War and subsequent events on Russian economic development. "The problem of Russia," Taylor said, "is not merely an internal situation involving a catastrophic experiment in Communism; it is a problem in international commerce." Taylor's figures showed that Russia, prior to the war, had exported more than she imported and that investments in Russia made up the difference. In the long run, this balance of exports over imports was principally used to pay fixed charges on foreign capital (interest and amortization) loaned to or invested in Russia. The country's foreign trade before the war amounted to nearly four percent of total international trade. Russia ranked sixth in order of exporters, ninth as an importer, and seventh in the monetary value of total foreign trade. Her greatest commerce was with Germany, which received one-fourth of Russian exports and supplied one-third of Russian imports. The United States ranked third as exporter to Russia but imported very little from her.

Taylor said, "War and Communism have erased for the time being the surplus-export productivity of Russia and her export functions have been taken over by other countries." The United States alone had taken over two-thirds of the task of replacing the Russian bread-grains. The same was true of lumber, flax, oil, and other Russian products. Substitution, rival production or disuse had deprived them of world importance commercially. Taylor explained that as Russian exports declined, her imports naturally decreased, and had to be paid for with gold, concessions or credits. Yet Russia remained the greatest potential market for European consumption goods. Trans-oceanic countries had only limited needs, but Russia's low standard of living made the country a natural market for European products. "It is

clear," Taylor concluded, "that what the world misses today is not Russian production, but Russian consumption." Moreover, Russian economic restoration would mean the production of foods and industrial raw materials but not manufactured goods. It is therefore to be expected, Taylor said, that Russia will receive encouragement for the development of agriculture, forestry and mining, but will be refused capital for industrial rehabilitation.

In the *Journal of Political Economy*, Miss Amy Hewes briefly reviewed the Russian wage systems.⁹ Through the admission of Lenin that "we have withdrawn to State Capitalism," said Miss Hewes, a new system of collective payment in wages was instituted, a culmination of the many methods used since the Bolsheviki came into power. Equalization was tried at the outset. By the end of 1919, however, there were thirty-five classes of workers with corresponding payments. Generally compensation was on a time basis, although piece-work was used when advisable. During the period of inflation the decreasing value of money made mere wage increases an insufficient reward, so premiums in the articles produced were offered. The real change in wage policy occurred under the New Economic Policy.

The Hewes article explained that under the NEP, factories formerly under state administration were leased to cooperatives, labor groups and individuals in order to stimulate competition, improve the quality and increase the quantity of goods. The system of "collective payment" was applied only to industries retained by the State. This method was determined as follows: every establishment had a required minimum production; from this figure was calculated the amount of food, clothing and other commodities the workers needed to reach the minimum quota. To this enough was added to cover the differentials of work and skill, a percentage of the value of the total output, the cost of necessary machinery, raw materials and upkeep. This sum was designated the "equipment and wages fund" and was guaranteed by the state as long as minimum output was maintained and kept pace with a predetermined schedule. While this policy brought wages to a more direct relation with output, workers often objected that factors beyond their control, such as failure of supplies, slowed them up. On the other hand, the system compelled the workers to consider the whole economic structure. By the end of October, 1921, ninety-nine large plants employing 400,000 workers had been placed on "collective payment" and some remarkable results were reported. Production had increased and absenteeism decreased. A method of energizing the Russian worker had apparently been found.

The result, the writer pointed out, was a wage system embodying

certain features that organized labor in capitalist countries vigorously opposed. Though production was stimulated by increased payment, the workers were penalized collectively if output fell short. Likewise bonuses for quantity production brought back the much dreaded speedup. Nevertheless, the trade unions for the most part approved of the policy. The All-Russian Council of Trade Unions cooperated in drawing-up the schedules and revising them from time to time. It was Miss Hewes' conclusion that if they proved successful and were extended the ultimate program of the Communist state would be deferred indefinitely.

A detailed report on trade unions was later given by Miss Hewes in the *American Economic Review*.⁸ Even after the advent of the NEP, said Miss Hewes, the mere existence of trade unions in an essentially non-capitalistic society created doubt concerning their real nature. They differed from trade unions in other countries in that they were young, industrial instead of craft in setup, and in their revolutionary intellectual leadership. Except for a flourish during the liberalized 1905-06 regime, they had occupied only an unimportant semi-legal status. Later trade unions had been confused by the many political parties, each with its own plan for progress or revolution. After the February Revolution, the unions could operate openly. At first the unions were distinctly moderate, opposing both the Bolshevik resolutions to end the war and their plans to establish control of industry by the Soviets (i.e., workers' councils). The unions declared that "the process of control was too difficult and complicated for the proletariat to undertake the entire or even the greater part of this control." Many unions had resisted the October revolution, chiefly the commercial and bank employees, the office staffs and higher officials of the railway and telegraph workers and the printers. The sabotage instituted by this opposition proved difficult to combat. After the October Revolution, Amy Hewes continued, the unions became more powerful because of complete interpenetration of Communist and militaristic control.

Once in the saddle, the workers were faced with practical problems of management. Subordinating local unions to national co-operation and centralized control was a hard task. The Communist Party, at its Ninth Congress in March, 1920, faced an organized labor opposition in its own ranks, seeking to free labor from State control. This faction argued that the governmentalization of industry had reached the danger point. Another objection was that, under the NEP, the re-appearance of the individual employer thrust the trade unions nearer the old basis.

Miss Hewes believed that trade unions would continue to exist in Russia because they represented the interests of the workers as

producers in contrast to those of the people as consumers. Under the NEP the problems of unemployment, wage difficulties and the reappearing profit-taker would require solution. Moreover, the antagonism between the peasants and the industrial workers had to be bridged. Lenin realized that the peasants and the industrial workers, as opposing classes, made a classless society impossible. He understood, too, that the clash between them had economic justification. But it was refreshing, Miss Hewes concluded, to witness the frankness with which the problems were attacked. The most promising aspect was the amazing honesty which characterized the Russian reports of actual conditions. Real solutions, she felt, would come through economic analysis of immediate situations and not, as the workers insisted, through principles developed in the middle of the Nineteenth Century.

Russia figured prominently in the account of the Trade Union Educational League and the general American labor movement which Earl R. Beckner gave in the *Journal of Political Economy*.⁴ William Z. Foster organized the T.U.E.L. in 1920 because he believed the American labor movement "bankrupt," that it had "no conception of the true meaning of the labor struggle," took "capitalist economics and morals for granted," had no ideals, and was poorly organized. To Foster its backwardness was evidenced by its lack of international affiliations, its need for an active labor press and, finally, its inadequate leadership. The radicals of the League, Beckner said, wanted "to win the trade union movement away from the long accepted principles of craft unionism and non-partisan political action and to substitute the principles of industrial unionism and independent working-class political action." The goal these radicals set for the American working class was a Communistic state in America similar to that existing in Russia. According to Beckner, the plan was not to create dual unionism but to strengthen the existing trade union structure by keeping the radicals in, thus fusing the unions into "fighting, revolutionary bodies." They wanted to parallel the entire American Federation of Labor with the T.U.E.L. as an auxiliary of the trade unions, not a substitute for them. However, the principal planks enunciated by the *Labor Herald*, official organ of the T.U.E.L., and in many pamphlets, indicated larger intentions. They urged that the doctrine of class struggle be adopted. They planned to amalgamate craft unions already existing in an industry into an industrial union. The League believed that industrial unionism was the logical development and a direct continuation of a perfectly natural evolution of structure corresponding to the changing shape of industrial ownership.

The T.U.E.L. contended that the activities of capitalist countries

against Russia were preventing world reconstruction. The American Government it felt, was allied with the other capitalist powers trying to overthrow the workers' rule in Russia. Even worse was the hostile attitude of the American Federation of Labor itself. According to Beckner, the U. S. Department of State knew that Foster had received \$40,000 in a trip to Moscow, and more money later. If this information was correct, Beckner concluded, the T.U.E.L. was the agent in the United States of the Red International of Labor Unions subsidized by it for the purpose of carrying on Communist propaganda in the trade unions of America. Beckner traced briefly the history of the League. It had met with defeat in the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen. In its challenge to the United Mine Workers in 1924, John L. Lewis won every contested point. Elsewhere partial advances were later lost (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and the Illinois Farmer-Labor Party backed by the Chicago Federation of Labor). Beckner observed that red-baiting and anti-Soviet prejudice in this country were invoked by the League's opponents.

J. E. Rossignol, in the *American Economic Review*,⁸ contended that accession to power by labor governments did not result in an immediate socialization of all or most means of production. Labor never remained long in control, nor had it taken power in the manner Marx predicted. Labor governments were supposed to arise only in developed industrial countries, "ripe" for revolution. Instead, workers had won power prematurely in Russia, resulting in expected failure and reaction. Rossignol said his thesis applied likewise to England and Germany. "Even in Russia," Rossignol insisted, "where something like a social revolution was actually brought about, the force of circumstances beyond governmental control seems to be leading the country back toward capitalism." Whenever the laborites gain too much control in business or "commit themselves unreservedly to socialism," more conservative parties, including a large section of wage earners, will present a united front against extremes. That was the explanation, Rossignol said, for the good natured tolerance with which the British regarded the late Ramsay MacDonald government. In the United States, too, Republicans and Democrats will "unite in opposition to the growing economic political power of labor."

According to Amy Hewes in the *Journal of Political Economy*,⁹ the attitude of the Soviet Government toward co-operatives could be divided into three phases. First the co-operatives were ignored, then seized and subordinated to the Government's purposes, and finally restored to a prominent and more or less independent position. In the

second period, the co-operatives were taken over in the following order: consumer's, productive, agricultural and distributive. When the Allies attempted to resume trade with Russia through the co-operatives, they realized that the semi-official status of the co-operatives would make such action inconsistent with their refusal to recognize Russia.

Under the New Economic Policy, Amy Hewes went on, the co-operatives entered their third phase. They were separated into four classes: trade and industry, agriculture, famine relief, and extension of co-operative enterprise. They were still nationalized but enjoyed a greater degree of independence. They became the central body for the conduct of foreign trade (a function ante-dating the NEP), establishing trading corporations in London and elsewhere. Internally, the co-operatives were bartering agents between the worker and the peasant. They also supplied raw materials for the handicraft trades. Given preference over individuals in leasing factories no longer under State control, the co-operatives were very active in the production of goods.

In agriculture, the same writer continued, the co-operatives were very successful in distributing farm machinery and in the introduction of new methods. They also proved extremely useful in famine relief. The degree of independence the co-operatives enjoyed under the NEP is not definitely known. The Government sought to harmonize and co-ordinate the several branches by creating interlocking directorates, apparently using the co-operatives to further its own policies.

The wide economic organization of co-operation was further indicated by Eugene M. Kayden's description of central co-operative banking in Russia.' This article appeared in the *Journal of Political Economy*. Although first disapproved by the Imperial Government, Kayden said, the co-operatives fought their way to prominence, numbering 16,055 establishments at the beginning of 1917. After much debate the Moscow Narodny Bank was established on March 16, 1911. It was prohibited from making long-term capital loans—its original intention—and restricted to short-term credit. Subscription of stock was limited to the co-operative societies, thus enabling the bank from the start to devote itself exclusively to their interests. With the fall of the Czar, the bank began making long-term loans for production and, under the Provisional Government, acted as the agent of the Ministry of Agriculture for the export and purchase of various goods abroad. It established a trading co-operative in London under the name of the Moscow Narodny Bank, Ltd.

The bank's increasingly strategic position, according to Kayden, necessitated the establishment of technical, seed, engineering, agronomist and statistical departments. When banking was nationalized in

1918, the bank became a Government bureau. The bank officers viewed this as a temporary status and stuck to their posts. Under the NEP their belief was justified, for in February, 1922, the Bank of Consumer's Co-operation was chartered. It was to face successfully the trying days of inflation, famine and disorganized private initiative. Several months later, the All-Russian Co-operative Bank was established, set up by twelve national co-operative federations. Its centralizing influence spread over the whole of Russian economic life. Marked by wise administration through difficult times, Kayden felt it had met all problems with competence and courage. Kayden did not describe the bank's exact relation to the government, but noted that the State Bank subscribed a small part of the capital in the reorganization of 1922. In general the relations of the Government and the bank were very close.

In the *Journal of Political Economy*,⁸ Alexis Goldenweiser, reporting from Germany, was pessimistic on the subject of banking and currency reform in Russia. Goldenweiser (who is now director of research with the Federal Reserve System) traced briefly the organization of the State Bank, its functions as a central bank prior to the NEP, and its operation as a Government bureau after the NEP. In 1922 the State Bank had been given the right to issue paper money backed 25 percent by gold or in stable foreign currencies and 75 percent by commercial paper or readily marketable securities. The new coin called *chervonets*, theoretically redeemable in gold, remained exclusively a domestic medium of exchange. By the end of 1923 *chervonetsi* constituted 80 percent of the total money in circulation. On June 16, 1924, the issue department of the State Bank showed "a total of thirty-eight million *chervonetsi* against which it held a reserve of 52 percent, consisting of precious metals and foreign currencies." Goldenweiser was not optimistic about the future, although he conceded that "from a technical point of view the reform appears to have been fairly successful, and the inevitable difficulties of the transitional period, such as the absence of subsidiary money, have been largely overcome." Reserves were in considerable excess of legal requirements and were adequate since a large number of the bank's customers were trusts, co-operatives, governmental and semi-governmental institutions and could be relied upon to repay their obligations. But there were larger issues which would influence the future. The Government's budget was out of balance, and while it was considerably less so in 1922-23 than previously, (45 percent against 87 percent in 1920-21), the banking reform which discontinued paper issues would make it harder to balance the budget. No success had been met in floating domestic loans. Fur-

thermore, general economic conditions of the country were not favorable. The "scissors," representing the difference between farm and manufacturing prices, were wide open. The crisis in industrial activity continued. Reduction in industrial prices led to unemployment, and budgetary economy intensified the trend. The newly developed commercial and industrial class was subjected to new persecutions. Finally, there had been a decided movement toward the left since Lenin's death. This drive away from capitalism would discourage the import of new capital and would impede the revival of economic initiative. Under these circumstances the future of Russian currency, as a part of the general economic and political prospects of the country, was far from promising.

Through a note in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*,⁹ American economists learned of the activities of the Conjuncture Institute at Moscow, formed by the Council of the Professors of the Agricultural Academy in Moscow and devoted to the scientific investigation of Russian as well as foreign data. During the period of inflation the Institute had constructed index numbers of prices as the only means of determining values, working closely with governmental agencies and industrial and co-operative organizations. Its work was separated into two large divisions, one for current and the other for long-time changes.

A brief description of the problems peculiar to Russia was given by S. A. Pervushin, a Russian economist, writing in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.¹⁰ Pervushin contended that the business cycles in Russia differed from those of the United States and likewise from those of western Europe (England, France and Germany). He gave five specific reasons: 1. The large size of its territory and the heterogeneous nature of its areas. 2. The industrial-agricultural character of the country, made up of a number of small agricultural enterprises and a decentralized internal market. 3. The extreme variability of certain elements in the economy (including the seasonal element). 4. The exceptionally important role played by the state and the factor of rational planning. 5. The reconstructive character of its processes in the post-revolutionary period since 1921.

A discussion in the November, 1927, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*,¹¹ conceded limitations were always necessary in a comparison of national incomes. The writer was nonetheless struck by the much greater equality of income in Russia and by the rate at which income increased. The rapid growth of income was due largely to the "reconstructive process" of the Russian commonwealth, though this rate slackened as the pre-war level of utilization of land and industrial

plants was reached. A large part of the income was from production, owned, operated or controlled by the state. Comparison with the United States revealed that there was greater uniformity between class and class in Russia than in the United States. Still the gap between the farmer and the mean wage-earner was considerably larger in Russia. On the other hand the distance between the wage earner and the capitalist entrepreneur was much more conspicuous in the United States.

"The ideal of income distribution in the Soviet Union," the article concluded, "is the elimination of extremes. This produces new problems in the question of capital for production. The absence of large private incomes and property accumulations forces the state to look elsewhere for sources of real capital. Hence a careful analysis of the growth, structure and distribution of national income . . . is of vital significance in the problems of Soviet economics."

Central planning in Russia was the subject of a round-table discussion reported in the Supplement to the *American Economic Review* of March, 1929.²⁸ Among those participating were Paul H. Douglas of the University of Chicago, Raymond T. Bye of the University of Pennsylvania and Clark Dickinson of the University of Michigan. The Socialist concept of planned and co-ordinated economic life represented by the effort in Russia was characterized as a "colossal and daring experiment." During the discussion, the technical organization and operation of the *Gosplan*, as well as the economic situation of Russia from 1921 to 1927 with regard to planned effort, were summarized. Three criteria were suggested for judging the *Gosplan* or any planned economy: 1. The behavior of the system in time of industrial crises. 2. The increase of national income. 3. Actual performance with respect to plan. After much discussion it was concluded that results were yet too meager to render a verdict either favorable or unfavorable. Bye insisted that if time proved that planned production works, capitalism would be forced to follow such a course. Already in America the actions of powerful groups of bankers, the subsidies to certain industries such as the merchant marine, the use of a revolving railway fund in which the excess profits of the stronger railroads are to be used to provide capital needed by the weaker ones, indicated the trend towards planning. Bye believed, too, that much of the *Gosplan* could be incorporated into capitalism "without doing violence to its essential features."

Most of the participants in the discussion agreed with this view. Douglas went so far as to suggest that the initial steps towards planning should be undertaken by the American Economic Association.

Although the task was not assumed, the suggestion did point to a small but sincere interest in the economic affairs of Russia, especially in the increasing importance of planning, in new banking concepts and other practices which were in sharp contrast to our own. However, there was still lacking a full, clear and basic analysis of a new economy by economists for economists.

V: LEARNED JOURNALS

THERE was little sympathy for Bolshevism in the learned magazines from 1917 to 1921. What friendliness was shown merely represented an effort to explain why Bolshevism had arisen. This kind of understanding was usually accompanied by the conviction that Bolshevism was a temporary phenomenon to be replaced in time by a moderate form of government. The New Economic Policy was hailed as the type of moderation which all had foreseen. During the 20's, Bolshevism was treated with a certain indulgence designed to expose its follies and confusions.

Leo Pasvolksy, in the *North American Review*, undertook to reveal the pretensions and fallacies of the *Proletkult*, the doctrine of proletarian culture resting on a class basis. "As such," he said, "the *Proletkult* is merely the expression of another phase of that more primitive stage of social development to which Communism would turn back the wheel of history."¹

According to many, the New Economic Policy was evidence enough that Communism could not succeed. *Current History* of March, 1921, published Lenin's address before the Soviet Congress, announcing the new plan of granting concessions to foreign capitalists,² and a few months later reported the protest which arose over it. *Current History* observed, "It may be said, in fact, that Lenin has been explaining ever since."³ At this time famine and rebellion were rampant in Russia, the magazine said,⁴ adding that Sovietism had crushed the peasant and workman, increased pauperism and established tyranny.⁵ The NEP had been introduced as a corrective. Jerome Davis, in the *Political Science Quarterly* of June, 1922, insisted that once the Bolsheviks gained power they had reversed many of their earlier ideas by introducing wage differentials and welcoming capitalists. "Today," he said, "we find the Bolsheviks,

except for phraseology and desire for world revolution and foreign propaganda, are rapidly approaching the other nations of Europe in their methods."⁹

In March, 1922, the *Annals* again published a series of articles on Russia, and once more condemned the Bolsheviks. Tyranny over the trade unions,⁷ desperate economic conditions,⁸ and famine⁹—these were the results of civil war and Bolshevik rule in Russia. In *Current History*, Abraham Epstein wrote that Russia's industrial exhaustion could be remedied only with the aid of foreign capital. The Soviet, he contended, had failed to effect either nationalization or decentralization. Moreover, the new leasing out of some smaller industries was not succeeding.¹⁰ One method used by the Government to replace its earlier schemes of distribution was through a more intense use of the old co-operatives. This program, according to Paxton Hibben in *Current History*, largely counter-balanced the effect of individual efforts under the NEP.¹¹ Former Governor J. P. Goodrich, of Indiana, in the same magazine, pointed out the fallacy of identifying the peasant commune or *mir* with Communism, for the former were independent and self-governing bodies with democratic principles.¹²

The real economic position of Russia under the NEP thus became the subject of much debate. Arthur Bullard declared in *Foreign Affairs* that "in all probability Lenin, Krassen and their friends laugh heartily when they hear their New Economic Policy described as a surrender to capitalism."¹³ *Current History*, in January, 1923, published an address by Lenin on the first five years of the Soviet. "Simply and frankly," an editorial observed, "he admitted the past mistakes of internal policy, and explained the motives for Russia's reversion to a form of State capitalism." Lenin, declared the editorial, made it very clear that in owning the land, the most important industries, and in carrying on the major part of commerce, the Soviet remained in control of all the essential economic factors.¹⁴

During 1923 and 1924 there were mixed feelings concerning the possibilities of Russia's economic development. Lincoln Hutchinson, writing in *Political Science Quarterly*, believed Russia could "come back" if, under the NEP, she went the whole way to economic sanity.¹⁵ In *Foreign Affairs* of March, 1924, Boris Bakhmeteff, former Ambassador to the United States from the Provisional Government, contended that Russia was at the crossroads. Powerful forces were driving her away from economic collectivism and internationalism. Bolshevism, no matter how large it appeared to the outside observer, was but a phase in the vast process of transformation from the old regime to the future democracy.¹⁶ W. H. Chamberlin also saw Russian Communism at the crossroads.

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There was great confusion, caused by the conflict between Trotsky and the Central Committee, by the unsuccessful results of the narrow concessions policy and the still unsolved problem of the peasant (whose status was becoming increasingly important).²⁷ Congressman James A. Frear, in the *Annals* of July, 1924, expressed the belief that under the liberalizing of Communist theories Russian industry was coming back. Frear believed, too, that the Russian people approved of their form of government.²⁸ Leo Pasvolsky, in the same issue, while agreeing that there would be a moderation of the government, could see no real hope of business revival unless foreign loans were extended.²⁹ After 1925, however, a contrary interpretation appeared, tempering the belief that the tendency was solely toward moderation and compromise. A. B. Darling, for example, described somewhat favorably the unification of Russian foreign and domestic trade into one commissariat of trade.³⁰ *Foreign Affairs* published a map calling attention to Russia's new economic divisions.³¹

The tenth anniversary of the Soviet Government in 1927 naturally occasioned much reflection on the past, present and future of the country. The *Annals* again published an issue devoted to Russia. P. B. Noyes, formerly American member of the Rhineland Commission and President of the Allied Committee for Occupied Germany, asserted that the picture of Russia in the mind of the average American was at least five years old. There was no Communism in Russia, said Noyes, for graded payrolls were the order of the day. Nor was the government going to fall; revolutionary violence had passed and the Russian people were now concerned chiefly with systematic work and education. Noyes saw the dictatorship of the proletariat turning, industrially and commercially, to opportunism. The "Redness" of the present rulers was fading to a light pink.³² Jacob Billikopf, in the same issue of the *Annals*, expressed an identical belief.³³

Current History, too, in November, 1927, published a series of articles on Russia. Walter Duranty recounted the ten years of struggle just ended. His was a favorable account of Soviet victories during the war, reorganization and the era of socialist construction (which he dated from 1925 to 1927). Duranty said that in spite of the "exhausting controversy between Trotsky and Stalin over what Trotsky believed to be wholesale capitulation before the petit-bourgeois tendencies of the Russian masses, the economic progress of Russia has been constant and the power has after all remained in the hands of the State . . . The future depends upon so many unknown contingencies that it is foolish to prophesy. But it may safely be said that the past ten years have shown that the weight of Russia is heavier in the balance than the weight of Communism."³⁴ All of the articles in the November issue of *Current History* (ex-

cluding, of course, those written by members of the Soviet Government) agreed that progress had been made but mostly at the price of abandoning Communist doctrine, and that the future depended upon further moderation. Boris Bakhmeteff, Kerenisky's Ambassador to the United States, concurred, although he foresaw in addition the probable fall of the Bolsheviks before the great forces of normalcy. Trotsky's exile seemed to him to foreshadow disintegration of the revolution.²⁸

At the end of 1928 and during the first part of 1929 the moderation under the NEP, although it never became capitalism, brought the Russian economy closer to the circumstances in the United States. American problems of centralization, the control of economic forces and the question of individual liberty suggested comparisons. Rexford G. Tugwell discussed this point in a *Political Science Quarterly* article, "Experimental Control in Russian Industry." He deplored the confusion of doctrine with realities that fomented rivalry which kept Russia and America apart. He felt that the objectives American economists were seeking—the reduction of waste and the balancing of economy—could be fruitfully studied in the light of Russian efforts in those directions.²⁹

Seldom, until the depression of 1930, was there any sharp comparison between Russian and American problems. Russian industrial expansion,³⁰ the fate of the peasant,³¹ and the significance of the Russian political structure³² were continuously discussed. Most characteristic of the 1921-1929 period was an increasing respect for the Bolsheviks, for their staying power, their sense of realities and their appreciation of compromise. At the same time, American observers failed to grasp that the compromises did not constitute a return to capitalism. Nor did they see that the NEP was an effort to establish an economic setup in between Capitalism and Communism—in itself a new thing. They were too ready to consider every compromise an admission that Bolshevism was falling. The significance of the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky was not clearly appreciated. Likewise they misunderstood the rigid determination of the Soviet to plan and control its economy, a determination that resulted in the first Five Year Plan.

From the beginning of the 20's Russia's position in world affairs became a prominent theme. *Current History* observed in March, 1921, that Russia's battle for trade was making slow progress.³³ How was Russia to re-enter the international economic fabric? Arthur Bullard, in the *Annals* of March, 1922, suggested a three-cornered credit arrangement. France owed us money; the United States did not want French goods; therefore, sell French goods directly to Russia on a long-term note payable to us. That would be better than having a short-term Russian note which could not be collected. The long-term note would be backed by Russia's natural resources, which in time would be developed.³⁴

Other commentators, like W. E. Walling in the *Annals*, were less constructive. They argued that Russia was the obstacle to the rehabilitation of Europe.³⁰ On the other hand, Paxton Hibben, executive secretary of the American Commission for the Relief of Russian Children, believed that recognition should be given so that Russia could get American capital and resume her proper position among nations. Hibben contended that Russia's claims against the United States were as just as the absurd "Alabama Claims."³¹ *Foreign Affairs* felt that the results of the Genoa and Hague Conferences, though meager, had cleared the atmosphere: "Russia, the great mystery of the last four years . . . has come out of its seclusion, it has shown itself willing, nay eager, to talk with other states." Though unrecognized by most nations, it had asserted itself in the concert of powers whether the others liked it or not.³²

The United States was not among the few countries which had early recognized Russia. Recognition formed the focal point of much discussion of the U.S.S.R. *Current History* for May, 1923, published the official statements of the Secretaries of State and Commerce (see the section on congressional hearings and executive pronouncements) explaining the position of the United States.³³ In the *Annals* of July, 1924, Jerome Davis expressed the view that the United States had pursued its anti-Russian prejudice long enough.³⁴ But Evan E. Young, Chief of the Division of European Affairs of the Department of State in the same issue, replied that Bolshevism did not represent the Russian people, that it plotted world revolution and that it was planning to set up a "Red" League of Nations. Hence, the United States could not recognize the Soviet Government. Young repeated the already familiar theme: The Soviet had repudiated its debts, had confiscated private property and was issuing international revolutionary propaganda.³⁵

In 1926 *Current History* opened the way to a fuller discussion of Russian-American relations by asking Leon Trotsky to state the Russian position and inviting prominent Americans to reply. Trotsky attempted to dispel the "unworthy hallucination" of Americans concerning Russia and depicted the vast opportunities for American capital. He pointed to the more liberal policy regarding foreign concessions. The Department of State answered by repeating the arguments of Hughes and Hoover, while Elbert H. Gary still demanded assurance, nine years after the revolution, that the Soviet was stable. Col. E. M. House believed that American business leaders themselves should decide, and the Chamber of Commerce of New York State passed a resolution urging the President and Secretary of State not to accord recognition so long as the Communist Party ruled Russia.³⁶ However, in the *Annals* of 1926, A. C. Ritchie, then governor of Maryland, inquired, "How long are we justified under all the circumstances, in declining to recognize

the government which the people of another country have established for themselves, and which maintains ordered authority there?"⁸⁹ In the same issue, Col. Raymond Robins declared that recognition of Soviet Russia was essential to world peace and stabilization.⁹⁰ E. A. Walsh, Jr., and others repeated the arguments concerning repudiation, confiscation and propaganda.⁹¹

Articles in 1927 and 1928 commenting on the tenth anniversary of Russia, in contrast to earlier articles,⁹² were much friendlier.⁹³ A recapitulation of American-Russian relations by Jerome Davis in the *Annals*⁹⁴ and another by B. J. Houde in *Current History*⁹⁵ emphasized the contradictions in American policy and the growing commercial relations despite non-recognition. Albert F. Bemis and others in the *Annals* urged a broadened outlook in our international thinking.⁹⁶ Samuel Cahan considered the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade the main reason for non-recognition although not explaining why the monopoly should be modified.⁹⁷ Perhaps, as Vera A. Micheles suggested in *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, it was a fear that state monopoly would allow the Soviet to place foreign trade wherever it got credits.⁹⁸

In many articles, the steady economic development of Russia was coupled with presumed moderation of Communist doctrine as an argument for recognition.⁹⁹ N. D. Houghton, in *International Conciliation*, reviewed the policy of the United States and other nations with respect to the recognition of Russia. Despite action by other nations Houghton saw no disposition on the part of the United States to extend recognition.¹⁰⁰ *Current History* reported the objection of the State Department to the sale of Russian bonds. Arthur B. Darling, in the same magazine, felt it was curious that the United States Government should object to loans when it regularly furnished information concerning trade with Russia.¹⁰¹

Opinion in the learned journals thus agreed that Russia's position in world affairs first required her economic rehabilitation. There was, however, no agreement that the United States should help through recognition. Toward the end of the 20's, the growing commercial relations between the United States and Russia and recognition by other countries made the non-recognition policy increasingly untenable. Arguments for recognition were drawn not from comparisons or contrasts of the two countries but from a common-sense realization that the Soviet Government was stable.

VI: GENERAL MAGAZINES

THE *New Republic* continued to maintain the same position it had expressed at the end of the first period, 1917-1921. It believed Russia should be given an opportunity to work out its own solutions. It tried to give Russia a fair hearing by exposing false rumors and by publishing articles by Soviet sympathizers.¹ Although making it very clear that it disapproved of the Bolshevik philosophy, the *New Republic's* attitude toward Russia became increasingly favorable.² The stability of the Soviet Government was continually emphasized,³ and upon this stability the *New Republic* based its argument for recognition. The magazine cited the NEP as indicating moderation and a return to nationalism, thereby facilitating peaceful relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries.⁴ Lenin's death in 1924 prompted the *New Republic* to express again its belief that economic recovery would bring about "a more democratic regime, whether through the adaptation of Soviet institutions or through their downfall."⁵ In 1925, the *New Republic* published a series of sympathetic articles on Soviet Russia by J. M. Keynes.⁶ In one of these Keynes remarked:

After a long debate with Zinoviev, two Communist iron-sides who attended him stepped forward to speak to me a last word with the full faith of fanaticism in their eyes. "We make you a prophecy," they said. "Ten years hence the level of life in Russia will be higher than it was before the war, and in the rest of Europe it will be lower than it was before the war." Having regard to the natural wealth of Russia and to the inefficiency of the old regime, having regard also to the problems of Western Europe and our apparent inability to handle them, can we feel confident that the comrades will not prove right?⁷

The magazine's articles analyzed the difficulties of dealing with the Soviet government,⁸ failure of the wheat crop in 1925,⁹ vacillations to right and left of the NEP,¹⁰ the continued antagonistic policy of the Department of State.¹¹ On the tenth anniversary of the Revolution in November, 1927, the *New Republic* praised the success of the Soviet regime in surviving a very difficult decade. It ascribed this achievement not only to the "able leadership or fighting faith of the Communists themselves," but also to the economic desperation of the country and the nature of the Russian people. Although the Russians were opposed to Czarism they lacked the political experience for democracy. They had found a "comfortable shelter in a state which was born of equalitarian religion." The *New Republic* concluded, "it is rather what the Russian people have done for Communism which has enabled it to survive than what Communism has done for the Russian people." Improvements had taken place despite, not because of, Communist theory. It was the NEP and its restoration of small-scale private trading, not the success of state industrial monopolies, which was giving the Russian people increasing ability

to satisfy their economic needs. The Bolsheviki had not yet succeeded in ending class warfare, the conflict between agricultural and industrial interests still raged. Said the *New Republic*:

Up to date they have failed to demonstrate how Communist government can save or acquire the socialized capital which it needs in order to defend itself and accomplish its objects, or how, if ever, it can discredit capitalism by a superior or even tolerable social and economic efficiency.

Yet Soviet vitality as a practical religion, the *New Republic* cautioned, "must not be under-rated as a force of world importance."¹⁷ This appraisal well summarized the attitude of the *New Republic* during the 20's. In 1928, Stuart Chase gave a picture of Russia's planning (the *Gosplan*) under the NEP. Absolute results could not be foretold but no one could "doubt the integrity and the courage of the attempt."¹⁸ John Dewey, in a series of articles, expressed the belief that the actual transformation in Russia transcended the visible economic or political facts.¹⁴

Compared to the liberal but cool attitude of the *New Republic*, the *Nation's* viewpoint was warmer and more militant. For example, it enabled the Soviet to speak its own mind by reprinting many extracts from *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other official Russian publications concerning the nation's industrial policy, economic conditions, legislation and the like.¹⁵ The *Nation* continued to demand American recognition of the Soviets as the only procedure that could restore Russia economically and curb its extremists. To this argument for recognition now were added the stability of the regime and the moderation of the NEP.¹⁶ The *Nation* repeatedly rebuked the United States Government for its policy of non-recognition.¹⁷ Like the *New Republic*, the *Nation* constantly sought to expose propaganda against Russia and the motives of its opponents.¹⁸ The magazine appraised the NEP in terms of the extent of the concessions, their significance and the designs of the Communists in accepting these compromises.¹⁹ The *Nation* vigorously defended Russia in the international scene, favoring her reintroduction into the family of nations for humanitarian as well as politico-economic reasons. In June, 1922, an editorial lamented, "The great Powers haggle over the terms on which Russia may be allowed to live; the great bankers are willing to barter a country's existence for a mess of interest on the loans of a dead autocracy."²⁰ The editors did not ignore the grimmer aspects of Soviet life and were frank in their criticism.²¹ This candor was severe but not hostile, for they believed Russia was making such great strides in its economic progress that criticism could only be helpful.²² The rumors of the death of Lenin in 1923, did not discourage the *Nation*. "We are of the opinion," it said, "that there is in the very ideas of the Communist force and power enough to carry on this experiment for some time to come under second- or even third-rate leaders." Later, pursuing the belief that the majority of

Russians had faith in Stalin, the *Nation* favored the Soviet Government in its struggle with the opposition headed by Trotsky and others."

On the tenth anniversary of the Soviet Government the *Nation* summarized its feelings in these words:

Ten years ago something new was born into the world—something fresh and alive, infectious and creative. The world into which it was born did not like it. At first it did not even take it seriously. It seemed to be just the temporary rioting of a few soapboxers, annoying because it interrupted the business of winning the war. Today the world is engaged in rectifying the mistakes of a war won too thoroughly, while Soviet Russia, still hated and feared by the West, is enthusiastically celebrating its tenth birthday.

The editors of the *Nation* felt that Russia's accomplishments were immense:

No government in history has set out so deliberately, and so successfully to annihilate illiteracy, to build up mass health, to set its people economically free . . . Russia is far from her goal of socialism, or communism . . . The effort to build the economic life of a nation upon the principle of planned common welfare is an experiment still. The valid criticism of Russia's method would be that it does not work; and only today, after the harsh years of counter-revolution, blockade, and famine, is that question receiving a fair test. The second decade—if England does not first produce another war—will tell.

Emphatically the *Nation* denied that it supported Russia because it subscribed to Communist principles or condoned "the brutalities of a Red dictatorship." It was favorably disposed toward Russia "for her enemies, (because) in the stale world of diplomacy, Soviet Russia has been a living yeast; and the example of its workers' republic has been a creative ferment in Western politics . . . the regime which brought so much hope and freedom still fails of its broadest destiny; but in this muddy age its ten years shine."²⁴ In 1928 and 1929 the *Nation* even more insistently demanded a proper place for Russia in international affairs. It derided the controversy over Russian gold;²⁵ it giped at the State Department for opposing the sale of Russian bonds in the United States²⁶ while it covertly allowed trade with Russia.²⁷

Thus we find both the *New Republic* and the *Nation* continually defending the Russian efforts, condemning excesses, explaining but not glossing over Soviet failures and brutalities. The two liberal weeklies fought vigorously for Russia but remained scrupulously fair in their appraisals. By and large, their awareness of the intangibles of the situation made their analyses, as subsequent events showed, more accurate than those of most other magazines.

None of the other general magazines provided a picture of actual events in Russia.

The *Saturday Evening Post* continued its unabated hostility. Its typical editorials were vehement: "Even if Russia's trade were important to us—which it is not—no decent, liberty-loving American could view

a compromise with the blood-stained crew in charge of Russian affairs, with anything but loathing and disgust."⁸⁰ The magazine constantly published articles telling of economic confusion and social degeneration in Russia.⁸¹ When economic recovery started, the *Post* asserted the improvement had been achieved by abandoning Communist principles.⁸² "Europe's Cuckoo" was what Richard Washburn Child called Russia in the *Post* of January 31, 1925,⁸³ and Isaac F. Marcosson, in a series of articles entitled "After Lenin—What?" came to the conclusion that the "sun of Sovietism" was setting.⁸⁴ He expected a new regime to emerge and compensate the Russian people for their long suffering. Will Rogers addressed to President Coolidge one of his "Letters of a Self-Made Diplomat," in this fashion: "You see, the Communism they started out with, the idea that everybody would get the same and have the same—Lord, that didn't work at all . . . I don't suppose there is two men in Russia getting the same salary . . . They get what they can get, and where they can get it."⁸⁵

The few articles in *Collier's* during these years emphasized a common-sense point of view. Both Arthur Ruhl and W. G. Shepherd thought the progress that had taken place since 1921 was due to the NEP. Shepherd compared a controlled economy to Prohibition in the U.S., both doomed to end in bootlegging.⁸⁶ Anna Louise Strong, always staunchly pro-Soviet, described keen and independent-minded peasants as the backbone of Russia. She also gave a description of a district Soviet meeting to show the democracy that existed in Russian industrial life.⁸⁷

Harper's, from 1921 to 1929, published only several short articles. One, written by Sir Paul Dukes of the British Foreign Office, was bitterly anti-Bolshevik.⁸⁸ A second was by a member of the former Kerensky Government who had become a leader of the Russian democratic parties opposed to Bolshevism.⁸⁹ The third article, written by Stanley High, pointed out that the Communists sought world revolution. High discerned a resemblance between Communism and Mohammedanism and called upon the Christian world to gird for an inevitable conflict.⁹⁰ In a brief article Raymond Gram Swing made incidental mention of his doubt that in a century the standard of life in Russia would be higher than in the United States.⁹¹

While most of the articles in the *Atlantic Monthly* from 1921-1929 continued to stress the confusion and scarcity in Russia, a few made calmer appraisals. A picture of chaos and insecurity in Russia was painted by Baron Waldemar von Mengden;⁹² others reported horrible conditions in Moscow and Petrograd.⁹³ Bitter condemnation of the Bolsheviks came from the mother of General Wrangel.⁹⁴ Unhappy memories were recounted by the American wife of a Russian diplomat of the old regime.⁹⁵ Some articles on the church implied that religion

might be the force which would destroy Communism.⁴⁴ Consideration of Soviet Russia in world affairs brought forth the comment that Communism would be crushed in the East by its attempt to force a materialist philosophy upon the Islamic world.⁴⁵ An American businessman described Bolshevik business trickery,⁴⁶ and W. H. Chamberlin told of profiteering under the NEP.⁴⁷ The calmer efforts in the *Atlantic Monthly* consisted of pointing out that the Bolsheviks had become more moderate and even willing to compromise.⁴⁸ The Russian leaders were reported to be showing a better understanding of the psychology of the peasants,⁴⁹ and one article even agreed that the ends desired were good and that only the means were wrong.⁵⁰ Sir Martin Conway urged that Russia be left alone to prove whether Bolshevism had the germ of truth it claimed.⁵¹ Although Communism would not work in the United States, W. S. Wasserman felt one had to admit the Communists were the best and hardest-working element in Russia.⁵²

Scribner's published very little on Russia from 1917 to 1921; it published even less from 1921 to 1929. In its pages the Princess Julia Cantacuzene heard a "still small voice" tell her that Russia would rise up and oust the Bolsheviks.⁵³ John Hays Hammond agreed with her that Bolshevism would fall, for the *mir*, the *Zemstvos* and the co-operatives indicated Russia's fundamental impulse to be democratic.⁵⁴ Kermit Roosevelt enjoyed his travels through Russia and Edwin Hollinger did not think we would have Bolshevism in America.⁵⁵ W. C. White said Lenin had been deified by propaganda, and Ellsworth Huntington believed Russia was committing suicide by killing off the brains of the upper classes.⁵⁶

The *Forum*, in its few articles, repeated the themes already noted in the other monthlies: the chaos in Russia,⁵⁷ the necessity of crushing the Bolsheviks,⁵⁸ and the argument that the blockade helped the Bolsheviks stay in power.⁵⁹

Thus, impartial discussion of Russia was still to be found during these years only in the liberal weeklies. In one or two articles in the monthlies a faint variation from the intense antagonism was noted. But the main general magazines continued to be unmistakably hostile to the Soviet Union.

VII: BOOKS

DURING the period of the New Economic Policy, most of the books that appeared on Russia concerned themselves not with attacks on the Soviet Government but with a description of the conditions of Russian life. On the whole they gave a clear picture of Russia in world affairs and drew their conclusions from the assumption that the Soviet Government would continue in power. The mood in which the books were written was calmer, and the analyses they made were more technical.

Such, for example, was A. A. Heller's *Industrial Revival in Soviet Russia*⁷ which reported that "the Soviet industrial house was being set in order, industries slowly reviving, production and transport improving, and the economic life of the country being gradually reestablished." Edward A. Ross, in *The Russian Soviet Republic*,⁸ expressed the belief that the Russian attempt to practice Communism and the new phase into which it had now passed vindicated orthodox economics. Although neither pro- nor anti-Bolshevik, Ross deeply resented the propaganda which had been turned against Russia and had great contempt for the policy of the Allies toward that country. To what degree Russia had returned to orthodox economics was recorded by E. T. Blanc in the *Co-operative Movement in Russia*.⁹ Nowhere in the world, she asserted, was the co-operative movement so well developed or so interwoven with government and economic policy as in Russia. Tracing the history of the co-operative movement from its origin down to 1923, she demonstrated its great educative value and its wide influence that extended even to international relations.

Russia's place in world affairs was indicated by a number of books dealing with her international status and activities. Leo Pasvolksy, in his brief volume *Russia in the Far East*,⁴ sketched Russia's pre-war imperial expansion, the activities of the Communist International, and the key positions occupied by the U.S.S.R. and the United States in maintaining the world balance of power. He deplored Russia's absence from world affairs such as the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, and suggested that the U.S.S.R. and the United States co-operate closely. Without stating his precise meaning, Pasvolksy adumbrated a "third Russia," neither Imperial nor Soviet, an economically reconstructed "strong, democratic Russia." A. L. P. Dennis, however, condemned Soviet foreign policy as concerned only with stirring up world revolution. At the same time, Dennis expressed faith in the moderation of the majority of the Bolsheviks, who, he said, were not fanatics.⁵ In 1924 the problems of Russian reconstruction, including the thorny question of debts, were analyzed in a volume on which Leo Pasvolksy and H. G. Moulton collaborated.⁶ Recognizing the revival of Russian

and German economic health as prerequisite to European rehabilitation, the authors attacked the debt problem. First of all, they advocated Soviet acknowledgment of the debts Russia had repudiated. Thus the question of payment would become part of the whole international debt problem. The question of payment would involve three queries:

(1) What are the amounts which any Russian government would have to pay abroad on account of the various foreign obligations for which Russia is now held responsible? (2) What is involved in obtaining these amounts within the country by means of budgetary surpluses? (3) What is involved in making these surpluses available abroad and what is the probable Russian capacity to make such payments?

The answer to the first question was that Russia was obligated to pay 13,823 million gold rubles,—6,681 million borrowed during the war and 7,142 million in pre-war debts, both public and private. Not allowing for amortization, the interest would be 400 million rubles on the war debt and 320 million on the pre-war debt. The second question was answered by suggesting that if pre-war economic activity were restored, Russia might possibly balance her domestic budget and obtain a sufficient surplus to meet a large part of her foreign obligations. However, despite cancellation of the domestic public debt through inflation, balancing the budget still offered great difficulties. The third question presented a dilemma. First, to convert Russia's surpluses into foreign currencies, her balance of trade would have to be favorable—an improbability. Secondly, her capacity to pay would depend on her attainment of the pre-war economic level and that was impossible without loans for reconstruction. If she did return to her pre-war scale, her balance of trade, as estimated by Pasvolksy and Moulton, would not be much more than a 100 million rubles a year, or just enough to meet interest charges on a reconstruction loan of 1,400 million rubles. There would be nothing left for interest on war and pre-war State debts, nor dividends for foreign holders of Russian industrial securities. Only if her resources were developed more fully than was estimated might there be something for the pre-war debt. But such a development would depend not only on her internal reforms but on her markets in central and western Europe. In this connection it must be remembered that before the war Russia borrowed heavily because she could not expand her exports fast enough.

Three alternatives were possible: to let Russia drift and do nothing; to exploit her resources through concessions, leaving the existing debt question unsolved; last and best, a complete statesman-like settlement of the Russian debt. The first meant a world poorer without Russian resources, while the second signified an exploitation without regard to national welfare, and, therefore, no permanent solution. Only the third choice seemed desirable. Russia must remain a sovereign state, meet her

obligations through ordinary trade and finance methods, and be restored economically to her proper place in the world. But this clear discussion by Pasvolksy and Moulton was not to receive the attention it merited.

Perhaps the diplomatic intrigue Louis Fischer alleged in his *Oil Imperialism*⁷ prevented a solution. Fischer, deeply sympathetic to the Soviet, presented a strong case. He showed the importance of oil in the rivalry between nations and the close relations linking oil companies and the policies of diplomats. One phase of the World War, said Fischer, was the struggle of England, Turkey and Germany for Baku oil, finally resulting in allied intervention in Soviet affairs. The Genoa Conference was a stage in the contest between Russia and the powers over oil, and the United States, according to Fischer, stepped into the Hague Conference in order to protect Standard Oil on the Baku question. Playing one country against the others, Russia forced them to deal directly with her to purchase the "stolen oil." Fischer pointed out that the day after the *New York Times* announced that Standard Oil had completed negotiations with Russia, a front-page story related that Ivy Lee, Standard Oil's adviser on public relations, had started a movement to recognize the Soviet Union.

Interpretation of conditions in Russia varied widely. Emma Goldman, who had preached revolution in the United States and been deported, had gone to Russia. In 1924, after two years in the U.S.S.R. she wrote *My Disillusionment in Russia*.⁸ It was a sweeping indictment of the regime; she found no evidence of benefits to workers or peasants and charged that the Bolsheviks had betrayed the revolution. The faith of the people, she asserted, had been broken. Her views were refuted by Magdeline Marx who wrote *The Romance of New Russia*,⁹ and by Anna Louise Strong, a Soviet enthusiast who acclaimed the new Russia in her book *The First Time in History*.¹⁰ But Morris Gordin, an ex-Communist who had escaped to the United States, heartily agreed with Emma Goldman.¹¹

In 1926, Maurice Hindus again sought to delineate the Russian peasant, in whom he saw the crux of the Soviet economy.¹² He found that Communism had made little headway among the *muzhiks*, though some of the younger ones were ardent Communists. Sensing their importance, the peasants had begun to criticize the Government openly, and the authorities displayed much patience. Hindus believed that the great struggle would have to end in either winning the peasant over to Communism or, what was more likely, (and already taking place) change the system to fit the peasant.

In 1926 and 1927 the Vanguard Press published a series of short volumes on various aspects of Russian life.¹³ Scott Nearing and Jack

Hardy wrote a volume entitled *Economic Organisation of the Soviet Union*, describing the machinery of production and exchange, the relations between employer and employee, and the extent of organization among the workers.⁴⁴ The picture they gave was a favorable one but they slurred over the problem of serious unemployment and the poor quality and scarcity of consumers' goods. H. N. Brailsford's *How the Soviets Work*, described the machinery of government and the interpenetration of the Communist Party among the soviets in order to maintain the dictatorship. He found the greatest danger in a growing bureaucracy.⁴⁵ Roger Baldwin, in *Liberty Under the Soviets*, discussed the significance of economic freedom, press censorship and suppression of opposition.⁴⁶ Jessica Smith asserted in *Women in Soviet Russia* that the welfare laws affecting Russian women were the most progressive in the world. She expressed confidence that however much the laws might fail in practice, they still formed a standard to which the nation would ultimately adapt itself.⁴⁷

The most significant publication of the period was the report of the American Trade Union Delegation to the Soviet Union, entitled *Russia After Ten Years*.⁴⁸ Three years earlier, in 1924, the British Trade Union Delegation had visited Russia and rendered a favorable verdict.⁴⁹ The American group included four American Federation of Labor members who did not, however, act as official representatives of the A.F. of L. The American Trade Union Delegation consisted of James H. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor and President of the Workers' Education Bureau of America; John Brophy, former President of District 2, United Mine Workers of America, and a director of Brookwood Labor College; Frank Palmer, editor of the Colorado *Labor Advocate* and a member of the International Typographical Union; Albert F. Coyle, editor of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers *Journal*; and James William Fitzpatrick, President of the Actors and Artists of America. They were accompanied by a technical staff that included Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, Rexford G. Tugwell, Paul Douglas and others. The findings of the technical staff appeared in a separate volume.

The report of the American Trade Union Delegation was highly favorable. It found Russia's "urban population undoubtedly better off than in 1913; the peasants not so well off, in respect to the amount of industrial goods which they received, while the industrial plant in the form of new capital was growing at an unprecedented rate." Of the *Gosplan* (the central planning bureau of Soviet economy) the delegation concluded that if estimated advances were realized, "a delegation visiting Russia five years hence may perhaps forget the East, and begin to apply some American standards in its judgment of Russian economic and social life." The unionists found the trade unions flourishing, actively sharing control, concerned in production, and seldom resorting to strike

action. They learned that while the Government controlled the trade unions, the worker's reaction to this control was, "It is our government." The trade unions were industrial in structure with craft departments. Factory committees functioned to protect the workers and promote their culture and education. The trade unions had representation in their own central body and in Government directly. The unions retained a large proportion of their funds for culture and welfare. Membership was voluntary, though strong inducements were offered prospective members. The interest in production manifested by Russian workers was one of the most encouraging aspects. "This production," the American unionists reported, "is one of the most stimulating and novel tasks of the unions in Russia. It is capable of unlimited development. And it brings out clearly the part that the trade unions are playing in the whole economy." And further, "The cultural work of the unions is one of the most impressive achievements of the new Russia. There is no precedent or parallel for it anywhere in the world today."

The delegation's report noted that wages had been increased 12 percent over 1913, not counting social insurance, medical attention, vacation with pay and other advantages. Unemployment, however, reduced the average wage somewhat. The report went on to say that housing was increasing, though not fast enough, while the co-operatives "offered an interesting contrast between the methods of adjusting supply and demand under a controlled economy and under a system of free enterprise." The Russian people, the report asserted, had more political liberty than they ever had under the Czars and possessed economic freedom to a degree enjoyed by the workers of no other country. They could not be fired through caprice, their representatives helped govern and form policy, they could criticize factory management, they shared in production improvements. Nor was there an upper class to envy. The delegation's report concluded by urging recognition of Russia by the United States.

The delegation's technical staff embodied its own report in a book, *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade*, which gave a detailed and equally favorable account of the major aspects of Russian economy.²⁰ Rexford G. Tugwell found the farmers in Russia, like farmers all over the world, suffering from a price disadvantage. But, "there is a disposition," Tugwell said, "to do something about it. Can this be said of the American Government?" Stuart Chase carefully summarized the pros and cons of Russian advances in industrial production, noting as an example the increase of production as against the poor quality of the goods. Chase reserved judgment on the ultimate triumph of socialized economy in competition with western nations: "We will have to give the *Gosplan* another five years before we can definitely determine whether this courageous and unprecedented experiment is destined to be a landmark for the economic

guidance of other peoples the world around, or just another memorandum for the waste basket of history."

Toward the end of the 20's, there began to appear a series of scholarly works reviewing the economic history of Russia and her relations with the world. Frederick L. Schuman wrote a thorough analysis in *American Policy Towards Russia Since 1917*.²¹ Although pro-Russian, Schuman's study was well-documented and authoritative. He bitterly condemned American policy toward Russia as "worse than futility." He asserted there were many who were "willing to accept certain hypothetical risks and difficulties for the sake of restored peace and friendship and to abandon past formulae in order to deal more constructively with recent realities." This was the attitude, he said, which would remove the inevitability of conflict.

The work of B. E. Nolde, *Russia in the Economic War*,²² made possible by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, formed part of a Russian Series on the economic and social history of the World War. Nolde's volume, together with others in the series, gave a vivid and detailed picture of Russia during the war, outlining the great movement for reform and reorganization which eventuated in the decisive change.

In 1928 Dorothy Thompson and Anne O'Hare McCormick each published gloomy judgments after visiting Russia. Mrs. McCormick, in *The Hammer and the Scythe*, believed the Communists had built neither well nor wisely.²³ Writing ironically of the proletariat as "the New Ruling Class," she saw "no convincing evidence that the worker was materially better off than before the revolution." Although the resumption of effort along original Communist lines demonstrated that the Russian leaders were not opportunists, the policy and abstract theory which governed them could never, as they professed, Americanize the Russian people however much it electrified, tractorized or mechanized them. Bolshevism was "frankly a mockery of civilization . . . not a parody but plagiarism . . . illiterate of the past, it spells the doom of democracy out of the big primer of the future."

Dorothy Thompson reported great inefficiency in Government operation of industry; goods were scarce, capital accumulated at too slow a rate, the buying power of the ruble was declining under the Soviets.²⁴ "The tendency of their program," she concluded, "is toward state capitalism and government by experts, with the welfare of the whole national economy rather than of any one class as the objective. It is this group which is attracting to itself the best brains of young Russia and it is this class which is likely to dominate the second act of that stupendous drama of which the ten long years since the revolution have been but the prologue."

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Thus examining the main themes of the prominent books on Russia between 1921 and 1929, it becomes quite clear, when contrasted with those of the war years and immediately after, that a sober and appraising attitude had replaced the earlier emotional reaction. The chief desire at this time was to know Russia not as miracle or disaster, but as an intelligible subject. The liberal-minded continued their efforts, seeking similarities and composing differences. The favorable judgments increased, though the crucial basic struggle between the peasant and the worker was clearly recognized. Less perceptive, however, was the consideration given the elements of trade union structure and planning, which were to dominate the period of 1929-1933 and which were already prominent in the years 1921 to 1929. Especially did the scholarly studies of pre-war, war and post-war Russia, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, help to correct the blind prejudice against the Bolsheviks. These studies revealed how deep and thorough were the forces which had culminated in the Soviet seizure of power.

VIII: NEWSPAPERS

TOWARD the end of the period 1917-1921 the country's newspapers admitted that the Bolsheviks had "survived" but insisted that America remain aloof. In the same reluctant spirit, during the 20's, the press objected to doing business with Russia on the ground that this country might get entangled in Soviet affairs. Still the *Baltimore Sun* believed the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was "the most significant and important international agreement made in recent years, because it establishes the open door between Great Britain and Russia." The *New York Herald*, however, thought Lenin had handed Lloyd George "a gold brick loaded with dynamite." The *Columbia Dispatch* observed, "It remains to be seen whether these promises by Russia are worth any more than Bolshevik promises in general." The *New York Tribune* called the agreement "a sand house." But the *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot* offered a different opinion:

This agreement was urged by necessity. It represents no concession on the part of Great Britain to the Soviet principle. It simply marks that Government's abandonment of the policy of fear that has too long colored not only Great Britain's attitude to the Soviets but also the attitude of the principal Powers, including America. The action of Great Britain increases the pressure on America to take similar steps."

A large number of papers endorsed the reply of Secretary of State Hughes to a Moscow "feeler" concerning a possible trade agreement. Secretary Hughes, the *Troy Record* said, "refuses to be stampeded into a trade agreement, and by his stand sets for all countries an example of international morality."¹⁰ "His reply," declared the *Washington Star*, "will receive the enthusiastic approval of the American public, just as it will prove a rude and wholesome shock to those whose tyranny, born in blood and maintained through terror, today extends over unhappy Russia."¹¹ The *New York Times* viewed the Hughes note as "sound statesmanship and excellent advice to Russia."¹² A few papers, like the *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*, which again dissented, felt the English attitude of trade with Russia seemed "to promise better results . . . The program of watchful hating has failed."¹³

Most of the papers were willing to help the starving Russians on purely humanitarian grounds,¹⁴ though many feared such aid might enable Lenin to maintain himself in power. Others believed the example of an individualistic economy furnishing abundant supplies would go a long way toward defeating Bolshevism. A few Socialist papers, including the *New York Call* and the *Schenectady Citizen*, were suspicious of Herbert Hoover.¹⁵ "What is Hoover up to?" asked the *Call*. "He has never neglected an opportunity to attack the Soviet Government."¹⁶

An offer by Soviet Foreign Minister Tchitcherin to discuss with the Allied Powers a settlement of Czarist debts was met by decided distrust. The *New York Times* noted, for example:

Recognition has sometimes been extended to Governments founded in blood and continuing by terrorism, particularly when other Governments felt they must get on with them somehow. But no such warrant can be pleaded for recognition of the Soviet Government . . . The Government carried on by Lenin, Trotsky and the Soviets is near a collapse. That has been made evident by the desperate bids they have been making for outside support. They have professed an abandonment of their communistic principles and their hatred for capitalism; they have admitted their experiment was premature; they have invited foreign capitalists to come in and develop Russian resources; they have pointed to the removal of the ban on private ownership and trade. If they had not been in a bad way and threatened with disaster, none of these things would have been done. Recognition by foreign governments would be an encouragement to them.¹⁷

Distrust was so great that many papers, including the *New York Times*, saw the relief agencies as a ruse to procure funds for the Soviet Government.¹⁸

It was generally felt the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Russia foreshadowed what the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* called, "a new European line-up, with Russia and Germany forming what may become a military as well as an industrial and political alliance against the rest of the world."¹⁹ Though the *New York Tribune* suspected "grave polit-

ical peril" rather than economic danger in the compact,²⁸ the *New York Times* informed its readers that "the possibilities of German-Russian cooperation are unlimited; they stretch from Vladivostok to the Rhine."²⁹ "Beggars on horseback"³⁰ was the *Philadelphia Public Ledger's* characterization of the Russians at the Genoa Conference of 1922. The *New York World* felt an agreement would be only "a scrap of paper."³¹ The *New York Tribune* said that Russia's promise to pay its obligations had "little more current value than those Micawber so freely signed."³²

In 1923 the sale of Russian wheat abroad while millions starved at home aroused wide-spread condemnation. The *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, the *Dayton News*, the *Troy Times* and the *New York Tribune* joined in indicting the action.³³ "What explanation," asked the *New York Times*, "can be given in defense of a sale of foodstuffs by the Soviet, even to buy agricultural implements and animals for next year's plowing and cultivation?" Why not use the foodstuffs immediately to save lives and then appeal, "if need be, to America and the other nations for the capital necessary to furnish needed plows and other needed implements and animals and raw materials?"³⁴

President Coolidge, addressing Congress on December 6, 1923, expressed willingness to make "very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing Russia." Russian Foreign Minister Tchitcherin then sent a note to the President manifesting the Soviet Government's desire to come to terms with the United States. Whereupon Secretary Hughes tersely replied that there seemed to be "at this time no reason for negotiations." This emphatic statement evoked wide editorial applause in papers all over the country, including the *Boston Transcript*, *Boston Post*, *Manchester Union*, *New York Times*, *New York Evening Post*, *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Washington Post*, *Washington Star*, *Louisville Courier-Journal*, *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, *Detroit Free Press*, *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, *Minneapolis Tribune*, *Des Moines Capitol* and *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*.³⁵ Objections to Hughes' reply were voiced by the *Boston Globe*, *Cleveland Press* and *Brooklyn Eagle*.³⁶ The *New York Journal of Commerce* summed up its attitude this way:

It is certainly not necessary either for the protection of our citizens, the safeguarding of our "principles," or the maintenance of anything we have stood for in the past that we should absolutely refuse to consider the question of relationship with Russia. What we do want is to find out first of all the facts about the whole matter and to put them forth in a concrete form. Finally we need to make up our own minds as to the purposes that we seek in our Russian negotiations and definitely to settle the question whether we want to reestablish trade relations, or to permit opportunities to be absorbed by other countries.³⁷

The news of Lenin's death ran the gamut from highest praise to scathing arraignment. Arthur Brisbane in the *New York American* said,

"History will call him a man remarkable and great—great in power, in persistency, great in extraordinary success."¹⁰⁰ The *Brooklyn Citizen*, conceded Lenin's greatness, but added, "He was, however, a dreamer and visionary, and such men are a danger for every country in which they attain power."¹⁰¹ The *New York Herald* characterized Lenin as "at once the most sinister and mysterious figure born of the war."¹⁰² "Undoubtedly an evil man," said the *Washington Star*.¹⁰³ The *Detroit Free Press* considered his rule "more ruthless, conscienceless, and immeasurably more sanguinary and destructive than ever had been that of the Romanoffs."¹⁰⁴ The *New York Sun* said, "His life is a monument to the evil that misdirected abilities and sincerity can accomplish."¹⁰⁵ The *New York Evening Post* believed Lenin had achieved "the very eminence of infamy."¹⁰⁶

When the forty-fifth annual convention of the American Federation of Labor heard the Hon. Arthur A. Purcell, M.P., visiting British fraternal delegate, urge that American labor "establish the closest fraternal relations with the organized workers of Russia,"¹⁰⁷ William Green denounced the proposal. The A.F. of L. president declared, "We are not ready to accept Communism . . . The American Federation of Labor movement will not affiliate with an organization which preaches or stands for that philosophy."¹⁰⁸ The cheers from the convention floor at this rebuke, the *New York Times* observed, plainly testified that Green was expressing the opinion of organized labor in the United States.¹⁰⁹ The *Providence Journal* said the American labor movement "should congratulate itself that it has as its present chief one who has the courage to say frankly that his organization will have nothing to do with a group that embraces Bolshevik doctrines."¹¹⁰ The same point of view was approved by the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Detroit Free Press*, *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, *Indianapolis News*, *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, *Chicago Evening Post*, *Pittsburgh Gazette Times*, *Wall Street News*, *Washington Star*, *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *Philadelphia Public Ledger* and, quoting the *Literary Digest* of October, 1925, "a score of other widely read newspapers."¹¹¹

Most newspapers agreed with the *Journal of Commerce* that the fall of Trotsky in 1926 foreshadowed "a gradual but convincing movement back to sanity."¹¹² By the middle of 1927, however, the press was again exhibiting impatience with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic rupture with Great Britain and a series of political executions in Russia brought forth angry comment. The *New York Herald-Tribune* was representative of many when it said, "Russia is a nuisance to all the powers which have diplomatic relations with her."¹¹³ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* believed it the duty of other nations to hasten the eventual downfall of the Bolsheviks by boycotting the Soviet.¹¹⁴ The *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot* saw no possible defense for the wholesale executions.¹¹⁵ The *South Bend*

Tribune declared that "Under the guise of protecting Russia from a foreign enemy, the despotic oligarchy at Moscow may now proceed to the slaughter of Russians whose presence is obnoxious to the reigning Bolshevik leaders."⁴⁴ The *New York World* commented, "Defeated in its foreign policies, full of economic maladjustments, debility and discontent, Soviet Russia faces a difficult situation. It is natural for the controlling dictatorship to turn to harsh dictatorial measures."⁴⁵

Litvinoff's proposal for complete disarmament, made at the preparatory disarmament conference at Geneva in 1927, brought a mixed response from the press. Many papers greeted the proposal. Said the *Baltimore Sun*, "Litvinoff and his colleagues are, for once, talking sense, whatever their motive."⁴⁶ This attitude was shared by the *Springfield Republican*, *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* and *New Haven Journal-Courier*.⁴⁷ Many papers, however, considered Litvinoff's offer a mere gesture which, according to the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, "Russia knew in advance would not be accepted."⁴⁸ Others considered it mere bluff. The *New York World* was emphatic: "The Russian proposal reeks with hypocrisy."⁴⁹

There was divergence of opinion in the press over the failure of the United States to invite Russia to Paris to participate in the Kellogg treaty. Many agreed with the statement of the *Washington Post* that "by no standard of law or morals have the Russian Communists earned the right to recognition by the United States. They need not hope to gain such recognition now, by a hypocritical offer to sign the treaty renouncing war."⁵⁰ Another section of the press, however, criticized the failure to include Russia in the pact. These papers agreed with the *Brooklyn Eagle* that "the burden of good faith is not primarily on Russia; it is on the United States."⁵¹ The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* thought Russia ought to be included "from a practical standpoint."⁵² The *New York American* declared, "The only reason for excluding Russia is a financial one, and not a diplomatic one, and if American diplomacy is ever to be of force and effect in Europe it must not be guided wholly by the selfish interests of the international bankers."⁵³ The *Memphis Commercial Appeal* argued, "To ignore Russia at this time will furnish the Communist party with fresh evidence of the 'iron ring' about the country. It may be well to encircle Russia with this ring. But let it not be said that the procedure would help the cause of world peace. A nation will fight to free itself from an iron ring, real or fancied."⁵⁴

The contract signed late in 1928 by the Soviet Union with the International Electric Company of New York, carrying an acceptance of the latter's claims against the Soviet Government, was regarded by Russians themselves as an entering wedge to recognition. But American newspapers did not think so. The *Philadelphia Bulletin* and the *Indianapolis*

News had both approved the policy of the State Department in insisting that old debts be recognized, reasoning that the present contract proved the correctness of that policy.⁸⁸ "If American claims against Russia are settled," the *Brooklyn Eagle* noted, "one of the obstacles in the way of official recognition disappears."⁸⁴ The *New York Times*, on the other hand, emphasized that recognition had come no nearer:

It would be unfortunate if the Soviet Government were to get the impression that the contract it has made with General Electric foreshadows a change in America's policy toward Russia. This is not the first or only American corporation of importance to interest itself in Russian development. Nor has there been any effort by the American Government to dissuade Americans from doing business with Russia. On the contrary, successive Administrations, beginning with that of President Wilson have made it plain that commerce and recognition are not one and the same.⁸⁵

Another aspect of the same situation was the refusal of the United States Government to allow the entry of Russian gold. Both the *Cincinnati Enquirer* and the *Columbus Dispatch* pointed out that this action demonstrated the universal doubt of Russia's honesty in international financial dealings.⁸⁶ The *New York World*, however, raised the point that if it was wrong to admit Russian gold why was it not equally wrong "to permit an oil company to bring money into this country which it has made by trading in Russian oil which other countries claim is their confiscated property."⁸⁷ It was only "certain quixotic technicalities," said the *New York Telegram*, that kept Russian gold from getting into circulation.⁸⁸ The *Milwaukee Journal* inquired "When are we going to act rationally with regard to Russia?"⁸⁹ The ban of the State Department on the sale here of Soviet railway bonds was another case in point. The *Wall Street Journal* approved: "The Department of State does right in disapproving of any financial interest facilitating in the slightest degree the distribution among our people of the bonds of a government that repudiates its obligations."⁹⁰

The newspapers, thus, continued their day-to-day reaction to events in Russia, without much modification of their attitude toward Bolshevism. Whatever modification did take place resulted, apparently, from a belief on the part of editors that Communism had been greatly transformed by developments in Russia. More from the tone of editorials than from the content could evidence be detected of an increasing acceptance of Russia under the Soviet Government. The press discussion largely revolved around the following proposition: given Russia under the Soviet and the entangled history of the past, what, in terms of our democratic convictions and our decreasing fear of Russia, could be done to improve relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.?

IX: GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS

CONGRESSIONAL hearings and executive pronouncements in the years 1921 to 1929, while still antagonistic to the Soviet Government, had lost nearly all of their previous hysteria. A report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with American efforts to relieve starvation in Russia expressed its conclusions calmly. After having reviewed the feasibility and costs of relief, the report said:

By ending the dreadful conditions now scourging these people, and at the same time enabling them by sufficient planting to prevent the recurrence of similar disasters, it is believed that the whole industrial system of the country, now prostrate, will be quickened into new life and activity. It will also furnish an impressive lesson to communities now suffering the dire consequences of disorder and anarchy, that only through ordered government can prosperity be restored or even the means of human subsistence assured.¹

The 1925 hearings on Senator Borah's resolution to grant recognition were likewise less inflammatory than the debates of the earlier period.² The State Department again presented a mass of evidence to show that subversive activities in the United States originated in Moscow. Before any conclusions could be reached or action taken, the hearings were ended by the "oil scandals" of the Harding Cabinet, which diverted attention from all other matters. But the purpose of the hearings had been twisted to demonstrate the subversive influences of Communism and not to analyze its economic philosophy or implications.

A statement often referred to in discussions of Russia was that issued by Herbert Hoover in 1921 shortly after he became Secretary of Commerce:

Under their present economic system, no matter how much they moderate it in name there can be no real return to production in Russia, and therefore, Russia will have no considerable commodities to export, and consequently no great ability to obtain imports. There are no export commodities in Russia today worth considering except gold, platinum and jewelry in the hands of the Bolshevik Government. The people are starving, cold, underclad. If they had consumable commodities they would have used them long since. Nor can trade with Russia under a Government that repudiates private property be based on credit. Thus the whole question from a trade point of view develops into furnishing commodities equal to the gold, platinum and jewelry, variously estimated from \$60,000,000 to \$200,000,000 in the hands of the Bolshevik Government. After that has been expended there can be little expectation of continued trade. There has been but little trade for gold because its title has been called into question. Europe cannot recover its economic stability until Russia returns to production. Trading for this parcel of gold would not affect this remedy, nor would the goods obtained by the Bolsheviks in return for it restore their production. That requires the abandonment of their present economic system.³

To Hoover, apparently, the problem of Russia was political rather than

economic, so long as the Bolsheviki retained power.

When Warren G. Harding became President, M. I. Kalinin, President of the All-Russian Executive Committee, addressed a note to the new administration, asking for the opening of business relations. Secretary of State Hughes replied that no lasting good could come to Russia "until the present causes of progressive impoverishment" ceased to operate.⁴ He concluded:

It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract, and the rights of free labor. If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations.

Secretary Hughes also made the following statement later:

It should not be overlooked that there has been a steady degeneration in even those industries in Soviet Russia that were not dependent upon imports of either raw material or partly finished products nor in which has there been any shortage of labor. The Russian production of coal, of iron and steel, of flax, cotton, leather, lumber, sulfuric acid, of copper, of agricultural products, of textiles, and the maintenance and repair of railroad equipment, have degenerated steadily from their level of production at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. There can be no relation of the failure of all these industries to blockades or to civil war, for most of them require no imports, and the men mobilized since the Soviet revolution were far less in number than before that event.⁵

Pointing out that trade between the United States and Russia before the war had constituted only one and three-tenths percent of American foreign trade, Secretary Hughes took note also of the fact that the purchasing power of the Russian people had greatly diminished. It was therefore evident, declared Mr. Hughes, that "at the present time even under the most favorable circumstances the trade of Russia could have but a minor influence on the industrial and agricultural prosperity of the United States. Under conditions actually prevailing in Russia, that trade is of even less importance; a statement amply demonstrated by the fact that though restrictions on trade with Russia have been eliminated, no business of consequence with that country had developed."

President Coolidge's annual message to Congress in December, 1923, indicated a tendency toward friendliness on the part of the United States.⁶ President Coolidge admitted that relations between the United States and Russia presented "notable difficulties," but spoke of the desire of the American people to see "our traditional friends restored to their position among the nations of the earth." He further noted:

We have relieved their pitiable destitution with an enormous charity. Our Government offers no objection to the carrying on of commerce by our citizens with the people of Russia. Our Government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another regime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose to make merchandise of any American principles. These rights and principles must go wherever the sanctions of our Government go.

But while the valor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government not by the Czar but by the newly formed Republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appears work meet for repentance, our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near when we can act.

This seeming overture brought a reply from M. Tchicherin, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, manifesting complete readiness of the Soviet Government to negotiate the settlement of claims, provided the counter claims were likewise discussed. But two days later Mr. Hughes gave a brusque answer:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his Message to Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the Soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make fair compensation, they can do so. If the Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and properly recognize them, they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results, which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. The Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts, directed from Moscow, are abandoned.

Secretary of State Kellogg's declaration of policy on April 14, 1928, was in the tradition of his predecessors since 1917.* He stated that the Soviet doctrine of world revolution, the repudiation of debts and the confiscation of property had made it impossible to recognize Russia. The experience of various European governments which had recognized Russia had proved the wisdom of American policy. Recognition by them had not decreased Bolshevik propaganda and resulted neither in the payment of debts contracted by preceding Russian governments nor indemnification of confiscated property. Mr. Kellogg expressed America's friendliness for the Russian people:

As concerning commercial relations between the United States and Russia, it is the policy of the Government of the United States to place no obstacles in the way of the development of trade and commerce between the two countries, it being understood that individuals and corporations availing themselves of the opportunity to engage in such trade do so upon their own responsibility and at their own risk.

The Department of State has endeavored to reduce to a minimum diffi-

culties affecting commercial relations. Visas are readily granted by American consular officers to Russian nationals even if associated with the Soviet regime provided that the real purpose of their visit to the United States is in the interest of trade and commerce and provided that they have not been associated with the international revolutionary activities of the Bolshevik regime.

The American Government has interposed no objection to the financing incidental to ordinary current commercial intercourse between the two countries, and does not object to banking arrangements necessary to finance contracts for the sale of American goods on long-term credits, provided the financing does not involve the sale of securities to the public. The American Government, however, views with disfavor the flotation of a loan in the United States or the employment of American credit for the people making an advance to a regime which has repudiated the obligations of Russia to the United States and its citizens and confiscated the property of American citizens in Russia.

Mr. Kellogg also commented on the growing trade of the United States with Russia, though he did so to show that its growth had taken place despite non-recognition.

The material in this section presents two characteristics that have been noted before with regard to the years 1921 to 1929. One is the calmer spirit of the investigations; the other, as in the governmental pronouncements, was the existence of certain undercurrents. These undercurrents suggest a growing realization of the existence of forces that eventually would necessitate the recognition of Russia—namely, the continuance in power of the Bolsheviks, the growing trade between the two countries and the apparent trend to the right under the NEP. There is definitely a noticeable difference between the early pronouncements of Hoover and Hughes and the tone and substance of Secretary Kellogg's declaration.

X: SUMMARY

THE 20's were a mixture of hazy optimism, wary tolerance, and unexpected events. American opinion of Soviet Russia from 1921-29 naturally conformed to this spirit. In both countries the prevailing mood demanded *laissez faire*. It generated in America a popular psychology of expansiveness and economic progress, beneath which was a lack of economic balance profoundly troubling reflective minds. In Russia, the growth of the Nepmen was countered by the abiding faith of the Communists in the principles the revolution had defined. The era of optimism here persuaded Americans to overrate the degree to which the NEP had affected fundamental Soviet philosophy.

The outstanding aspects of American opinion on the problem were: A calmer tone in the appraisal of Russia.

Reports of improvements in industry, trade, finance, etc.

Articles were more analytical. They weighed the facts concerning labor, foreign trade, etc., and arrived at percentages of approval or disapproval, not wholesale judgments of the entire system.

There was much emphasis on the New Economic Policy under which, it was conceded, Russia was "coming back." The implications were that this recovery would mean a return to democratic institutions and, indeed, to capitalism.

Communism was judged a failure because the Bolsheviks had been obliged to offer compromises in the form of the New Economic Policy.

Trade "difficulties" were spoken of in contrast to earlier contentions that trade was "impossible." The theme that Russia would remain an economic vacuum under the Soviet gradually disappeared.

The co-ordination of industry under the early forms of planning was reported but neither clearly described nor thoroughly understood.

A better understanding—or willingness to consider the immense obstacles the Bolsheviks had faced and were confronting—the size of the country, the variety of peoples, the complexities of the economic problems (lack of capital, a backward agricultural economy and the non-industrial psychology of the Russian people.)

The moderation of feeling toward Russia was a by-product of American self-satisfaction and preoccupation with its own developing economy. It was not a change of opinion deriving from a deeper inquiry into Russian affairs. The American people, glancing up from their work and their ticker tape, perceived a Russia getting along, developing its resources, with the Bolsheviks somehow staying in power and, therefore, accredited by time. Despite all these pleasant impressions, it was kept in mind that Russia was still being ruled by a system of government not approved by Americans. This prejudice was so deeply rooted that it succeeded in nullifying to a large extent any decided reformation of American attitude. What resulted was an acceptance of Russia, not in any positive or conscious spirit, but in a vague mood of acknowledging strange but existing actualities. The sharpness of contrast between the two economies became dulled. The growing Russian nationalism weakened the talk of world revolution, while the long thrust of prosperity rendered the American people indifferent to the propaganda of Communism.

Part Three

THE DEPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN RUSSIA

1929-1933

I: LABOR ORGANS

“WHO is your well-fed friend?” a writer inquired in the *American Federationist* of July, 1930. The answer was, “William Z. Foster . . . That boy is the big squeeze in the Communist Party and has two of the softest grafts in the world.” The implication was that Foster obtained funds not only from Russia but also from sympathizers in the United States.¹ Thus continued the long opposition of the American Federation of Labor to Communism and Russia.

In 1930 American importations from Russia were attacked in some quarters on the ground that the imports were made by convict labor. An editorial in the *American Federationist* of September, 1930, strongly supported the charge: “The American Federation of Labor does not seek discrimination against Russian products, because we are not in sympathy with their political theory. We believe that Russia must make her own internal decisions.” It was because the American Federation of Labor believed in free institutions that it endeavored to protect them from menacing circumstances. “We are urging,” the editorial concluded, “the application of a general principle to protect free workers against competition with unfree labor in the form of goods sold at less than the cost of the product which pays wages of free labor.”

The *New York Times* of October 13, 1930, reported the demand of the National Lumber Manufacturers' Association to the Treasury Department that importers be required to prove their foreign goods had not been made by convict labor, and that difficulties of such proof ought not to be allowed as an excuse. At the 1930 Convention of the A. F. of L.,

a motion from the floor recommended that this item from the *Times* be included in the proceedings.³

In an issue of the *American Federationist* containing an editorial against convict-made Russian goods, G. W. Hartmann, writing about industrial psychology in Germany and Russia, said that the industrial psychology employed in Russia was effective — that, contrary to popular belief, the Soviet Government recognized individual differences and made ample provision for selecting workmen with special capacities for particular jobs. Hartmann pointed out that "Since industrial psychology is such a heavy contributor to the contemporary increase in Russian output, it is clear that its principles can function in the interests of a socialistic order as well as in the interests of stockholders." He praised the work of the Central Institute of Labor in Moscow which guided the psychotechnical work of industrial psychology. He also approved of the "labor clinics," to which workers of poor productivity were sent to be treated instead of being fired outright, as in the United States.⁴ Hartmann's stand was not characteristic of the attitude of the American Federation of Labor.

In summarizing the friendly relations of the British Labor Party with Soviet Russia, the *Federationist* observed that while there was some likeness between the efforts and desires of labor in Russia and England, a sharp distinction had to be made between democratic self-determination and Bolshevism. It pointed out that the difference in method which British and Russian labor used made them practically irreconcilable.⁵

The Central Labor Council of Vallejo, California, which had visited Russia on invitation wanted to read to the 1934 A. F. of L. Convention a forty-five minute report of its findings. The committee on resolutions rejected the request. When the matter came to a vote on the floor, the Convention voted not to hear the report.⁶

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers were more concerned with the Five-Year Plan than with convict goods. Russia had given the world a new idea which interested the Amalgamated more and more as the American depression deepened.⁷ *Advance*, the union's organ, considered the Five-Year Plan the essence of the "constructive phase of the revolution"; and commented that "the Soviet experience was moving intelligent people to take the economic planners seriously."⁸ It declared that the "Russian Revolution has grown into the stage where it is no longer an experiment, or a passing show. It is a lasting fact, rich in consequences," a profound lesson provided by "a nation which is starving itself into social greatness."⁹ When the United States recognized Soviet Russia in 1933, *Advance* took pride in not having required that much time "to recognize a fact of world-wide significance, the establishment of a labor regime over one-sixth of the globe and a population of 160 million."¹⁰

It was convinced that recognition, if not hampered by reactionaries, would be to the advantage of both nations.

Justice, organ of the International Ladies' Garment Workers, seldom referred to the Five-Year Plan but continued its anti-Communist policy.²² On the other hand, the *Locomotive Engineers Journal* agreed heartily with *Advance* that the Five-Year Plan challenged the "attention of economists the world over."²³ This magazine published a large number of articles reporting progress in railway construction, wage increases and reduction of working hours.²⁴ It pointed out in 1932 that the decrease in Russian trade was due mainly to a lack of credits, a situation unwarranted when it was considered that in an era of bankruptcies, defaults and moratoria, Russia had been purchasing from the United States since 1924 without a single default.²⁵

II: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL MAGAZINES

CLARENCE T. STARR spent three years in Russia. In *Nation's Business* he related that the unions were controlled by a strong minority of Communists, that civil liberties were restricted, strikes prohibited and union activity, as understood in America, repressed. He contended the Russian worker had nothing the American worker lacked and in many instances, less. Starr reported that an American engineer was asked by a young Russian, "When will the revolution take place in America?" The American replied, "When they take all the automobiles away from the worker."²⁶

In 1929, in an effort to better working conditions, the 360-day work year was introduced. Discussing this the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* quoted an article by Walter Duranty in the *New York Times* as follows:

Whoever conceived this measure is little short of a genius, for it kills at least five birds with one small stone. First, it will increase factory output 20 percent. Second, it will provide jobs for workers eliminated by industrial "rationalization." Third, it will be a powerful weapon in the Soviet anti-religious campaign against Sunday and church holidays. Fourth, it will give "more backward" countries like England and Germany a new idea for their struggle against unemployment. Finally, it will reduce overhead by the elimination of the weekly "let-down," both of machines and man-power.²⁷

That the Russians were working by the clock was evidenced, said *Business Week*, by their purchase of two American clock factories. The

Russians needed time-pieces, it observed, because of industrialization and increased mileage in transportation, part of the Five-Year Plan which "amazes the world by its impetus." Of more interest to American labor and business than actual conditions in Russia was the news in *Business Week* in 1931, that 6,000 American artisans were being hired to go to Russia, and that Amtorg had received 100,000 bids for these jobs.⁴

The practice of banking, the *Journal of the American Bankers Association* remarked, was not true Communism, nevertheless, by 1930, banking had developed over 20,000 units in Russia. The State Bank alone had 546 branches as well as 53 correspondents all over the world to handle foreign trade. Since 1923 a very large number of savings banks had been opened. The major institutions were the Prombank for trading and industrial banking, the Gosbank for short-term financing, a Central Agricultural Bank for agriculture, and the All-Union Co-operative Bank. Naturally the main consideration of Russian banking was the welfare of the State, not of the individual.⁵

The development of the banking system did not eliminate inflation. R. C. Long, correspondent of the *London Economist*, writing in the *Annalist*, pointed out that the security behind even State Bank notes was very low—less than 25 percent of face value. Finance Commissariat notes, increased by the reform laws of 1922-24 to 50 percent of the State Bank Notes, were raised in 1928 another 25 percent. Only a 13 percent reserve was held behind the combined bank and commissariat note circulation. It seemed currency had outrun production and wealth.⁶

Alzada Comstock, likewise writing in the *Annalist*, explained inflation by saying that, since checks were not trusted, currency inflation was needed.⁷ V. A. Diakonoff, in the *Journal of Accountancy*, showed how bookkeeping credit was substituted for the cumbersome system of bills of exchange. This was done by estimating the needs of the factors of production and crediting them, rather than allowing the awkward bills of exchange to accumulate and unnecessarily endanger the credit structure.⁸ Difficulties were bound to develop, as R. C. Long pointed out in the *Journal of the American Bankers Association*, because production did not increase at the rate expected, and also because of bureaucratic inefficiency, fear of assuming responsibility and functional breakdowns. Another reason he gave was that the first Five-Year Plan, emphasizing producers' goods, created a scarcity of consumers' goods. Fearing inflation, the people began to hoard and trading in kind reappeared.⁹

Again writing in the *Annalist*, Alzada Comstock pointed out that the Credit Reform Act of 1930 (discussed more fully in the section on economic magazines) had not proved quite successful. The system was slow and engendered much distrust between the various productive units. Quarrels were so serious between these units that they demanded con-

tracts from one another guaranteeing that material and labor would be forthcoming.¹⁰ However, the basic idea of the reform, as D. V. Lehovich indicated in *Bankers Magazine*, was not abandoned. Capital was to be allotted by central planning in order to accomplish the greatest social good. The industrial or commercial importance of an industry's product to the nation's economic life determined the share of capital it received.¹¹ Late in 1932, *Bankers Magazine* reprinted an article from the *Economic Review of the Soviet Union* to the effect that the function of banking in mobilizing and distributing resources would achieve increasing importance in Russia.¹²

The idea of uniform accounting practices and central control of credit was the subject of a detailed article in the *Harvard Business Review*. After much technical discussion of Russian balance sheets the article concluded: "The State has the same interest in its industries that a capitalist parent organization has in its operating branches. The correct application of the capital intrusted to them by the State is their particular care." And further: "Soviet balance sheets are very explicit and real. Only actual values at the disposal of the enterprise and its obligations are shown."¹³ This inter-relationship of credit, accounting and planning in Soviet Russia was explained with care by both the *Journal of Accountancy*¹⁴ and the *Harvard Business Review*.¹⁵ V. A. Diakonoff, in the latter magazine for January, 1933, pointed out that with forty annual report forms the Soviet Government always possessed an exhaustive analysis of the "statics and dynamics of all economic activities of the enterprises of 'trusts' and 'syndicates' in the U.S.S.R." "

Regarding the prospects of trade, the magazines agreed that the vast capital requirements of the Five-Year Plan constituted a great opportunity for American business and industry.¹⁶ *Business Week* for February 15, 1930, indicated that "Russia, unrecognized politically by the United States, and unable—until within a year—to do a credit business in this country, has come to the aid of depressed American industry."¹⁷ The following month *Business Week* observed that the U.S.S.R. had begun to pull its own weight in world trade.¹⁸ The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* drew attention to other countries, like Great Britain, who were extending credits at the same time the U.S. Department of Commerce was urging American exporters to insist on cash or near cash.¹⁹ This policy forced Russia to curtail its orders in the United States because of lack of credits.²⁰

Complications immediately arose when trade with Russia was considered. These included the low price of Russian goods and the great risk of long-term credits.²¹ The *Magazine of Wall Street* charged that slave and convict labor had produced the Russian imports.²² *Business Week* reported the opposition to Russia organized by the anthracite in-

dustry," and the *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* called attention to the embargo placed by the United States on Russian wood pulp.²⁴ While we spent our time baiting Amtorg, said *Business Week*, Europe was striving to obtain Russian orders.²⁵ Germany was offering substantial aid²⁶ and Italy had given Russia twenty-five to fifty years credit on a 10-million dollar order.²⁷ According to *Sales Management*, Russia offered America a chance to do great business.²⁸ Although American trade with Russia was small, Alzada Comstock, in *Barron's*, expressed confidence that it could and would be considerably larger.²⁹ However, the charge of dumping, to which Walter Duranty reported the U.S.S.R. pleaded guilty,³⁰ caused fresh dispute and led to a Congressional investigation.³¹ Canada, France and Great Britain joined the U. S. in opposing Russian exports.³² *Business Week* cited the Soviet's desperate needs as an explanation of the dumping.³³ *Forbes* described how we continued to trade gingerly with Russia,³⁴ while *Business Week* pointed out that the U.S.S.R. enjoyed the distinction of buying more and selling more than any other nation in 1930.³⁵

Business Week also recorded that although there were doubts as to Soviet credit,³⁶ Russian orders were eagerly sought³⁷ despite the accusations that Russia gave its trade only where it got credits.³⁸ Germany and Italy had already extended liberal credits and were offering even better terms while France, long opposed to Russian exports, finally opened her markets to Russian orders.³⁹ *Business Week* remarked that the United States, disturbed by fading foreign markets, was watching the Russian prospects closely, and added that although "popularly considered the greatest risk, the Soviets, it is admitted, have never defaulted to any foreign creditor."⁴⁰ Moreover, the second Five-Year Plan promised tempting opportunities.⁴¹ Russia's trade was now rapidly winning international recognition.⁴² Though *Barron's* reported Europe skeptical over Soviet credits, other magazines noted that Europeans were competing energetically for Russian orders. The *Harvard Business Review* traced the upward movement in Russian trade to closer political bonds between Germany and the U.S.S.R.⁴³ Ethel B. Dietrich, in *Barron's*, urged the United States to take advantage of the inviting Russian market by offering terms to the Soviets at least as favorable as those offered by other countries.⁴⁴ *Business Week* recounted a credit scheme devised to stimulate trade between the United States, Russia and China. This scheme consisted of sending Soviet woodpulp to China, Chinese silk to the United States and American copper to Russia.⁴⁵

In July, 1935, the United States encouraged the sale of cotton to Russia through credits extended by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This action was naturally expected to increase Russo-American trade,⁴⁶ and led *Forbes* to believe that the United States would soon recog-

nize the U.S.S.R." *Advertising and Selling* estimated the Russian market for the ensuing five years at five billion dollars.⁴⁸ *Business Week* in October, 1933, reported that the Soviet Government had been invited to send representatives to Washington to discuss past debts. Russia understood that a debt settlement would mean a billion dollars worth of orders immediately to be filled over a period of several years.⁴⁹

By 1929, a number of American firms were doing construction work in Russia. The Austin Company, of Cleveland, aided by Henry Ford, was building a "miniature Detroit" at Nizhni Novgorod at a cost of 40 million dollars. The same article, in *Business Week*, reported that Stuart, James & Cooke, of New York, Allen & Garcia, of Chicago, and Roberts & Schaefer, of Chicago, were completing the mechanization of Soviet coal mining.⁵⁰ No mention was made of the means of payment.⁵¹ Henry Ford, interviewed in *Nation's Business*, explained that he was helping the U.S.S.R., because Russians had seen the necessity for mass production and wanted to perfect themselves in the use of it. To him the important thing was facts, not theory, and he expressed the opinion that economic practice could be worked out only when a country had become self-sufficient and industrially advanced. He, therefore, had invited Russian engineers to study the methods used in the Ford plant.⁵² However, T. M. Knoppen noted in the *Magazine of Wall Street* that Ford risked no permanent investment in Russia and did his building for a fee.⁵³

Bernard Knollenberg wrote in *Nation's Business* that Russia could best be compared to an old firm gone bankrupt and asking for a new line of credit. He felt that its leaders were men of high character, who would have risen to leadership anywhere. Moreover, the Russians realized the necessity for foreign capital and would, therefore, act honorably in all their agreements. It was true the concessionaire was obligated to amortize his investment quickly but, under concomitant monopoly control, large profits facilitated matters. He proposed that the United States establish an American finance corporation for Soviet-American trade in order to keep abreast of Russian economic conditions and work out a sound policy.⁵⁴ *Business Week* took up this difficulty in actual business operations in an article entitled, "Six Men, One Important, Will Get You Cash For Russian Paper." The "important" man was Isaac Sherman, formerly of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, who had become one of six brokers offering cash for Russian paper. The money ultimately came from Europe where there were ready buyers of Amtorg notes. Sherman was quoted as follows: "Today there is not a single banking institution in America where an Amtorg trade acceptance, issued against the unpaid balance due on a bill of goods, is immediately discountable 'without recourse,' as the phrase goes." The rates were said to be 12 percent for six-months paper.⁵⁵

As in other sections of American opinion, the principle of economic planning had a weighty effect on business and financial magazines. They were markedly impressed by the magnitude of the Five-Year Plan. The *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* reported in October, 1929, that Soviet Russia would spend 33 billion dollars in the next four years on industrial expansion. One project was the creation of a large automobile industry.⁶⁰ *Business Week* decided that Russia really meant business.⁶¹

There were other explanations of the first Five-Year Plan. Professor Paul Haensel, formerly of the University of Moscow, believed the plan had been introduced to diminish imports.⁶² *Business Week* expressed the view that the whole plan represented a titanic dumping campaign to wreck capitalism and bring about world revolution.⁶³ Some called Russian prosperity an illusion and Russia only "an undeveloped oriental country."⁶⁴ But the majority were interested in such developments as the new Turkish-Siberian railroad which would enable Russia to exploit her cotton and develop the other resources of her vast hinterland.⁶⁵ *Business Week* decided in November, 1930, that Russia's European trade refuted prophecies that the economy of the U.S.S.R. would collapse.⁶⁶ A few months later, however, it stated that lack of skilled workers vitiated the threat of Russian competition.⁶⁷ *Barron's*, too, remarked the lack of skilled men and noted the large number of American firms who held technical assistance contracts.⁶⁸ Samuel H. Cross said in the *Harvard Business Review* that although Russia had increased her productive means, she could not use them effectively. He doubted whether the Russian masses would be any better off at the end of the Five-Year Plan.⁶⁹ However, Alzada Comstock, in *Barron's*, showed that with regard to producers' goods the Soviet economy was advancing faster than any other nation in the world.⁷⁰ *Business Week* in April, 1931, reported oil and cotton production had far exceeded expectations, pointing out that Russia was underselling American cotton in London by half a cent.⁷¹

Dissent was voiced in the *Magazine of Wall Street*, stating that the Five-Year Plan was being supported through artificially stimulated enthusiasm and violence.⁷² In *Nation's Business* for July, 1931, Clarence T. Starr called the plan a paper program,⁷³ and, in a subsequent issue, maintained that lack of incentive was the "dead hand" retarding Russia.⁷⁴ When the first Five-Year Plan began to lag, second thought and reappraisals began to appear. *Business Week* agreed that Russian difficulties were increasing but not as swiftly as the rumors had it. The magazine mentioned that there were no defaults against Soviet Russia; what had interfered with her plans were the low world prices.⁷⁵ The *Magazine of Wall Street*, on the other hand, was certain that financial collapse confronted Russia. Basile W. Delgass, formerly vice-president of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, writing in the same magazine, expressed the

opinion that Russia, denied credits everywhere, might continue under the Soviet system, but that Communism was at the end of its rope; the people were clamoring for goods and food.⁷³ Alzada Comstock, in *Barron's*, had become unsure of the Five-Year Plan. What was the matter with planning, that breakdowns occurred so often? "Perhaps," she said, "such things must remain obscure to the citizens of a land where unplanned, chaotic railroads accept freight calmly and deliver it promptly."⁷³

The end of the first Five-Year Plan caused mixed feelings. Old and new problems abounded. Food shortage again appeared and *Barron's* carried an article entitled "Russia's Wheat Dream—An Obituary."⁷⁴ *Business Week* was moved to wonder whether Germany's grant of credits to Russia twice in four weeks meant that Moscow was a strained or merely a shrewd debtor.⁷⁵ The *Magazine of Wall Street* saw the price system being reintroduced under economic pressure and the enthusiasm for world revolution gone.⁷⁶

Business Week was impressed by the sobriety of the second Five-Year Plan, and declared that despite the failings of the first Five-Year Plan, it had successfully carried out its initial scheme. "The severest critics," it said, "admit that."⁷⁷

Business Week for June 15, 1932, told about a group of eight American businessmen who had visited Russia to see things for themselves. These men felt that American business was friendlier toward Russia than the United States Government. Although the United States had not recognized Russia, the group noted that the U.S.S.R. had been allowed to sit in on the World Economic Conference—a tacit admission that the U.S.S.R. was "an important cog in the world business machine."⁷⁸

The opinion of the business and financial magazines centered on the first Five-Year Plan. There was some discussion of centralized banking and its role in planning. Possibilities for trade were estimated in terms of the needs of the Plan. The idea of setting up a definite program to co-ordinate and control production made a very great impression although, toward the end, there were doubts about its results. Nonetheless, planning did add to Russian prestige and it was generally admitted that the U.S. S.R. had become a world power.

III: TRADE PERIODICALS

THE trade journals also considered Russia's industrial needs mainly in the light of the Five-Year Plan.

Paul Wooton, Washington correspondent of the *American Machinist*, felt that Russia could not buy any great amount of goods because of inability to produce as much as was expected. While the Five Year Plan undoubtedly promised much, waste and miscalculation would undo it.¹ Increase of purchases however, was reported in the same magazine, for investments in machinery, mining, oil, electro-technical and metal industries in 1929 rose 51.5 percent over 1928.² *Iron Age* also considered the Russian market barely scratched.³ As for Russian competition, the *Oil and Gas Journal* noted that oil production had been greatly intensified, and because of Soviet price cutting, constituted a "permanent menace."⁴ *Textile World*, fearful that Russia's dumping of fabric materials would affect world markets, quoted many figures to substantiate its forebodings. It took note of the increased acreage in cotton and hemp which, under the Five-Year Plan, was to equal by 1932-33 one-fourth of the world crop. Russian flax, which in 1913 constituted 27 percent of the total world crop, would amount to half the world total by the completion of the Plan.⁵

Another need began to provoke comment: that of supplying Russia with skilled men from America. A special report on the conditions confronting American engineers in the U.S.S.R. was prepared by the Board of Directors of the American Institute of Mechanical Engineers, and published in *Mining and Metallurgy* of April, 1931. Russian living conditions, said the report, were inadequate and expensive. It also warned that American engineers, returning to this country, found their contacts gone and met many employers whose prejudice against Communism extended to anyone who had even been in the U.S.S.R. Russian experience, the report concluded, would be of little help to an American engineer, and admonished the young engineer to work with an American concern if he went to Russia.⁶

Col. Hugh L. Cooper, writing in *Electrical World*, declared that the menace of Communism had been vastly over-rated and he thought it foolish to reject a market worth 2½ billion dollars over a period of seven years. Despite his dislike of Communism, Cooper admitted progress had been made in Russia and pointed out that, among other things, the supply of electric lamps sufficed to satisfy the domestic demand.⁷ *Iron Age*, in July, 1932, said the economic situation in Russia appeared to be clearing up, and proposed the RFC aid in handling credits for Russia by discounting acceptances.⁸ *National Petroleum News* in September, 1932, reported that the Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd., (one of the Mellon inter-

ests) had traded one million dollars worth of aluminum for Russian crude oil. Since Mellon also owned 85 percent of Gulf Oil, the deal likewise seemed to reveal the direction of Russia's future international oil policy.⁹ The *Oil and Gas Journal* of November 9, 1933, a few days before American recognition, foresaw large orders as the result of recognition. It quoted the Soviet Government's own claim that Russia's credit was good, for all of its obligations had been met promptly.¹⁰

The condition of Russia's natural resources and their exploitation continued to occupy a prominent place in the trade journals. The *Oil and Gas Journal* reported production of oil in 1929 had passed the 1913 level by two million tons.¹¹ New oil fields were being opened in the Urals.¹² In the meantime, domestic consumption was expanding so rapidly that production facilities were strained.¹³ C. E. Kern, of the Washington bureau of the *Oil and Gas Journal*, reported a 12 percent decline in cost of oil production due to the introduction of new methods.¹⁴ The same magazine said that in 1929 the Soviet had set a record year in oil,¹⁵ and added that prospecting in Russia was continuing intensely.¹⁶ In September, 1930, the first cargo of Soviet gasoline to the U. S. arrived at Baltimore.¹⁷ "The success of the Russian oil program," commented the *Oil and Gas Journal* several months later, "has been questioned since its first announcement but many are now inclined to take it more seriously."¹⁸

However, not all reports of oil developments in Russia were favorable. There were some contradictory statements, for example, in the *Oil and Gas Journal*, although the very nature of these reports indicated the great interest in the matter. A. E. Mockler, in 1931, described Russia's ambitious program for her oil industry during the coming years,¹⁹ and in December, 1931, reported that Soviet refineries included units of modern design and large capacity.²⁰ But other reports charged the Russians had failed to grasp technical problems and had lost much time and money through oversight and wastage.²¹ Rumors of exhaustion of reserves and lack of supplies for home use²² alternated with accounts of Russian oil overtaking the American exports to Finland and outranking them in Esthonia and Latvia.²³ Predictions that Soviet oil production would decline unless machinery was forthcoming,²⁴ were followed by indications that the oil leaders of the world were trying to induce Russia to limit her petroleum exports.²⁵

The trade papers presented a similar picture of Russian iron and steel. The early hardships of the Soviet mining and metallurgical industries, said an article in the *Engineering and Mining Journal*, had now become less basic problems of multiplicity of planning, lack of trained men, labor problems and accidents. All these had to be solved before real progress could be made.²⁶ Still, progress was taking place for, as

the same magazine and others reported, the Soviet Solimansk potash deposits threatened to rival those of Stassfurt and Alsace.⁷⁷

Agitation in the United States over charges that Russia was dumping convict-made goods could be interpreted as an admission that, however she achieved it, the U.S.S.R. had products for export, although (Russia was acquitted of the charge in April, 1933.⁷⁸) *Steel* wondered whether the Russian iron and steel program constituted a world menace, and itself attempted an answer with the belief that home consumption would absorb Soviet production for years.⁷⁹ *Steel* also quoted the Department of Commerce's statement that costs of Soviet steel production were rising,⁸⁰ and that long distances and bad transportation would prevent Russian exports of iron and steel.⁸¹

The story of electricity and power in Russia, unlike that of oil and metals, was clear of both internal and international complications. *Electrical World* reported great enthusiasm in Russia for electrical development as one aspect of the new society the people believed they were creating.⁸² The *General Electric Review* gave a technical description of the 250,000 kilowatt steam-generating plant at Stalingrad, and spoke of plans to raise electric generation from 5,160 million kilowatt hours in 1928 to 22 billion by 1933. New and larger power sites under consideration, the article noted, "are located strategically with respect to factories which require power."⁸³ *Mechanical Engineering* dealing with developments at Magnetostroy and Dnieperstroy, remarked that the creation of such power offered no problem to Russia although it "would be a problem anywhere except in Soviet Russia."⁸⁴ *Engineering News*, in its technical review of the Dnieper dam, was most favorably impressed with Russian efforts. "The popular notion in America," it contended, "that labor is forced in Russia was found to be 100 percent erroneous . . . The work done by the Russian engineering personnel and all the labor units won the admiration and respect of the American engineers."⁸⁵ The *General Electric Review* saw great possibilities in the Dnieperstroy power station, "the largest in the world," which would not supply only power, but provide a series of navigable ways connecting the Black Sea with the Baltic. The power station would develop mineral resources and industrial centers through the power and new water transportation it made possible.⁸⁶

Likewise favorable was the opinion on general industrial progress in Russia expressed by the trade journals. *Automotive Industries*, in October, 1929, reported that tractors would lead Soviet automotive production, itself a rapidly growing industry.⁸⁷ W. L. Carver, special representative of General Motors in Russia, writing in *Automotive Industries* for March 5, 1932, said that, "In the face of handicaps of staggering magnitude affecting material, personnel, contributory industries, transportation, and management technique, automotive development prob-

ably is proceeding at a more rapid rate in Soviet Russia than in any other country in the world."⁸⁸ A number of articles, several by John M. Carmody, later administrator of the Federal Works Administration, reported a growing comprehension in Russia of technical problems.⁸⁹ The *Engineering and Mining Journal* quoted Stuart Chase: "We have talked and hoped; the Russians have deliberately planned."⁹⁰

Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering in December, 1929, characterized Russia as "a nation starting anew."⁹¹ *Iron Age* enjoyed the Russian mode of putting a chart of pig iron output on postage stamps to stimulate production.⁹² Ivy Lee, public relations adviser to Standard Oil, writing in *Engineers and Engineering*, said he felt "the most significant fact about the present Russian regime was the personal honesty of the men in charge."⁹³ Several writers expressed wonder whether Russia could stand the strain of such rapid expansion. Whiting Williams, in the *American Machinist*, of February, 1930, speculated on the consequences if the Soviet "machine gods" collapsed.⁹⁴ Hugh L. Cooper, in *Steel*, of August 28, 1930, debated whether the U. S. should help Russia.⁹⁵

Engineers and Engineering published an account of water and sewer works in Moscow.⁹⁶ *Domestic Engineering* reported progress in school buildings.⁹⁷ *Iron Age* remarked, in comparing Russian optimum output with limited production for profit in the United States, "If the Russian Experiment is successful, the alternative will no longer be Utopian but a perfectly definite one with a going example."⁹⁸ The great movement for standardization brought forth comment from many sources. *Steel* gave a long list of items that had been standardized, including items as small as pins and hooks, and listed the number of industries that would be standardized by 1931.⁹⁹ Walter N. Polakov, in the *American Machinist*, maintained that results of the Five-Year Plan could not be measured in terms of figures and percentages but as a psychological stimulus "without equal."¹⁰⁰ The *Oil and Gas Journal* reported that the Soviet planned to outstrip the United States in oil production, having increased from 1925-30 by 160 percent while the United States showed only an 18 percent increase.¹⁰¹ The *Oil Paint and Drug Reporter* published like increases for the chemical and oil paints industry in Russia.¹⁰²

The question of how far Russia had advanced in plant management was usually answered favorably. However, problem of responsibility of management was still unsolved. "Unquestionably," said John M. Carmody in the September 24, 1931, *American Machinist*, "the greatest need in Russia today is intelligent industrial management and the elimination of fear on the part of the managers and engineers that they will pay heavy penalties for making mistakes."¹⁰³ Early in 1932, Walter N. Polakov, in *Factory and Industrial Management*, said the Russians were learning fast. It was not fair, he argued, to compare the United States and

Russia. America had experienced 150 years of industrialism and fifty years of scientific management, while Russia was just beginning.⁶⁴ Indeed, as John M. Carmody pointed out in the same magazine, the United States could learn from Russia: "In the United States, we have political democracy and industrial autocracy. In Russia the situation is reversed—the government is autocratic but industry is democratic."⁶⁵ While the *American Machinist* found the U.S.S.R. planning and controlling more effectively through use of the Gantt Chart,⁶⁶ *Iron Age* doubted whether the Russians would be able themselves to operate what others had built for them.⁶⁷ Thus, opinion varied in its judgment of Russia's sudden and tremendous development. A. P. N. Fleming, Director of Research and Education of Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Co., of Manchester, England, believed the Russians were equal to the task. In the September, 1933, *Civil Engineering*, Fleming declared: "There is in Soviet Russia a larger body of organized research workers under unified control than exists in any other industrial country in the world."⁶⁸

In contrast to the largely favorable reactions to Russia's industrial developments, a few writers believed with Alfred M. Wasbauer, writing in the *American Machinist*, that Russia's vast home market would absorb all she could make and hence would not affect world trade.⁶⁹ Neither did *Food Industries* fear Russia as an agricultural competitor because only slight farm expansion appeared possible.⁷⁰ A few voices continued to dismiss any reports of progress in Russia. W. H. Grady, in the *Mining Congress Journal*, characterized conditions as disastrous, with the Five-Year Plan being carried through by terror alone, and that the best brains were being killed off.⁷¹ Such violent attacks, however, appeared infrequently.

The trade periodicals, like the business and financial magazines, did not appreciate the significance of the Five-Year Plan. They reported progress or failure without judging events in relation to the structural organization of Russian economic life. These publications saw the first Five Year Plan only as an opportunity for trade, with due regard to the possibilities of Russian competition. There was no real understanding of the nature of a planned economy. It would have seemed that in a group of magazines devoted to production, especially those dealing exclusively with one industry, the idea and effort of collective industrial planning should command deep interest. But it was merely as a business judgment that the trade journals of 1929-1933 reported Russia's rapid growth. That conclusion might have been derived from ordinary newspaper channels.

IV: ECONOMIC MAGAZINES

THE economic magazines during 1929-1933 finally achieved an objective attitude toward Russia, even though the articles on the subject were still few.

That the vast experiment of establishing social insurance in Russia had been successful, was the conclusion of A. Victor Abramson in the August, 1929, *Journal of Political Economy*.¹ Abramson said that while the all-embracing scheme introduced after the October Revolution had been somewhat narrowed, there remained a bold determination to insure ten million persons against physical risks and economic uncertainties. This number included the main body of workers in industry, commerce and transport, as well as some seasonal workers. Agricultural workers and "certain classes difficult to reach," such as persons in the employ of artisans, were omitted. The insurance covered six degrees of physical disability. For unemployment it paid a maximum of 50 percent of wages in order to impel people to seek work, (especially under the NEP). Medical aid was also available. The insurance was operated through a highly centralized system and at a comparatively low cost, control remaining with the workers. During the NEP employers paid contributions which varied with the degree of risk. At first (under the NEP) the difficulty of collecting these contributions and delayed payments endangered the financial resources behind the insurance. Moreover, increased benefits, the frequent reduction of liquid assets, absence of adequate reserve funds in times of crisis and frequent use of resources for unforeseen expense combined to place a heavy strain upon it. The creation of a sound financial basis for the insurance depended upon the general improvement in the economic industrial position. The experiment, the article concluded, remained unfinished and the worker could not fully reap the benefits until the national economy "shall have passed through its present period of penury."

The economic situation in Russia formed the subject of a round-table discussion in the *American Economic Review*.² Among the participants were Professors Susan B. Kingsbury of Bryn Mawr, Mildred Fairchild, also of Bryn Mawr, William Adams Brown, Jr., of Brown University, and Calvin B. Hoover of Duke University. Aspects of factory life, the attempt to train technicians and the general results of the budget and central planning received keen analysis which was mostly favorable. The discussion showed that the sanitary conditions in factories had been considerably improved, that old plants had been reconditioned and the worst torn down. Control rested usually with a director (representing the trust and approved by the trade union) and a technical director, both of whom worked hand in hand. Committees were elected

by the workers to deal with industrial problems and with cultural and recreational activities.

Basic wages and piece rates were determined "by conference between the trade union and the trust of the industry," as were also methods of training and promotion. Rewards included old-age pensions, disability retirement, health insurance, medical care, rest-homes and the "whole system of unemployment insurance." Ten percent of all profits went for welfare housing, creches and kindergartens. The factory committee presided over the social life, while the creches were managed by a health department. In large establishments the clubs were "magnificent," in smaller ones rather simple. These factories, with their social and educational facilities, formed the community center for the workers. When new factories were built, they were located either at the outskirts of large towns or within small ones, and included new houses, a central food kitchen and laundry and bathing facilities.

Miss Fairchild drew a detailed picture of Russia's efforts to solve the important problem of training experts and technicians. In 1927-28 there were only 0.67 percent of university-trained engineers and 0.69 percent of technicians for every 100 workers. The Gosplan estimate indicated that in 1927-28, out of twelve million industrial workers, only 40 percent had been trained in their trades. The adoption of the Five Year Plan intensified the need for skilled men, who would have to be imported from other countries, but even they were not available in sufficient numbers. By 1933 another million and a half skilled workers would be needed. The effort to bridge this gap by training the native population was most enterprising. The first step was to establish apprenticeship schools in the factories. Master workmen served as teachers to "brigades" of learners. One hundred and thirty-two thousand young people in the State industries, employing two million workers in 1928, received this training. The Central Labor Institute worked with the trade unions and the Supreme Council of National Economy to teach increasing numbers of young people in the methods of mass production based on the Taylor and Gilbreth techniques. In 1929-30 nearly one hundred and fifty thousand under the age of twenty-one were so trained. Other schooling included evening courses and study circles operating under a central clearing house of information and organization called "Tech-Mass." The training of engineers and technicians required the creation of technical high schools, a new institution for Russia. Engineering in old Russia had been of a highly theoretical nature and offered little training in large-scale production. Moreover, the old engineers were either of the aristocracy or the upper bourgeois classes and were therefore not available to the proletarian government. The number of new proletarian engineers graduated in 1930 was insufficient to meet

requirements, but Miss Fairchild, in concluding, pointed to indications that this problem would be solved.

Mabel Newcomer of Vassar, in the same symposium, discussed the Soviet fiscal method as a test of Russia's ability to maintain its program of industrialization.⁸ Finance constituted a severe trial. Forced to raise money in a country which had never accumulated large capital funds and which could not borrow abroad, the Government had to resort to force or persuasion to lower the standard of living in order to raise the necessary capital. Moreover, it had to allot this money according to concepts opposed to traditional profit-making. Often the Government had to sell its product below cost if this seemed essential to the development of the plan. By levies on industrial gains, by taxes, by borrowing and by currency inflation, the government succeeded in raising the needed funds. On the whole, Miss Newcomer concluded, the Soviet budget showed many elements of strength: "A large percentage of expenditure for production purposes and a growing proportion of income from the earnings of industry; a gradual shifting of such taxes as are imposed from articles of consumption to incomes; and a budget which balances without excessive borrowing. Against this there is some currency inflation, but as yet this would seem not have gotten out of hand."

A more detailed account of the economic control exerted through financial centralization was presented in this round-table discussion by William Adams Brown, Jr.⁹ Surveying credit reform in Russia, he noted three main aspects: "1. The elimination of unnecessary duplication of credit in financing the production and distribution of goods. 2. The State Bank, one of the most powerful institutions in the Soviet State. 3. The establishment of an accounting control and audit over the operations of all state enterprises whereby efficiency and economy of their operation can be continuously measured." These measures could not have been effected without an increasing centralization in production and distribution. Prior to credit reform and under less centralized organization, the factories sold to the syndicate, the syndicate to the *Centrosoyus* (purchasing agent for the co-operatives), the *Centrosoyus* to the local co-operative, and the local to the consumer. The factory drew a draft on the syndicate and discounted it at the State Bank, the syndicate drew a draft on the *Centrosoyus* and also discounted it at the State Bank, and lastly the *Centrosoyus*, upon sale of goods to the local co-operative, likewise discounted its draft at the State Bank. If the sale to the local co-operative took place before the maturity of the first draft, there was a threefold duplication of credit built up, to be broken down by the cash deposits of the local co-operative. Despite the complexity of the system in requiring a constant and unnecessarily large volume of credit to facilitate the flow of goods, it could have worked had

the value of goods coming from the factories been equal to the value of goods passing out of the hands of distributing organizations into consumption . . . but these two values in the very rapidly growing Russian economy were not equal. There was a constantly increasing volume of goods coming from the factories and hence the credit continually being cancelled was less than that being created.

Advocates of credit reform argued:

Let us get rid of this complicated system of bills of exchange with its continuous rediscounting, unnecessary bookkeeping and undesirable building up of both sides of the balance sheet of the State Bank. It is the consequence of an illogical procedure copied from capitalistic countries, namely, the procedure of giving credit to the seller who has goods and does not need credit. Let us rather give credit to the buyer who has neither goods nor credit. Let the credit follow the goods.

This reform was carried out by a thorough-going reorganization of industry and the establishment of great trusts or *obiedinenii*, while *Centrosoyuz* became a planning organization for distribution of goods. These trusts, state farms and distributing agents kept accounts with the State Bank, credit being extended to them at the beginning of each quarter to meet expected demands. Settlements then were made by transfer of credits on the books of the State Bank. This concentration of industry and finance gave the State Bank great power in economic planning, which was the second aspect of credit reform. Actually the State Bank became the cashier of the entire nation. The other banks became merely planning organizations and distributors of credits.

The third aspect of credit reform, analyzed by Professor Brown, was concerned with the continuous audit of Soviet industry and trade. For example, the audit estimated the credit needed for any one period according to three standards: "(a). The amount of finished product which the factory is required to produce by the plan of production; (b). The output of finished product which it can produce per unit of labor and raw material; (c). The prices of raw material and the rates of wages which determine the price of the finished product." These elements, naturally, were the same that determine the price of the finished product "and gear in with the general machinery of price determination." Since these factors were known, the cost of production could be calculated, and from that, the credit needed as working capital. If the individual factory operated on schedule, there would be no balance at the end of the period. If production exceeded schedule there would, of course, be a balance. This served as a measure of efficiency. If a deficit occurred, proved due to causes beyond the control of the management, it was made up out of the general funds of the *obiedinenia*. Thus centralized credit control was intimately connected (a) with fixing prices which involved the whole plan of current accumulation of capital; (b) with the plan of redistribution of profits of individual industries over the whole field of industry;

and (c) with the audit and control of efficiency of operation within the producing units of the country.

Paul Hänsel, another participant in the discussion,⁵ attacked the violent methods of "Red directors" and the secret police in enforcing the will of the Government. He contended that the working class was being exploited and that piece-work was universally introduced for speed-up. Workers lacked housing, foodstuffs and textiles while the Government was exporting large quantities of products needed at home. Waste, poor quality and inefficiency were so widespread that Hänsel concluded, "We are correct in asserting that the Soviet Government has not shown the superiority of a socialistic order in comparison with the achievements of the advanced capitalistic countries."

On the other hand, Calvin B. Hoover⁶ maintained that "the economic and social experiment which Soviet Russia represents is the most significant development of our capitalistic era." This judgment was qualified by his assertion that despite "some impressive successes," Russia was further removed from the "good life of the Utopian philosophers than is our present bourgeois civilization." Fear and force reigned supreme, hatred and fanaticism were "officially inspired and nourished." But its economic successes must nonetheless be recognized. The collectivization of one-fourth of all peasant farms, "a harvest which has restored Russia as a factor in the international grain market," and the immense achievements in capital construction of the Five Year Plan, were results that could not be denied. Hoover concluded with a declaration the day would come when the "inevitable differences in the ideals of communism and capitalism" must cause a conflict. The Communist challenge, he said, made schemes for the stabilization of our economy "through purely negative action such as the limitation of production very dangerous. Our capitalistic system must be constantly able to offer a higher standard of living to labor than could be obtained under Communism if sharp class struggle is to be avoided."

Amy Hewes, in the December, 1932, *American Economic Review*,⁷ re-emphasized the changed status of the Soviet trade unions under Communism. Although membership grew, the unions had lost their control over production, and under the new centrally managed economy simply served to stimulate production and reduce labor turnover. Since the Government would tolerate no conflict with rapid industrialization, the tasks of trade unions had become largely disciplinarian. Still, said Miss Hewes, though the Soviet trade unions could no longer claim to control industry or even to serve in a protective capacity, they had sought to establish a different theoretical basis from that of capitalist countries, one nearer the theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. They endeavored to hold their members through new functions. By cultural and educational

work, workers' clubs, admirable recreation facilities, sports, music, drama and study, the unions had "actually created a new world for the worker." Despite their loss of economic power, the trade unions retained their energy and the loyalty of the membership.

The remaining articles in this section are included even though they post-date the period where this study ends. They are treated because they give close scrutiny of Communist theory. Gustavus Tuckerman, Jr., in the *American Economic Review* of December, 1933,⁸ attempted to show that Marxian genetic principles served as the basis of Soviet Russia's economic policies. He said that the period of the NEP gave the State the chance to concentrate capital as Marx predicted would happen and that the Five Year Plan further demonstrated this tendency. Moreover, the machine technique, "that proletarianizing octopus," was making the peasant dependent on "accumulated labor." The next five years would institute in the villages an environment "which will complete the foundation, according to the logic of Marx's historical materialism, of the classless Socialist state."

Calvin B. Hoover, in the March, 1935, *American Economic Review*,⁹ found that, contrary to Marxist-Leninist principles, changes in fundamental economic structure had not been achieved through the laboring classes alone. He cited Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany and the New Deal in the United States, concluding that there are "perhaps greater resemblances between National Socialism and Fascism on the one hand and the Soviet system on the other than there are between National Socialism and Fascism and old-style capitalism."

John R. Commons reviewed Lewis Corey's *Decline of American Capitalism* in the *American Economic Review* of June, 1935. Commons contrasted the teachings of Communism, Collective Democracy (his own doctrine of institutional economics) and Fascism with the individualistic economics of Adam Smith, pointing out the fallacy of failing to make a complete analysis of economic factors. Commons argued that collective democracy attempts to solve the problems of the economy not through "wiping out all other interests by the one who gets military control of the state . . . [but] piecemeal and experimentally [by] a complete analysis of profit, rent, interest, wages and materials, and a more perfect relation of institutions to technology."¹⁰

These last articles reveal that economic magazines were beginning to debate the Soviet economy with some admission that fundamental differences did exist and required discussion.

V: LEARNED JOURNALS

AMERICAN opinion in the learned journals, although conscious of the stresses, strains and profound difficulties of the Five Year Plan, was convinced that planning was a valid and praiseworthy experiment in economic life. In the May, 1929, *Current History*, Edgar S. Furniss wrote that another food crisis menaced Russia. He expressed confidence, however, that the Communist Party would "win through these difficulties, as it had weathered more ominous storms in the past." Bartlett Brebner, in the *Political Science Quarterly* of June, 1929, posed this question: "Can the leaders of Russia retain the main principles and the scale in time and extent of their experiment, its main direction, and at the same time secure the foreign funds now necessary to complete it?" He answered the question in part, summarizing the general attitude toward Russia at that time when he said, "At present one can credit the revolutionaries with a consistency in aim most notable under the circumstances." The January, 1930, *Current History* observed that to know what is going on in Russia and to "catch the temper of Russian opinion, [one] must use as a point of departure the momentary success of the five-year industrialization program." Bruce C. Hopper, in *Foreign Affairs*, although by no means over-enthusiastic about the possibilities of the Five Year Plan, admitted "the Russian people have no alternative to industrialization but continued economic backwardness."

Vera Micheles Dean, writing in the July 23, 1930, *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*⁵ on Russia's agrarian problem, concluded:

The Soviet government, by the establishment of large-scale farms and the introduction of factory methods and machinery on these farms, is effecting an agrarian revolution which in scope and estimated results is comparable to the great Industrial Revolution.

Aware that a great part of the Bolshevik effort would be at the expense of the peasant, this writer wondered whether there would not be a decline in production—even possible revolt. *Foreign Affairs*, in the same month carried this comment on transportation by Bruce C. Hopper:⁶ "Failure to provide sufficient means for the conquest of Russia's vast barriers of distance is now recognized as a costly miscalculation of the Five Year Plan." For the peasants could not be provided quickly enough with the machinery, seed and fertilizer which had been offered to them as inducements to join the collective farms. An improvement in transportation was, therefore, the immediate goal of Soviet efforts. The food crisis, peasant discontent, inadequate transportation—these problems were so optimistically tackled by the Five Year Plan as to call for examination of the real meaning of the enterprise. Why did so many

difficulties persist when everything was subject to central control and the spirit of cooperation was so active? What was Soviet planning?

Sam A. Lewisohn, in the March 1931, *Political Science Quarterly* gave an answer which is quoted here as an epitome of the viewpoint offered:

Russia has aroused interest as a melodrama but it has not been sufficiently appreciated as a laboratory . . . Russian industrial activities have furnished us with a controlled experiment on a gigantic scale, whose workings, particularly at the present stage, furnish a wealth of material to business men and students specializing in various branches of capitalistic economy . . . In Russia today there are state corporations called trusts with all the attributes of our corporations except stock and stockholders and what Marxians have called "dividend mongering." So like are they to capitalistic corporations that the directors and officers of these trusts have developed a corporation consciousness. Despite the fact that the profits of their corporations eventually go to the State, there have been cases of directors and officers of such trusts who have been charged with being more interested in the success of their particular enterprise than in the welfare of the workers employed therein. Russia has its syndicates not unlike German cartels or our own co-operative marketing associations. They have banks and bankers, discussion about inflation or deflation; about whether too much or too little credit has been introduced into industry, whether inventories are too large or too small and whether prices are too high or too low. They have their problems of finance and problems of distribution . . . They even have that phenomenon supposed by Marx and Marxians to be confined to bourgeois capitalism—namely economic crises . . .

But it is easy to be misled by this surface similarity. To suggest that Russia has 'gone capitalistic' because she has adapted these forms is to play with words. There is in Russia today no private control of the means of production, and private profit is in such homeopathic doses as to be negligible . . . 'Socialistic emulation' between different factors or groups has been substituted for individualistic emulation between different persons. The forms are capitalist, but the spirit is communist and in strict conformity with the Marxian dogma of a society of and for the proletariat.'

A more technical analysis of the actual planning was made by William Adams Brown, Jr., and A. Ford Hinrichs in the September, 1931, issue of the *Political Science Quarterly*. Their explanation revealed Russian planning as a cumulative process, with the initial step taken by the smallest producing unit. The first draft then went to successive boards of higher centralization, finally reaching the Supreme Economic Council which eventually returned it to the point of origin. From there the plan could still be modified through legally constituted processes of appeal, until at last a suitable blueprint was agreed upon. "The Russian economic plan," these writers said, "is not the work of one man or committee of men. It is the work of tens of thousands, probably of hundreds of thousands of men."

W. H. Chamberlin, in the January, 1932, *Foreign Affairs*,⁹ described how education and the press co-operated in developing a collective psychology in Soviet Russia. "The new Soviet intelligence," he concluded, "is, on the whole, very cocksure and dogmatic, very different from the

eternally doubting Hamlet type of the pre-war Russian student; and the collective farm may be as big a factor in remolding the individualist psychology of the peasants as the Soviet factory has been in producing a new type of worker, shot through and through with new political and social ideas."

By 1932 comment was abundant on the partial breakdown of the Five Year Plan and on the reappearance of the twin terror: peasant discontent and the food problem.¹⁰ Bruce C. Hopper, in *Foreign Affairs*,¹¹ reported a relaxation to a milder pace for the workers. This was done, Hopper said, because the tempo had become too fast in the basic industries, and the human elements had to be placated through increased differential wages for skilled workers and a greater availability of consumption goods. These factors resulted in modifying the first figures contemplated by the plan. Part of the explanation lay in an article by W. C. White in the *North American Review*. He said Russia had suffered because the world-wide depression had caused the disappearance of markets for its agricultural products and denied it the valuta with which to purchase industrial requirements for the Five Year Plan.¹² On the whole, judgment of the final results of the first Five Year Plan was favorable. "Care must be taken," Edgar S. Furniss admonished in *Current History*, "in any attempt to appraise the success of the Communist experiment not to confuse details with essentials . . . The economic plan may have miscarried in detail, but there is no danger that the principle itself will be abandoned."¹³

Concerning Russia's place in world affairs, the charges of debt repudiation, confiscation of property and dissemination of Communist propaganda still cropped up,¹⁴ but discussion had become more analytical and broad-minded. Much of the general comment, such as that of William McAndrew in *School and Society*, advised the United States to learn more about Russia before judging it.¹⁵

From 1929, the main treatment of Russia took up the delicate question of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, "Not since the days of President Wilson," Paul Scheffer stated in the October, 1930, *Foreign Affairs*, "has American been confronted with a decision fraught with such consequences for Europe as is involved in this question of Soviet recognition. If America decides upon recognition, it may hereafter be necessary to say that in 1931 she made her deliberate choice between bourgeois Europe and the Soviets."¹⁶ Frederick L. Schuman, writing in *Current History*, for August, 1930, offered a justification of Soviet counter-claims arising out of American intervention in Russia. But the same pages of *Current History* contained the text of an official note by Bainbridge Colby in 1920, refusing recognition to Soviet Russia.¹⁷

(See section on Governmental documents) George Soule, in the July, 1931, *Annals*, presented the pro-recognition argument:

The truth is, that the official policy of non-intercourse originated at a time when it was thought the Soviet Government and economy were inherently so weak that they would soon disappear in favor of another regime. Passing years have proved this opinion sadly mistaken. It is time to execute a right-about-face and deal with the reality which exists. We certainly shall not abolish it by ignoring it.²⁸

In addition to the stability of the Soviet Government, many articles emphasized that Soviet foreign policy itself had changed. Michael T. Florinsky, writing in the *Political Science Quarterly*, pressed the point. The Soviet, he said, "bases its hopes at the present time not so much on fostering discontent in foreign countries, as on the success of the socialist experiment within its own borders."²⁹

Vera Micheles Dean, writing in *Foreign Policy Reports*, summarized the position of the Soviet Union as a European power:

By its unremitting efforts for collaboration with capitalist states, the Soviet Union has sought to demonstrate the feasibility of the principle it first proclaimed in 1927—that, at the present stage of their development, capitalism and the Soviet economic order, described as socialism, can peacefully exist side by side. This principle, however, has not displaced the fundamental conviction of Soviet leaders that the triumph of socialism alone can eliminate all economic crises and international conflicts.³⁰

This growing acceptance of Soviet Russia was accompanied by increasingly favorable reports of Russia as a good credit risk.³¹ A friendlier tone in the debate on recognition also emerged. Many of the arguments against recognition had lost their force, such as the assertion that Russia was an "economic vacuum," and the accusations of dumping.³²

Opinion in the learned journals showed the Soviet Union moving toward re-entry into the family of nations. The Five Year Plan, despite its inherent difficulties and inevitable short-comings, won respect for both principle and performance. Russia's manifest spirit of international cooperation and her modified philosophy of world revolution were raising her prestige in the Western world. The steady growth of Russian trade with the United States also helped materially to weaken the conventional arguments for non-intercourse. By 1933 diplomatic recognition was definitely on its way.

VI: GENERAL MAGAZINES

IT will be recalled that the *New Republic* from the first favored recognition and trade relations with Russia. Although it often pointed out the deviations from Communism under the NEP, this magazine continued to maintain that what really mattered was the new psychology and spirit in Russia.¹ These themes received even fuller treatment from 1929 to 1933. As early as August, 1929, the *New Republic* stated its case for recognition:

The advantages of recognizing Russia are manifold. American recognition of Russia would increase the mediatory influence of the United States over Soviet foreign policy. Recognition, accompanied by increased commercial intercourse, might tend to moderate the intransigence of the Soviet regime. Already Communist propaganda in Europe and America seems to be much less aggressive than it was five years ago. The chief concrete material advantage of recognition is that American loans to Russia would become possible. A loan would be advantageous to American investors, while it would contribute to the success of the Russian Five Year Plans. A loan would bring to the United States increased concessions, contracts and trade.

It is foolish to state that in recognizing Russia the United States would place its moral imprimatur upon the Soviet regime. The United States recognizes Mussolini and other equally ruthless dictators without assuming any responsibility for their acts.²

The *New Republic* continuously attacked the attitude of the American Government toward Russia,³ and especially during the Congressional investigation of 1930.⁴ This magazine's support of the Soviet experiment never wavered. It welcomed the progress of the collectivization of agriculture;⁵ it defended the Soviet from the charge of dumping in the United States,⁶ and always espoused the basic principle represented by the Five Year Plan.⁷ Dramatizing the contrast between the American depression and Soviet planning,⁸ it continuously pointed out both the differences and the similarities which would make planning in the United States effective.⁹

W. H. Chamberlin, in the February 15, 1933, *New Republic*, summarized the two Five Year Plans. The first had brought great industrial gains, the second would be modified by the pressure of the food problem, the fatigue of the people after the strenuous pace of the first plan, and the necessity of armaments. Since Stalin firmly believed in collective farming, the efforts in that direction would no doubt continue until complete collectivization had been achieved.¹⁰ When the United States finally recognized Russia the *New Republic* said:

Having argued for recognition almost from the moment when the Soviet Union came into being, we are, naturally, deeply pleased that the dream of so many years has at last become a reality. We are confident that most of the American people have finally come to share this view, though they have done so for various reasons, some of which are a good deal more admirable

than others. We are confident, also, that the wisdom of this action will be more and more evident as time goes by.¹¹

The magazine felt that the settlement reached on the points at issue was as good as could be expected, and that the possibilities of trade were better than ever. But business prospects were not the main consideration. Of truer significance to the *New Republic* was the fundamental fact that Russia, with one-sixth of the world's area and 160 million active and resourceful inhabitants, had again resumed normal relations with the country which was foremost in economic resources and potential technological achievement.¹²

The *Nation* during this period held views almost identical with those of the *New Republic*. It cited the increasing trade of the United States with Russia¹³ and the resumption of relations between Great Britain and Russia¹⁴ as indicative of the advance of Soviet Russia in world affairs, both economically and politically. The *Nation* stalwartly attacked American prejudice and propaganda against Russia, striking repeatedly at the reactionary attitude of the American Federation of Labor and others.¹⁵ At the same time, the journal directed bitter criticism of the political executions and the religious persecutions in Russia.¹⁶ Neither did it withhold fire from that contradiction in American policy which allowed trade with Russia but refused formal recognition.¹⁷ The *Nation* greeted the news of the Five Year Plan with the welcome, "And now Russia has gone Communist," drawing attention to the numerous obituaries that had been pronounced on the doctrine of Communism when the NEP was instituted. Without venturing any predictions,¹⁸ the *Nation* sympathetically reported the tribulations of the plan, with an interpretation usually favorable to Russia.¹⁹ It could also see the humorous side of Sovietism, as indicated by this story (one of the many which circulated about the plan):²⁰

It is the year after the Five Year Plan is completed. The sky is black with airplanes. One man riding in last year's airplane is overtaken by a friend in a new model and hails him by radio.

"I see you have the new motor from our super-factory."

"Yes, in this model we have at last surpassed America! Two hundred miles an hour. Cost minimum; operation foolproof. Want to show it to you, but not now. I'm in a rush."

"What's your hurry?"

"I hear they're selling eggs in Kiev."

Several times the *Nation* pointed out that jealousy and economic fear lay behind the charges of dumping. In one issue it declared: "It is fear of Soviet success that alarms Western farmers and industrialists alike."²¹ Despite the uproar over dumping, Jerome Davis, in the May, 1932, issue reported that "the most reliable concerns in America, which have had actual dealings with Russia and have representatives in that country, are

overwhelmingly of the opinion that we should recognize Russia." Davis based his conclusion on the answers to fifty letters he had written to the largest firms dealing with Russia, including General Motors, Henry Ford and E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company.²³ When in 1933 the United States did recognize Russia, the *Nation* proclaimed:

The importance of Mr. Roosevelt's recognition of the U.S.S.R. cannot be exaggerated. Its possible effects reach into every corner of public life . . . It means far more than new opportunities for trade, although these are undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of many Americans who have welcomed the agreement. It means more even than the return of common sense after the long reign of fantasy and fear. It means the creation of a new force for peace in an international situation bristling with imminent conflicts.²⁴

Thus the two liberal weeklies, the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, saw a revitalized Russia as a legitimate member of the family of nations. They evaluated the Five Year Plan not in terms of a miraculous renaissance but as the logical expression of a nation's philosophy. They judged its successes and setbacks in terms of its own immense difficulties and prodigious ambitions.

Of the opposite school was the *Saturday Evening Post* which seemed to refresh its hostility to Soviet Russia with each event. It stepped up its antagonism in both articles and editorials, attacking on all fronts. It opposed giving Russia credits for agricultural machinery on the ground that it would simply increase Soviet production and lower world prices. It asserted that Russian dumping, while perhaps not done below production cost, revealed standards drastically inferior to living or labor conditions that Americans would tolerate themselves. As to the Five Year Plan, it would not quarrel with Russia for having one, but was severe with "American capitalists who are putting it over for them." It charged that loans to the U.S.S.R. meant worse than throwing away money which belonged to the American taxpayer, for "one of Russia's principal exports has been subversive propaganda."²⁵ The *Saturday Evening Post* did open its pages to Leon Trotsky for a series of articles on the Russian Revolution, possibly because the exiled Soviet leader provided a living example of inherent confusion.²⁶ Then followed an onslaught of bitter and satirical articles from many pens. Eva Garrette Grady who had lived in the U.S.S.R. as the wife of an American engineer, published several under such titles as "The Russia Tourists Do Not See" and "See Russia, and Die Laughing."²⁷ George Sylvester Viereck described the tyranny in Russia. "Always logical," he said, "never human, Soviet Russia illustrates the horrors of any government dominated completely by the intelligentsia."²⁸ The contrast before and after the Revolution, with emphasis on the former, was furnished by the Grand Duchess Marie.²⁹ A further version was given by the Princess Cantacuzene, an American-born descendant of Ulysses S. Grant.

Still, the *Saturday Evening Post*, between 1929 and 1933, found it necessary to concede that Russia had become an important factor in world affairs. In its issue of April 11, 1931, David Lawrence said, "Late-ly Russia has become a concrete problem. The tide of conversation about the Union of Soviet Russia has been rising." Wondering how potent Russia was, he granted the possibility that within five years America might lose much of its export trade to Russia since that nation was entering the world market with a production machine unparalleled anywhere in the world except the United States. "Fortunately," he concluded, "the problem is not American alone; it is a source of worry also for Germany, France and Great Britain as well as ourselves." He expressed the hope that Russia would realize the necessity for co-operation and internal moderation.³⁷ Conditions in Russia were still described as miserable,³⁸ but Russia's world position—commercially, politically,³⁹ and militarily⁴⁰—was receiving careful scrutiny. Will Durant gave the readers of the *Saturday Evening Post* a philosophical summary of the new Russia. First, it had shown the way to planned economy, and individual societies could profit by the example; second, it had ended unemployment; third, it had taught the people to work; finally, it had made the first great experiment in cooperative agriculture. For that, he said, Russia had "sweated and bled."⁴¹

Collier's common-sense attitude toward the U.S.S.R. continued, with some emphasis now added. Favorable descriptions of Russian agriculture were given by Thomas D. Campbell, who operated in Montana the largest farm in the world.⁴² Gene Tunney foresaw the United States borrowing from Communist experience in the future, but made the proviso that individualism would reassert itself in Russia.⁴³ Uncle Henry, *Collier's* regular columnist, advised tolerance and sympathy to get the true facts about the Soviet.⁴⁴ The magazine published a laudatory life of Stalin which set him against the background of widespread suffering under the Czar and portrayed Stalin as a savior of the Russian masses.⁴⁵ When recognition came in 1933, Ray Tucker welcomed it as a return to sensible relations and an important stimulant to trade.⁴⁶

While not economic in nature, *Liberty* magazine's novel by Floyd Gibbons, published under the title "The Red Napoleon," vividly suggests the popular mind of 1929. It depicted the conquest of the world by a mythical Slavic emperor after a "war of the races."⁴⁷

The articles published in *Harper's* prior to 1929 were anti-Soviet, but those after that date were liberal and even favorable. Charles M. Muchnic, Vice-President of the American Locomotive Sales Corporation, reported his encouraging impressions of a visit to Russia.⁴⁸ There was a thoughtful effort to explain Communism's opposition to theology on the ground that it was itself a religious creed.⁴⁹ In a following issue of

Harper's, Gamaliel Bradford published a sympathetic account of Lenin.⁴⁸ Calvin B. Hoover outlined the reasons that made Soviet Russia a challenge to capitalism, and suggested that America could derive much from Russian experience.⁴⁹ Indeed, in its number for December, 1930, the question as to Communism was given an affirmative answer.⁵⁰ Needless to say, the unpleasant aspects of the U.S.S.R. were not omitted.⁵¹ What is significant is the presentation of the positive side of the controversy for the first time. The Five Year Plan was favorably summarized in several articles.⁵² A recapitulation shows a definite shift of opinion in *Harper's*: from 1917 to 1920 the articles were few, vague, entirely anti-Bolshevik; from 1921 to 1929 there were only three articles of the same tone and content; but from 1929 to 1933 nearly all the articles were in some sense pro-Soviet.

A tourist's pleasant narrative of the new Russia appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*⁵³ during the period under review, and Anna Louise Strong spoke enthusiastically in the same publication on Russian agriculture.⁵⁴ The majority of articles, however, assessed the Soviet with considerable reservation. Joseph Wood Krutch, for example, saw the Russians as young barbarians, but admitted that, if they made Communism succeed, it would transform the world.⁵⁵ The Five Year Plan evoked only one article in which A. F. Hinrichs analyzed Communism's challenge to America. "The Communist practice of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics," he contended, "must be considered as a perfectly possible and real alternative to the system in vogue in the western world."⁵⁶ W. H. Chamberlin presented a series of articles on Russia in the *Atlantic Monthly*.⁵⁷ These dealt with various phases of the spiritual meaning of Sovietism, including the struggle between the Government and the Church, the state of liberty in Russia and the "tragedy" of Russian intelligentsia. To Chamberlin Russia and the United States seemed to occupy different planets, so contrary were their economic and political ways of life; yet he saw the possibility that time might efface the difference through a restriction of liberalism in the United States and an extension of it in Russia.

Scribner's also published more articles on Russia from 1929 to 1933 than it had from 1917 to 1929. This magazine also evinced a growing respect for Russia's advancing position, though the interpretations were cautious and varied. William Lyon Phelps, reviewing a book by Maurice Hindus, expressed the opinion that only government employees lived comfortably in Russia.⁵⁸ Malcolm Logan found it plausible to the capitalist world that it could avoid the horrible example of Bolshevism only by abolishing "the conditions which make men and women listen to its desperate counsel." From that point of view, he said, Bolshevism formed "a useful element in our capitalist economy."⁵⁹ William C. White set a

precedent on the subject for *Scribner's* with a series of articles which were completely objective in describing Russia.⁶⁶ John Carter believed the Soviet Union to be an omen which would become a challenge to America when it finally perfected its economic co-ordination.⁶⁷

On the other hand, an article by W. J. Austen, who had built an automobile plant for the Russians, predicted "no head on collision between Soviet Russia and capitalistic America." In his view it was more likely that Russia would have a rebirth of democracy while more regimentation developed in the United States, so that eventually the two nations would be parallel.⁶⁸ Isaac Don Levine expressed skepticism about the chances of the Five Year Plan because of the stifling dictatorship.⁶⁹ Even Louis Fischer, in *Scribner's* for October, 1932, described the Russians as abandoning the doctrine of world revolution and "slowly collecting themselves after the shock of Hitlerism."⁷⁰ Ella Winter, writing on the family under Communism, told movingly of the Russian mother who now felt she had a larger brood, "the human family."⁷¹

Like the other monthlies in this period, the *Forum* tried to revise its completely anti-Soviet position. While not swinging to the other extreme, it did cultivate objectivity and fairness. Articles were published by William C. White, who, as always, presented facts clearly and accurately.⁷² There was also an interview with Thomas D. Campbell, the American adviser on Soviet wheat problems, who advocated recognition of and trade with Russia. He even said that when Russia dumped wheat to pay obligations it was just what he and every other business enterprise did when pressed.⁷³ There also appeared a detailed survey of the tremendous possibilities of trade with Russia, listing commodities Russia would buy and the products she could give in payment. This survey concluded with a note of assurance concerning the "red trade menace" to the effect that the Russians knew that in the long run only goods can be traded for goods.⁷⁴ Discussing another controversial aspect of the Revolution, George N. Shuster felt that only Christianity could inspire energy in Western culture comparable to that which Communism seemed able to arouse.⁷⁵ Andre Maurois counselled capitalism to save itself by becoming adapted to solve the needs of crisis.⁷⁶ As to Communism, he thought that Russian energy would eventually run down and produce a new bourgeoisie in that land.

To judge by the decisive change in the attitude of the influential publications, there can be no doubt that a general shift of opinion in favor of Russia had taken place in America. In *Harper's*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Scribner's* and the *Forum*, it seems obvious that a willingness to discuss Soviet Russia must have reflected the demand of their readers for knowledge about the subject. That the articles grew more objective in tone could be regarded as part of the same demand. The presence of

Russia as a full-fledged nation was now taken for granted. According to the U.S.S.R. the respect due a powerful competitor and the curiosity merited by a profound experiment, were very different observations from those of earlier periods. Even the *Saturday Evening Post* had begun to admit Russia's possibilities, perhaps for no other reason than to refute them.

VII: BOOKS

THE years 1929 to 1933 simultaneously marked the advent of depression in the United States and the formal introduction of planned economy in Russia. These contrasting developments exercised a distinct influence upon the books published in America during this period. The idea and technique of planning took the spotlight. Russia had been conceded a position of world importance both actually as an economic factor and symbolically as a revolutionary system. In both aspects, she represented a real challenge to capitalist society, then embarrassingly deep in the doldrums.

S. G. Bron, former chairman of the Board of Directors of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, very early in the period issued a statistical comparison entitled, *Soviet Economic Development and American Business*,¹ which showed the results during the first year of the Five Year Plan. Using this as the basis of a plea for recognition of Russia and normal relations, he cited the three-fold increase of trade in 1929 over 1923-24, together with a list of the American concessions in Russia.

A detailed history of the increasing rationalization in Russian economic life from the Revolution through the early years in the Five-Year Plan was recorded in Emile Burns' *Russia's Productive System*.² He believed that conditions in town and country were improving, and that shortages were temporary and would be overcome. "Only an ostrich," Burns stated, "can continue to deny these results are being obtained, and no economist, no politician, no employer, and no worker can afford to ignore a new productive system which is giving such results."

W. H. Chamberlin, long a correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, gave another viewpoint in *Soviet Russia; A Living Record and History*.³ Objective in his treatment, he attempted an evaluation of the new psychology and its possibilities as an incentive to economic progress. He saw the ultimate success of Socialism dependent on how effectively

private ownership and personal gain could be replaced by "new stimuli, rooted in class and community loyalty." The strength of Sovietism was in his opinion "to be measured not so much by its concrete achievements as by such imponderable factors as the new spirit of emancipation, class pride and class consciousness aroused among the workers, and the faith in 'building Socialism,' sometimes cherished with equal intensity by the Communist official in high government office and by the simple workman in the factory." These "imponderables," Chamberlin said, "tend to make the prospects of the existing social order better than they might seem to be if one took into account only the unmistakably grave economic difficulties with which the country is affronted."

The demand for fuller information on Russia was reflected by Louis Fischer's two-volume study, *The Soviets in World Affairs*.⁴ In these volumes Fischer noted two major developments—growing Russian accord with the United States and the possibility of strained international relations because the success of the Five Year Plan might impel the capitalistic world to war on Russia. Though ardently pro-Soviet at the time, Fischer achieved a balanced full-length portrait of the new Russia.

The problem of recognition loomed larger. H. W. Wilson Company published a volume, *Selected Articles on the Recognition of Soviet Russia*,⁵ and the *University Debater's Annual* of 1930-1931 contained much material on the subject.⁶ Louis Fischer in *Why Recognize Russia?*⁷ reviewed the arguments pro and con, emphasizing the affirmative. Fischer did not, however, define clearly the relations between the Soviet Government and the Third International.

More and more Russia emerged as the challenger for the crown of industrial advance. George S. Counts of Columbia University wrote *Soviet Challenge to the United States*,⁸ pointing out that Russia's goal was to overtake and surpass America. Sherwood Eddy, in *The Challenge of Russia*,⁹ criticized the "tyranny of terror," and the doctrine of world revolution by means of violence, but praised Russia's positive contributions, such as the classless society and the socialization of economy. He announced that in the rapid rate of reform Russia was challenging all existing social orders. W. H. Chamberlin, in *The Soviet Planned Economic Order*,¹⁰ confirmed this reasoning in reviewing the war-period development of planned economy in Russia. He quoted Kuibishev, former head of the Supreme Economic Council: "The race between the 'capitalist' and 'socialist' economic systems has begun." Without attempting a final judgment in terms of 1931, Chamberlin was certain that "the carrying out the Five Year Plan has changed the visible face of the Soviet Union more than the original Bolshevik Revolution had changed pre-war Russia."

The effect on the Russian people themselves was another theme.

Michael Farbman's *Piatiletka* described the enthusiasm for the Five-Year Plan, especially among the young.¹¹ Farbman, like Maurice Hindus, perceived the collectivization of the farms as the crucial test. Hindus, in *Red Bread*,¹² thought the drive to collectivize agriculture would further embitter the struggle between town and country, but that the individualism of the peasant would be forced to surrender.

In 1931 Calvin B. Hoover presented an extensive analysis in *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*,¹³ finding that the workers' motive did not differ from that of the workers in the United States. But among the leaders, he said, the Russian psychology was distinguished by a struggle for power: "The chance for promotion is infinitely greater in the Soviet economic system than in the capitalistic world." Punitive measures, as well as rewards and privileges, therefore made responsibility very tangible. Hoover did not think the form of industrial organization would undergo much basic change in the future, for capital investment in industry had been as great in 1928-29 as in any pre-war year and, if plans succeeded, would be twice as large subsequently. He also described the savings system, which as a part of the economic organization, made private deposits small, although one reason for this was the great abstinence exercised by the people. Emphasizing the significant fact that capital investment greatly exceeded capital depreciation, Hoover pointed out that if the technical success of collectivization was proved in Russia, "having in view the world-wide crisis in agriculture, it may be that the answer to this question will be the victory in the future struggle between the capitalistic and communistic social and economic orders."

The danger in Russia's economic possibilities was the topic of H. R. Knickerbocker's *Red Trade Menace*,¹⁴ a sensationalistic treatment of dumping which concluded that the practice could "no more be dispensed with under the Soviet foreign trade system than can bargain sales be abjured by department stores." In a sequel, *Fighting the Red Trade Menace*, Knickerbocker revealed that American businessmen trading with Russia were tempted by orders rather than inhibited by the dumping.¹⁵ He proposed a tentative solution for America by a similar concentration of foreign trade in a single unit, either by government or private cartel.

Waldo Frank gave a thoughtful tourist's impressions in *Dawn in Russia*,¹⁶ greeting the Soviet as a symbol, but rejecting it as a model for American emulation.

Russia in Transition,¹⁷ by E. M. Friedman, was unusual in that it was a businessman's plea for recognition of Russia, even though it also insisted that she pay her debts. Ellery Walter was unimpressed after six months in Russia. In his opinion, the country was far from unified and of no commercial menace to the world. He quoted Walter Lippmann's remark, "To say that Russia has succeeded where America has failed is

like saying that a boy who does long division well is a better mathematician than an advanced student who has difficulty with calculus." A more generous observer was G. A. Burrell, an American engineer employed to modernize the petroleum industry, who believed that another generation would establish a moderate system for the U.S.S.R.¹⁰ W. A. Rukeyser, engineering adviser for the Soviet asbestos trust, embodied his experiences in *Working for the Soviets*,¹¹ with special attention to the business structure of Russian economy. "I believe that it is not generally appreciated," he said, "how closely the organization of a Soviet state trust follows, externally at least, that of a large corporation under the capitalist system." His conclusions about Russia's commercial importance were negative, believing the enthusiasm aroused by the Five Year Plan was bound to lapse, after which the internal demand for goods would make both dumping or any foreign trade impossible. Isaac Don Levine expressed the same view in *Red Smoke*, and was quite certain that Russia could not thrive under the ideology of the Bolsheviks.¹²

But Ray Long told a completely different story in *An Editor Looks at Russia*,¹³ boldly proclaiming, "I am convinced that what happens there in the next twenty years will have more effect on the future of my seven-year old son than anything I can do for him or with him. Stalin and his Georgians—stalwart, husky, intelligent, shrewd economists and shrewd politicians—they are the Russia we've got to consider."

Even further went the symposium, *The New Russia*, edited by Jerome Davis, in January, 1933. Written by American scholars, the book was dedicated "To all who unafraid face facts and dare to act."¹⁴ It declared that Russia represented more than a change or intensification of Western World technique; it had created a new psychology, a new attitude toward human problems, and constituted a powerful force for world peace and international understanding.

Harry F. Ward hailed the collective spirit of the new Russia as a far greater economic incentive, entitling his book, *In Place of Profits*.¹⁵ But Will Durant voiced his mournful dissent in the *Tragedy of Russia*, as a land filled with meaningless exaggeration.¹⁶ Maurice Hindus countered with the *Great Offensive*, portraying Russian socialism and collectivization of human life on a scale never before attempted.¹⁷

Michael T. Florinsky described the profound dilemma of the Russian leaders; on the one hand, there was a strong nationalist movement built upon economic production for human welfare, and on the other, an ideology of world revolution through violence heavily imbedded in the doctrines of Communism.¹⁸ The conflict for leadership between Stalin and Trotsky, he said, symbolized this struggle to determine a future course, for "Moscow is now watching Europe with a keen premonition of disaster it feels powerless to avert. Far from trying to foment

revolution, the U.S.S.R. today is ready and eager to co-operate in any sincere attempt to combat the effects of the depression and to restore the economic order."

There is no doubt that the books published between 1929 and 1933 accepted the permanence of Russian efforts. Belief in Russia's possibilities of economic development had become general. The significance of the U.S.S.R. in world affairs and its challenge to other forms of national economy had reached a stage where it was no longer possible to dismiss the Soviet or merely to minimize its basic philosophy. This realistic attitude was clearly reflected in the spirit of the books of this period, and differed sharply from the almost purely emotional reactions of 1917-1921. Nor did it resemble the objective formality of the years between 1921-1929. There emerged in the books of 1929-1933 a respectful awareness that Russia represented a purposeful experiment in actual "scientific socialism," which dramatically attested man's power to guide the automatic writing of the "invisible hand."

VIII: NEWSPAPERS

THE newspapers disputed vigorously on the meaning of Britain's resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. England's chief reason, said the *New York World*, was simply trade.¹ The *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot* was more emphatic:

The British move is animated by sound judgment. The Soviet Government has now been established for ten years. Its existence is nowhere seriously challenged by the Russian people. To withhold recognition from such a government because of disapproval of the economic and political principles upon which it is founded is to pass judgment on the internal affairs of the Russian people in a manner that no government is warranted in doing. There are differences of political organization and of economic theory between all nations. In deciding on an about-face on the Russian question, the British Labor ministry sets an example which America might appropriately follow.²

Directly opposed to this point of view was the *Grand Rapids Herald*: "We have not yet reached the stage where it is necessary for us to sacrifice our national honor in favor of business." The *Washington Post* asserted, "The United States will have nothing to do with a regime which seeks to preserve itself by destroying all other political systems." "We can get along," the *Detroit Free Press* boasted, "if we never sell Russia a dollar's worth of goods."³

In 1930 charges of Soviet dumping and convict-made goods caused much discussion. The antagonism of some papers was typified by the *Albany News'* comment on the arrival of a cargo of Russian woodpulp:

A cargo marked with the blood of its stevedores, the unpitied convicts, men and women, whose wretched, ill-fed bodies carried every stick of wood into the hold of the ship under guns that itched to speak. This was Soviet commerce, an example of the glorious vindication of Communism.⁶

The *Boston News Bureau* called the alarm over cheap Russian goods "hysteria" and the *Newark News* confessed itself bored by the "sudden clamor of Red, Red, Red!" The *Wall Street Journal* saw "no occasion for nerves." The *New York Herald-Tribune* considered it "unwise to determine our whole trade policy toward Russia in the general atmosphere of emotion and dubious documents which has been stirred up for the moment." "Why," asked the *New York American*, "should the Government of this country, which doesn't seem to know what is the matter with our prosperity, turn away hundreds of millions in real money that Russians are willing to spend?"⁷ "If Russian trade melts away," the *Baltimore Sun* pointed out, "Mr. Matthew Woll, et al., will be welcome to whatever pleasure they can get from the knowledge that they have killed a trade that kept thousands of American workmen employed."⁸ The *New York World* warned: "By closing this important export outlet we shall increase existing unemployment and thereby encourage the Communists in their propaganda—the very thing which a proposed embargo is supposed to prevent."⁹ The *New York Times* added:

The Communist leaders have been speaking to the faithful of the day when the capitalist system abroad shall give way under the competitive blows of a mighty Russian industry based on proletarian efficiency and discipline.

At heart they have known how far off is that day, and what terribly difficult lessons in efficiency Russian industry has yet to master. But to the Communist rank and file and whoever else will listen, they will lose no time in pointing out that capitalist America is already shaking in its shoes at the onset of triumphant Russian industry.¹⁰

Practically the same response was forthcoming with regard to Russian wheat.¹¹ The *Literary Digest* listed a few typical editorial captions—"The Soviet Menace to All the World," "Can Russia be Curbed?" "The Russian Challenge."¹²

The end of the first Five Year Plan evoked numerous estimates of its success. The *Boston Herald* said: "The famous Five Year Plan has had much the effect on the Russian people that a five-mile race has on a man. They stand panting and puffing, rather exultant about their accomplishments, but feeling very uncomfortable in their stomachs."¹³

"Sovietism," the *Philadelphia Record* declared, "has just ended its first duel with human nature."¹⁴ The *Troy Record* observed: "The stan-

dard of Russian industry, agriculture, and mining has been improved more in the last four years than in the previous four centuries . . . and although want, misery and wretched conditions still prevail to a great extent in Russia, the Bolshevistic regime has taught the world the value of visualizing progress to the people of a nation."²²

Others held a more cautious viewpoint, as expressed by the *New York Times*: "It is impossible to appraise the result of the Five Year industrialization plan until it has already taken on the character of a normal industrial plan. Hitherto it has been conducted in the spirit and with the methods of a war plan."²³

The *Cleveland News* remarked:

Dictatorship and autocracy have their advantages when it comes to efficiency at the cost of human labor. Whatever we may think about Russia, we must concede that. But even had the Five Year Plan succeeded 100 percent, no true government of the people would care to undertake it. Government, according to the democratic way of looking at things, is for the people, not the people for the government.²⁴

Opinion of the American press in 1933 with regard to Soviet recognition was permanently recorded through a questionnaire addressed to more than 1,100 newspapers by the Committee on Russian-American Relations of the American Foundation.* The questionnaire was phrased as follows: "Does the (name of paper) favor or oppose recognition of Russia? Signed by (Editor)." It bore this explanation: "'Recognition' is here understood to mean the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations, with agreement to enter upon subsequent negotiations for the adjustment of all outstanding claims, and other matters now in dispute." Replies were received from 1139 dailies. Of these 718, or 63 percent, advocated recognition on the terms of the question submitted; 29, or 2.6 percent, favored recognition, but with qualifications that might negative the reply; 306, or 26.9 percent, were opposed; 79, or 6.9 percent, took no stand or replied inconclusively; 7, or 0.6 percent, expressed a view or comment, but did not reply to the inquiry as framed.

These were the only figures calculated from the returns. Other information in the survey suggested a method of developing these figures. Since circulation of the newspapers was known, it was possible to check up the circulation of each paper to ascertain whether the circulation totals of each reply-category gave the same percentages as counting the number of newspapers. The following table was obtained:

	Newspapers (percent)	Circulation (percent)
Favor on terms of inquiry	63.0	57.7
Favor, but with qualifications that might negative reply	2.6	5.2

	Newspapers (percent)	Circulation (percent)
Oppose	26.9	22.5
Take no stand or state inconclusive view	6.9	11.9
Express view or comment but do not reply to inquiry as framed	0.6	2.7

It will be noticed that this analysis does not substantially change the proportion of those favorable to those opposed. The gains by the groups who qualified or refused their replies may be discounted by the assumption that many of the reservations did not, in a realistic sense, oppose recognition. If the newspapers expressed the opinion of their subscribers, it is clear that the majority of readers decisively favored recognition.

These data also offer a geographical means of analyzing reactions of the press. Summarizing by states, and then grouping states into regions, reveals opinion in relation to area. (See Table I below). The figures represent the total circulation of the newspapers voting in each of the five categories set up in the questionnaire. The sectional responses were as follows: The New England states widely opposed recognition. The middle Atlantic states gave a two-to-one decision in favor of recognition. The East North Central states were almost equally divided in their choice. The West North Central states were in favor of recognition in an approximate three-to-one ratio. The South Atlantic states voted overwhelmingly for recognition, as did the East South Central states. A similar majority was returned by the West South Central states. The Mountain states likewise favored recognition. The Pacific states were two-to-one for recognition. Considering only those replies which simply answered "favor" or "oppose," (Columns A and C in Table 1), the proportionate order of support of recognition, by the various sections of the country, is as follows:

South Atlantic states
West South Central states
East South Central states
Middle Atlantic states
West North Central states
Mountain states
Pacific states
East North Central states
New England states

Thus the greatest sentiment for recognition was found in the South and in some of the large Eastern states.

TABLE I

A. Favor on terms of inquiry.

B. Favor, but with qualifications that might negative reply.

C. Oppose.

D. Take no stand or state inconclusive view.

E. Express view or comment but do not reply to inquiry as framed.

Figures in parentheses represent the number of newspapers voting as indicated.

Divisions and States	A	B	C	D	E
New England	481,847	8,066	480,826	390,640	240,334
Maine			82,989 (5)		
New Hampshire	9,359 (2)		43,579 (4)	2,285 (1)	
Vermont	6,845 (2)		28,016 (3)		
Massachusetts	240,534 (13)	1,986 (1)	208,432 (13)	365,620 (4)	240,334 (2)
Rhode Island			11,869 (2)		
Connecticut	225,109 (10)	6,080 (1)	105,941 (6)	22,735 (3)	
Middle Atlantic	3,518,821	852,919	1,029,354	1,113,365	30,060
New York	1,779,449 (44)	17,109 (2)	767,285 (17)	1,055,917 (10)	30,060 (1)
New Jersey	536,061 (14)		60,472 (4)	21,664 (1)	
Pennsylvania	1,203,311 (52)	835,810 (5)	201,597 (20)	35,784 (2)	
East North Central	2,303,939	50,329	1,866,742	665,693	227,005
Ohio	1,103,147 (47)	2,972 (1)	293,157 (16)	15,126 (3)	196,003 (1)
Indiana	200,574 (22)	47,357 (4)	213,652 (23)	143,506 (8)	24,373 (1)
Illinois	551,156 (26)		902,113 (20)	216,364 (7)	
Michigan	99,825 (15)		365,899 (16)	265,309 (1)	
Wisconsin	349,237 (13)		91,931 (11)	25,388 (1)	6,629 (1)
West North Central	2,122,898	12,604	662,079	48,595	
Minnesota	366,148 (15)		133,652 (4)	2,516 (1)	
Iowa	488,921 (19)	9,264 (2)	88,962 (10)	6,922 (1)	
Missouri	887,578 (18)		346,020 (14)	1,200 (1)	
North Dakota	20,946 (4)		22,130 (4)		
South Dakota	5,937 (3)		31,343 (8)	32,640 (1)	
Nebraska	185,881 (10)	3,340 (1)	4,163 (1)		
Kansas	167,487 (22)		35,809 (11)	5,317 (1)	

Divisions and States	A	B	C	D	E
South Atlantic	1,366,114	2,712	152,081	134,339	
Delaware	11,227 (1)			49,651 (2)	
Maryland	366,968 (5)		3,370 (1)		
District of Columbia	65,644 (1)			62,195 (1)	
Virginia	192,426 (7)		22,830 (5)	5,026 (1)	
West Virginia	64,462 (8)	2,712 (1)	58,926 (9)	2,217 (1)	
North Carolina	143,974 (12)		27,677 (6)	4,855 (1)	
South Carolina	98,028 (8)		2,625 (1)		
Georgia	245,926 (16)		13,014 (2)		
Florida	177,459 (20)		23,639 (6)	10,395 (1)	
East South Central	868,061		122,601	23,115	
Kentucky	189,365 (11)		3,790 (2)	23,115 (2)	
Tennessee	335,018 (15)		98,241 (4)		
Alabama	284,953 (15)				
Mississippi	58,725 (9)		20,570 (2)		
West South Central	1,101,852	71,564	133,820	163,233	
Arkansas	71,766 (15)		33,680 (9)		
Louisiana	94,570 (3)		12,416 (2)	4,215 (1)	
Oklahoma	357,101 (25)	64,651 (1)	14,340 (4)	8,099 (2)	
Texas	578,415 (59)	6,913 (3)	73,384 (2)	150,919 (6)	
Mountain	294,163	15,331	93,945	27,836	
Montana	42,524 (7)		5,487 (2)		
Idaho	53,803 (10)		1,840 (1)	6,763 (2)	
Wyoming	7,553 (2)		6,205 (1)		
Colorado	64,714 (11)	11,349 (1)	7,090 (3)	9,639 (2)	
New Mexico	42,795 (5)		8,956 (3)		
Arizona	52,702 (4)	3,982 (1)	3,995 (2)	11,434 (2)	
Utah	10,002 (3)		60,372 (2)		
Nevada	20,070 (7)		----- (1)		

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Divisions and States	A	B	C	D	E
Pacific	862,353	152,947	489,419	105,437	99,111
Washington	146,223 (9)	55,968 (3)	187,161 (10)		
Oregon	254,027 (16)		8,120 (3)		
California	462,103 (63)	96,979 (2)	294,138 (12)	105,437 (9)	99,111 (1)

Still another test of the results of the questionnaire is afforded in terms of the political tendency of the replying newspapers. These party influences were identified through the annual issue of *Editor and Publisher*, January, 1933. This material, not tabulated in the Committee's survey, is as follows:

	Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Republican
Favor on terms of inquiry	139	82	296	77	102
Favor, but with qualifications that might negative reply	4	3	9	7	6
Oppose	36	19	109	41	100
Take no stand or state incon- clusive view	11	9	25	18	14
Express view or comment but do not reply to inquiry as framed	1	1	2	1	1

(Figures do not tally with those of preceding tables as the political tendency of certain papers was not identified by *Editor and Publisher*.)

Conceding that political denominations are vague, it can, nevertheless, be seen that the favorable vote did not simply reflect "party lines." The vote of the "Independent" group and the divided opinion of the Republican papers constituted the bulk of the affirmative replies.

The statistical summary of the Committee's findings is supplemented by reviewing the reaction to the poll in some of the papers.^a The *New York Times* responded by referring to a few of its editorials. The Committee had classified this paper's answer as inconclusive or without a stand. A similar position was taken by the *New York Tribune* which claimed "no final position," and repeated the charge of subversive propaganda. A few other papers said the same thing—the *Troy Record*, the *Syracuse Herald*, the *Schenectady Union-Star*, the *Albany News*, the *Albany Knickerbocker Press*, the *Brooklyn Times-Union*. Among the papers firmly opposed to recognition were the *Buffalo Evening News*, the *New York Evening Sun*, the *Troy Times*, the *Utica Observer and Dispatch*, the *Watertown Times* and the *New York Evening Post*. The latter summed up its opposition in these terms:

We believe resumption of normal relations with Russia would be desirable if properly attained. We do not believe that a proposal to discuss claims and counterclaims after recognition is sufficient. We do not believe there is anything left to discuss while one party—Russia—stands on a "revolutionary right" to extinguish public and private debts due "capitalistic" countries. We do not believe that there is yet a safe and sound basis afforded for negotiation, after recognition, of the problems of propaganda and Red internationalism.

The majority of papers in New York State favored recognition without reservations. Among these were the *Buffalo Courier-Express*, the *Buffalo Times*, the *New York Daily Mirror*, the *New York World-Telegram*, the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, the *Brooklyn Citizen*, the *Journal of Commerce*, the *Rochester Times-Union*, the *Utica Press* and the *Troy Observer and Budget*. The *Wall Street Journal* did not answer the questionnaire, but commented as follows:

We believe that before recognition is the prerequisite which former Secretary Hughes laid down, namely, Russia's admission of the right of other peoples to their own social structure free from subversive activities of foreigners. With this principle established we would favor recognition upon an agreement to enter into subsequent negotiations for the adjustment of other matters now in dispute. In the present state of the world markets and with the present thought concerning world economy we do not attach tremendous significance to "immense trade opportunities" which recognition would open up. We believe that to repay credits Russia would have to sell abroad. Consequently the scale of Russian buying here three or four years ago does not appear to be a measure at this time with the present state of world markets. If there are principles involved in Russian recognition they should be given attention and not sacrificed to trade experience which at best we believe over-rated.

In Pennsylvania the overwhelming majority of the newspapers were in favor of recognition. Among the more prominent were the *Philadelphia Record*, the *Pittsburgh Press* and the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* likewise gave support: "The question is political not moral; it is one of experience. In view of the changing attitude of the world toward Russia the tendency toward recognition by the United States appears to be inevitable." Two of the large newspapers gave replies that were favorable but with reservation which might negative the reply: the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* and the *Philadelphia Evening Ledger*. The latter favored recognition "largely because it is inevitable." The *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin* said it would desire recognition "when the Russian government meets the requirements of the recognized comity of nations or definitely pledges itself and its policy to comply with that standard. The *Bulletin* recognizes no prejudice against or difference with the form of the Soviet government as constituting a bar to recognition." A few Pennsylvania papers opposed recognition, including the *Scranton Times*, the *Scranton Republican* and the *Scranton Scrantonian*.

The papers of Massachusetts split rather evenly. Advocating recognition were the *Worcester Telegram*, the *Worcester Gazette*, the *Worcester Post*, the *Brockton Enterprise*, the *Haverill Gazette*, the *Springfield Republican* and the *Berkshire Eagle*. The opposition included the *Boston Transcript*, the *Springfield Daily News* and the *Springfield Union*. The *Boston Post* took no stand, while the *Boston Herald*, which did not reply to the question as framed, said:

It is hard to see how we can avoid recognition ultimately. Russia is twice the size of the United States, potentially the most powerful country in the world, with a population of 40,000,000 greater than our own. The Soviet system has endured fifteen years. The two practical questions for us to consider are recognition, when and on what terms.

The *Christian Science Monitor*, of Boston, favored recognition but insisted that questions concerning property and propaganda should be settled before or simultaneously with recognition.

In Maryland, the *Baltimore Post*, the *Baltimore Sun* and the *Evening Sun*, of Baltimore, favored recognition. The largest papers in Virginia favored recognition; a few small papers such as the *Danville Bee* and the *Staunton News Leader* dissented. All of the papers of Georgia were in favor of recognition, with the exception of the *Griffin News* and the *Macon News*. The *New Orleans Item* and the *New Orleans Tribune* supported, while the *Baton Rouge Advocate* and the *Baton Rouge State Times* opposed recognition.

In Ohio the great majority of the newspapers favored recognition, with the only conspicuous protest coming from the *Cincinnati Times-Star*. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* did not answer the question as framed but said it was "thoroughly and unalterably opposed to the political philosophy underlying the Soviet state. It believes, however, that the time is here to open negotiations for Russian recognition."

Indiana divided almost equally in the debate. The *Indianapolis Times*, the *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette* and the *Evansville Press* were among those prominently in favor; the *Fort Wayne News Sentinel*, the *South Bend Tribune* and the *South Bend News-Times* opposed. The *Indianapolis Star* was "waiting further developments." The *Terre Haute Star* added to its favorable reply the reservation that there should be "certain definite agreements against propaganda and dumping of goods on world markets."

In Illinois, among the prominent papers, the *Chicago Daily News* was the only metropolitan daily to vote favorably, though two papers took no stand or replied inconclusively. The *Chicago Times* said, "We incline toward recognition but are not yet sufficiently convinced that recognition can be made without stimulating Soviet agitation here. We are of the opinion that problem can await more settled times here for

decision." The *Springfield State Journal* admitted that "Conservative papers, which have only the propaganda of interested partisans to guide them, must accept the judgment of the government at Washington." The *Chicago Tribune* was the largest opposing paper.

Michigan, too, divided rather equally, but the papers with the largest circulation opposed recognition. Among these were the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Flint Journal* and the *Grand Rapids Herald*. The *Detroit News* answered inconclusively that it trusted the government to handle foreign policy. The vote in Texas was overwhelmingly favorable; only two papers, the *San Antonio Express* and the *San Antonio News*, objected to recognition, while the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* declined to take a definite stand.

California newspapers favored recognition by a vast majority. The *Los Angeles Times* and the *Oakland Tribune* were the two out-standing opponents. The *San Francisco Chronicle* said, "There must come a time when the Soviet Republic will be recognized by the United States. That time will require an understanding between the two countries. On the President must be laid the responsibility of time and understanding." The *Los Angeles Daily Illustrated News* voted for recognition, but mentioned the usual arguments against recognition—repudiation of debts, confiscation of property and world propaganda.

Alabama was the only state reporting unanimously in favor of recognition, and Maine the only one unanimously opposed.

From the survey by the Committee of the American Foundation it can fairly be judged that an unmistakable majority of the American press favored recognition. Comment in the report and elsewhere indicates that American newspapers were conceding Russia an eminent position in world affairs. Skeptical as they were about the specific results of the Five Year Plan, they no longer doubted Russia's general economic advance. Characteristic of the period was the realization that non-recognition only tended to perpetuate an artificial state of affairs.

IX: GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS

THE Congressional hearings on Communism in 1930 revived the intense excitement of the earlier 20's. However, the nature and extent of the 1930 investigation were quite different from the previous inquiries. The hearings during the Hoover administration sought to survey Communist penetration in the large cities and into many aspects of American

life. The obvious purpose of the 1930 hearings was to show how widespread Communist activity had become in the United States; but the result was a mass of evidence proving a point the investigators had not expected. For the findings demonstrated not the far-flung influence of a tiny minority but that radical doctrine had attracted the attention of a significant number of citizens.

Earlier proceedings had contained only general information and contributed a lurid description of the chaos in Russia under Communism. But the 1930 examination was placed against a background in which Russia was playing a more serious and consequential part. The increasingly probable success of the Five Year Plan and its impact on world economy, intruded into the investigation. In 1920, the movement for recognition, such as it was, merely revolved around the desire to sell Russia some of our goods; by 1930 we had begun to speculate on the danger Russian competition presented to American industry.¹

The agitation in Congress for an embargo on Soviet goods increased in 1930, and efforts were made to extend the restrictions imposed by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff (signed by President Hoover on June 17, 1930).² The debate cut across national party lines, as specific economic interest dictated. Finally, the investigations by the Tariff Commission and the Treasury Department absolved Russia from the charge of dumping goods.³

But powerful witnesses continued to appear at hearings of the House Ways and Means Committee and strongly advocated embargo against Russia. They persisted to argue that danger to America lay in the economic war they believed Russia was waging. They described the disappearance of the United States from the wheat market and asserted it was only a question of time before it lost its cotton market. This statement by J. S. Adams, representing both the Johns-Manville Corporation of New York City and Keasby and Mattison of Ambler, Pennsylvania, was typical:

The companies I am representing see no relief for our industry under the existing laws. In our opinion the labor in Russia is not all convict labor; all labor in Russia is not indentured labor; all labor in Russia is not forced labor. Some part of it is freely and enthusiastically given to the state by members of the Communist party. That much is certain. The situation that we face is a new set of economics and we cannot take ourselves away from a square look at them.⁴

While many authorities insisted that Russian products were being dumped, they often themselves introduced into the record evidence of tremendous economic development in Russia in order to show that the problem threatened to become even more severe. The results of these investigations thus were for the most part favorable to Russia. By 1930 the U.S.S.R. had achieved a conspicuous position in world opinion.⁵

The friendly tone of President Roosevelt's letter to Soviet Presi-

dent Kalinin on October 10, 1933, suggesting a meeting between the two nations, indicated that the United States had finally adopted a rational view toward Russia.' Mr. Roosevelt's letter follows:

Since the beginning of my administration I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia.

It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practicable method of communicating directly with each other. The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble. And difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries.

Participation in such a discussion would, of course, not commit either nation to any future course of action, but would indicate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems involved. It is my hope that such conversations might result in good to the people of both our countries.

Thus, three aspects of the Congressional hearings and executive policy are apparent from this brief summary: the arguments crossed national party lines in the discussion of the embargoes; the economic progress and potentialities of Russia were acknowledged; and the official attitude of the United States became friendly. This shift can best be appreciated when compared with the opinion from all sources previously reviewed.

X: SUMMARY

THE development of American opinion on Soviet Russia from 1929 to 1933 is illuminated by two contrasting and co-existing phenomena: depression in the United States and the first Five Year Plan in Russia. Even when breakdowns occurred toward the end of the first plan, and its achievements did not reveal the mastery presupposed inherent in planning, there still remained in the minds of men the living example of collective effort and the significance of a central, stubborn and purposive will. During the war and its aftermath, Marxist philosophy had been too closely identified with the economic chaos in Russia to allow the world any clear view of the intentions of a Communist economy. In the next period, the New Economic Policy muddled the waters and concealed the

undercurrents toward centralization. With the advent of the Five Year Plan, the effort toward scientific control, the revelation of the mechanism of planning and the reasonableness of estimated progress, American opinion accepted the Soviet Union as an accredited system of experimental economics.

But there also developed great antagonism to the plan, both on humanitarian and economic grounds. The violence involved in the collectivization of the peasants, the brutality of the secret police and the restrictions on the standard of living for the sake of increasing capital goods, were bitterly assailed. Economic fallacies in the plan were repeatedly pointed out such as adulteration in the quality of goods and speed-up of workers. There were allegations of convict labor and dumping abroad of products needed at home. Nevertheless beneath the criticism lurked a constant if reluctant respect for the fundamental intentions and clear economic ambitions of the plan, and, as a corollary, a new and tacit acknowledgment that Russia's leaders were sincere.

A brief résumé of the outstanding influences between 1929 and 1933 reveals the extent and manner of the change of opinion:

1. The tremendous impact of the Five Year Plan on a world in depression. Russia became the nation of contrast.
2. The Five Year Plan was over-rated just as Bolshevism earlier had been exaggerated, and the New Economic Policy wrongly estimated.
3. The immense requirements of the Five Year Plan aroused speculation on the prospects of huge trade.
4. Russia was considered, in 1917-1921, an economic vacuum; in 1921-1929, a growing economic possibility; in 1929-1933, admittedly a world competitor.
5. Russia had achieved a position of world power, politically as well as economically.
6. The American people gained a clearer insight into the mechanism of planning. They still had little understanding of detail. They did not understand clearly in what way planned economy differed from the economy of the United States nor in what respects both economies were similar.
7. Recognition of Russia had become increasingly reasonable and natural, due to the cumulation of ideas pointed out above. For many, it is fairer to say that non-recognition became untenable.

Part Four

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN PACT

ON AUGUST 21, 1939, Soviet Russia entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Was American public opinion prepared for this event? What was the nature and quality of our reactions?

It is necessary to remember that between 1933 and 1940 events in Europe resulted in a very different attitude than that between 1929 and 1933. The difficulties of the Five Year Plan, the famine, the violence used in the collectivization of agriculture, and the political trials had produced the general impression that everything in Russia was directed and controlled by ruthless force—indeed, that “planned” economy and violence were one and the same thing.

Even more important, the years 1933 to 1940 saw the rampant growth of Fascism. Before 1933 many assumed that Fascism was peculiarly Italian. Dictatorships were regarded as essentially temporary phenomena. With the inception of Nazi power in Germany, the phenomena began to spread terror and brutality across the face of Europe.

To most Americans, Communism and Fascism were essentially the same evil. This was indicative of the kind of thinking which prevailed. Equally revealing was the literal way in which the avowed opposition of Nazism to Bolshevism was accepted.

Kindness would forbid mention of the long list of “authoritative” books on Russia and German which had not even indicated the possibility of the 1939 pact. But no such consideration can be shown those who were positive that such a pact could never be. Only a handful of articles and books showed any perspicacity.

In 1937, the editors of *Fortune* published *The Background of the War*, in which they reviewed the mutual interests of Russia and Germany, the credits extended by the latter to Russia, and the great similarities in totalitarian techniques. Although admitting that it would be a good thing for both Russia and Germany to establish close economic

relations, *Fortune* editors conceded that in collaboration they could threaten the world. However, it was pointed out that:

No one who has observed the officially fostered Soviet fear of Germany with its bugle blowing patriotism, its sentiment for the "Socialist fatherland," its spy mania, its proletarian flavor, and its messianic lore can believe that the Soviet dictatorship has any intention in the measurable future of doing anything with Germany but fight if the Ukraine is invaded.¹

H. R. Knickerbocker suggested in July, 1937, that Germany and Russia might join hands; he indicated that the Reichswehr and the Red Army had much in common and that Hitler knew Stalin had abandoned Bolshevism. More important, Hitler realized he could not fight a war with Russia at his back. In Knickerbocker's opinion it was "scarcely necessary to point out that an alliance between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would constitute a force so overwhelming that it could hope to partition the continent."²

In 1937 Stephen H. Roberts wrote an excellent book, *The House That Hitler Built*, which included a chapter called "The Soviet Bogy in Theory and Fact." He analyzed Hitler's claim of saving Germany from Bolshevism and then weighed the possibility of Germany and Russia reaching an understanding. Describing the large amount of trade between the two countries and the cooperation between the two armies, he concluded:

For all these reasons, it need not be assumed that the present hatred between the two countries is necessarily permanent. By using his control of propaganda, a dictator may easily change his policy, even in the most unlikely directions. For instance, Hitler could stress the economic and political relationships with Russia and could at any time tell Germany that the Russian Government no longer endorses the Bolshevik penetration of Germany. By stressing the positive facts of cooperation and by halting the destructive propaganda, he could even bring the two countries together, especially if he could construe the winning-over of Russia from the French and the Czechs as a diplomatic victory. History has seen far stranger reversals of policy than this; and Hitler has still not decided irrevocably in favor of any single line in foreign politics. He may decide to stake everything on the penetration of central Europe, or on the encirclement of France, or even on colonial expansion; and, as each of these would involve dropping his eastern imperialism, it might suit his book to come to friendly terms with Russia. After all, he did renew the Berlin treaty and expand trade with Russia, and he feels a considerable pressure from those of his military advisers who value the Soviet resources. Confronted by such a dynamic situation, we should indeed be wrong to take the rantings of the last Nuremberg Rally as a final expression of policy, although one must add that, up to the moment, the anti-Bolshevik tirades in Germany have lost none of their force.³

In the *Saturday Evening Post* of December 24, 1938, Demaree Bess warned that Germany and Russia did not inevitably have to fight each other. They had come together before at Rapallo when both were isolated from the world, and German airmen had been trained on Russian soil.

There was also much trade between the two countries.⁴ Henry C. Wolfe, in *The German Octopus*, which appeared in 1938, also pointed to the possibility of such cooperation, though he felt that no alliance between Berlin and Moscow seemed likely during the lifetime of Joseph Stalin. Still the thought of it was causing consternation in Vienna, Bucharest, and Warsaw.⁵ Writing in *Harper's* of June, 1939, Wolfe had become more certain. Americans took German anti-Bolshevik talk too literally, he said, in view of the fact that there had been much continuous co-operation between the two countries. Nazism was destroying capitalism in Germany and Russia was going nationalist; both had much in common. With Russia's aid, Germany could break the "encirclement" about her; then Italy could get a slice of North Africa, Japan could turn to the Dutch East Indies, and Germany and Russia would share in the division of Poland.⁶

Hermann Rauschnig's *Revolution of Nihilism*, published in 1939, achieved a wide audience in America. His reference to the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet pact was a very minor part of the book:

If Germany and Russia were to join together, the Western Powers and the small States would be compelled to capitulate without a struggle. There is a good deal of evidence that this policy might prove attractive for reasons of internal policies. In any case, dynamism sees in the *volteface* of an alliance with Soviet Russia a last chance which might be of incalculable revolutionary effect.⁷

Rauschnig listed a number of substantiating trends: differences in ideologies had become indefinite, the Russian executions seemed to represent a movement toward nationalism and a purge of the Jewish elements among the doctrinaire revolutionists, many in Germany preferred a Russian to a Polish alliance, etc. Rauschnig concluded:

It may well be that sooner or later, Germany will deliberately seek an alliance with Soviet Russia. And not with any Fascist Young Russia as many German politicians imagine, seeing in the relations between Stalinism and the monarchist Young Russian emigres a logical phase in the development towards a new Czarism with which they could treat.⁸ That alliance is the great revolutionary coup in foreign policy at which controlling elements in the National Socialist leadership have long been aiming . . . The decision to offer this alliance has been closer, and it will be closer in the future, than is suspected either in Germany and abroad . . . That alliance is Hitler's great coming stroke.⁹

Perhaps the outstanding pre-pact predictions were offered by W. G. Krivitsky in the *Saturday Evening Post*.¹⁰ Krivitsky had been a Soviet general and directed Russian military intelligence in Western Europe. His article of April 29, 1939, was entitled, "Stalin Appeases Hitler." It asserted that Stalin had been courting Hitler patiently for several years:

There is probably no more widespread myth in the world today than the

one which presents Hitler and Stalin as mortal and irreconcilable enemies. The true picture is that of a persistent suitor who will not be discouraged by rebuffs. Stalin is that suitor . . . Stalin's foreign policy in the western world was predicated upon a profound contempt for the "weakling" democratic nations and upon an equally profound respect for the mighty totalitarian states . . . Stalin's international policy during the last six years has been a series of maneuvers designed to place him in a favorable position with Hitler.

But in June, 1939, the *Nation* said: "The assumption that Britain and Russia will sooner or later find an acceptable formula for a mutual assistance pact is probably more responsible than anything else for the recent lessening of European tension."¹¹ In July, the *Nation* discounted the rumors of a secret deal between Hitler and Stalin.¹² As late as August, it published a letter signed by more than four hundred prominent persons outlining "the basic points in which Soviet socialism differs from totalitarian fascism."¹³

There were comparatively few signs to indicate that a pact might be made. Most of them were minor observations in books or were scattered here and there in a handful of magazines. It is therefore understandable why the announcement of the pact caused universal surprise.

Time described it as a bombshell which stunned the world.¹⁴ *Newsweek* headed its report, "Sudden German-Soviet Deal Leaves Europe Thunderstruck."¹⁵ J. T. Murphy in the British *Nineteenth Century*, of November, 1939, exclaimed: "No event in modern history has so profoundly shocked, distressed and confused the British Labour Movement as that of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact."¹⁶ John Gunther felt the same way: "When the German-Russian Pact was signed, I have seldom seen people so stupefied as the French and British."¹⁷

Current History prefaced its publication of the text of the German-Russian non-aggression agreement: "History may record that the Second World War began on August 24, the day thunderstruck officials of Moscow's Central Airport cast embarrassed eyes on swastika flags draped on public buildings, but so carefully placed as not to be visible from the street."¹⁸ E. O. Hauser in the *New Republic* of September 20, 1939, reported that "Germany's sudden turn toward Soviet Russia hit the city of Tokyo like a bombshell."¹⁹ "Not for a long time," the *New Republic* editorially confessed, "has such a paralyzing piece of news struck the world as the announcement of the Russo-German treaty of non-aggression."²⁰ H. N. Brailsford, a consistent and influential sympathizer of Russia, admitted in the same magazine that the pact "was a violation of public morality for which nothing in the record of the Soviet Union prepared us."²¹ Louis Fischer, equally eminent Soviet protagonist, found the pact a "startling agreement" and "totally indefensible." After an unconvincing effort to explain it, he confessed, "I don't know."²²

Granville Hicks resigned from the Communist Party following the

pact, and wrote a letter in the *New Republic* of October 4, 1939, explaining his action:

As far as one can judge from all the evidence, the leaders themselves were completely unprepared for what has happened. They were unprepared for it, and they did not understand it. If they had only said this, if they had only admitted their ignorance, the Communist Party of the United States would be intact today. But instead they insisted that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was the greatest possible contribution to peace and democracy, and offered anything that came into their heads as proof. They rushed into print with apologetics completely devoid of clarity and logic. Only one conclusion could be drawn: if the party leaders could not defend the Soviet Union intelligently, they would defend it stupidly.⁷⁸

The *New Republic* said it could not remember the *Daily Worker* advocating such a pact prior to August 22, and recalled that on July 5, Earl Browder had made a speech at the University of Virginia in which he answered a question on the possibility of Nazi-Soviet pact: "The most effectual source of such rumors is Berlin, which has hopes of confusing the democracies with such stories. There is about as much chance of agreement as of Earl Browder being elected president of the American Chamber of Commerce."⁷⁹

Time laughed at the "Revised Reds"⁸⁰ and *Newsweek* summarized the confusion in their ranks under the title of "Blushing Leftists."⁸¹ Anna Louise Strong had suggested even prior to the pact that Russia might possibly combine with Germany to break capitalism and to play German and Italian Fascism against English and French Fascism.⁸² The *Nation*, too, felt Russia had been playing a double game, willing to keep western powers dangling by "holding in reserve the well-known desire of Germany for an understanding."⁸³ The *New Republic* was more forthright and characterized the pact as "Communist Imperialism." It said: "If then we regard Stalin and his government realistically, as a dictatorship, playing the imperialist game as shrewdly as any, their actions appear in a clearer light. We shall also be less surprised by future events."⁸⁴ *Collier's* likewise called the pact nothing but imperialism: "We still think it was an imperialist performance; that Hitler and Stalin are nothing but old-style land grabbers and empire builders wearing new sets of labels and mouthing new slogans . . . It was plain old-style imperialism, covered with a new-style rationalizing along socialist lines."⁸⁵ John T. Flynn found a simpler explanation—it was mere selfishness; the same cupidity applied to Stalin, stockholders in Wall Street, labor leaders—everyone.⁸⁶ C. E. Gratke, writing in *The Christian Science Monitor*, pointed to earlier relations between the two countries. He felt that similarity of methods rather than ideas had been the main force behind the pact.⁸⁷ In *Collier's*, Winston Churchill, not yet British Prime Minister, recalled that he had pointed out long ago the resemblances between the Nazis and

the Soviet Government.” However, J. E. Williams, in the *Christian Science Monitor* of October 21, 1939, argued that the pact must not be judged on ideological grounds for it merely represented an action of desperation, a deep fear of the combination of the democracies.” Walter Duranty presented an equivocal point of view. For him the pact was “neither black nor white, but gray and cannot be fitted to any simplified formula.” It was his belief that the pact’s main purpose was to frighten France and Germany into submission.”

Writing after the pact had been signed, Vera Micheles Dean tried to explain the forces which produced it. Within Germany, she said, there had always been two rival trends—one desiring conquest of Eastern Europe, the other seeking close relations with Russia.” Other writers felt the military vulnerability of Leningrad was the main motivation, for its loss would endanger Stalin’s domestic position.” Predictions as to the consequences of the pact were cautious. Said the *New Republic* of August 30, 1939:

“We do not expect that out of this appeasement will grow that great bogey—an offensive and defensive alliance between Soviet Communism and German Nazism, any more than a firm partnership between Britain and the Reich grew out of Munich. It is necessary not to derive more meaning from an event than there is in it.”” However, in the same magazine, Ernest Sutherland Bates analyzed the treaty as stronger in some respects than those the U.S.S.R. had made with Turkey, Lithuania and Persia: “The agreement to refrain from participation with hostile powers is more inclusive; there is no escape because there is a provision for mutual consultation; the duration of the treaty is twice that of any of the others.”” To the *New Republic*, a serious consequence was the loss of prestige which Russia had enjoyed—“a bulwark of honesty and humanity in a treacherous world” was gone forever.”

How much aid could Soviet Russia give Germany? Answers varied, but the one given by Bruce C. Hopper in *Foreign Affairs* was representative:

The precise answer to this double-barreled question, which may well determine the military outcome of the European war and the future course of world politics, is still unknown. Current estimates, insofar as they are not guesswork limited to specific items (i.e. oil), are based on the inadequate and often unreliable statistics of Russia’s past economic performance. Russia’s potential performance is contingent upon many political intangibles yet to be revealed, and upon such factors as the undetermined capacity of Germany to supply equipment and large-scale technical assistance for the reorganization of Soviet industry and transport. Information upon which to base final judgments is inaccessible. Nevertheless, as long as Germany and Russia continue to execute in good faith their treaties of 1939, speculation will be in order. For in the conduct of the war, and in any political action looking towards peace, the Allied Governments must use as a key reference some estimate of the nature, extent and effectiveness of the Nazi-Bolshevik co-operation.”

Others thought that help might indeed come from Russia but without any real sacrifice on the part of Soviet Russia unless it was quite certain Germany was going Bolshevik.⁴⁸ For much the same reasons, Guenter Reimann concluded in the *New Republic*: "Nobody can at present definitely predict the extent of Russian economic support of Nazi Germany."⁴⁹ There was much evidence that Russia was slow in fulfilling her side of the bargain, partly because of difficulties in transportation and basic lack of surpluses.⁵⁰ *Business Week* reported frequently that realists in both Russia and in Germany doubted whether any serious economic help to Germany would come from the pact.⁵¹

The newspaper response throughout the country, although it agreed on many points, appeared largely uncertain. It minimized its own surprise, but could not conceal bewilderment. Newspaper comment may be summarized as follows:

There seemed to be doubt as to the binding power of the pact. It was merely a diplomatic victory for Hitler, not a vital military or economic advance.

Stalin, turning his attention to the East, had created by the pact a western barrier about which he would not have to be immediately concerned.

The pact was temporary rather than permanent.

The pact should not have caused surprise since all "isms" are fundamentally alike.

The pact deferred the outbreak of war in Europe.

The *Chicago Daily Tribune* entitled one editorial, "The Comrades Join the Kamerads."⁵² The *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin* agreed but added that the pact was not binding because either country could withdraw;⁵³ it represented merely an alliance of two dictators bound by the ties of common contempt for democracy and individual freedom.⁵⁴ Said the *Wall Street Journal*: "It has long been clear to most informed observers that the differences between Hitlerism and Stalinism are immaterial."⁵⁵ It had little faith in the pact because neither nation had ever kept its word.⁵⁶ The *San Francisco Chronicle* believed that the pact would not last because both countries had conflicting interests in the Baltic.⁵⁷ The *New York Times* was not sure the pact held much significance: "It may still turn out to be a grandstand flourish in the game of playing one side against the other"; although it seemed a diplomatic triumph for Hitler, time would develop its usual cracks in all the Nazi treaties and agreements.⁵⁸ The *New York Herald Tribune* said the morale of the democracies had not been broken by the pact.⁵⁹ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* called it "A contract for mutual distrust."⁶⁰

That Russia signed the pact in order to get better terms from France

and Britain was the interpretation offered by the *Boston Evening Transcript*, the *Philadelphia Evening Public Ledger* and the *Atlanta Journal*.¹⁰ The *Philadelphia Record* felt it was the announcement of the pact and not the pact itself which was of importance.¹¹ The *Christian Science Monitor* shared the same sentiment. All the pact did, it added, was to immobilize Russia.¹² Many papers believed Russia's action had been dictated by its concern about the situation in the Far East. The *Atlanta Journal* wondered whether the pact would cause Japan to leave the axis and woo the Western powers.¹³ The *Washington Evening Star* also saw the pact as a heavy blow to Japan,¹⁴ as did the *Portland Oregonian*.¹⁵ The *Milwaukee Journal* found the whole situation explained by Russia's concern for her Eastern interests.¹⁶

There was no certainty as to whether the pact meant war or peace. The *New York Sun* reflected general belief that the treaty lessened the chances of conflict.¹⁷ The *New York Daily Mirror* was sure the probability of peace had been heightened because allies must trust each other and it doubted whether Germany and Russia did so.¹⁸ The *San Francisco Examiner* thought the pact would prevent war and enable Neville Chamberlain to return to his old peace methods.¹⁹ The *Detroit News* also believed the immediate result of the pact was more likely to be peace than war.²⁰ Almost symbolically, the *Boston Post* summed up the speculation by announcing on one day that the result would be the postponement of war, and on the next day confessing its feeling that nothing short of a miracle could avert disaster.²¹

CONCLUSIONS

AMERICAN opinion of Soviet Russia has been outlined in the previous chapters. What conclusions can now be drawn? First of all, it is quite obvious that American opinion of Soviet Russia has changed considerably. It passed from a mood of war hysteria to an attitude of watchful waiting, then to a respectful and attentive regard for planned economic effort, and now wallows in confusion.

The reaction of the American people to events in Russia was largely determined by developments here at home. In the first period, 1917 to 1921, there was war and its aftermath. The second, 1921 to 1929, brought tremendous expansion in the United States. Influenced by their own

optimism, the American people beheld in Russia an apparent relaxation of governmental control known as the New Economic Policy. In the third period, 1929 to 1933, the United States, sinking deeper into depression, saw Russia launching a vigorous and ambitious Five Year Plan. Thus, in each stage, American thought about Russia was intimately related to and colored by what was going on in the United States. When Americans considered Russia they were really comparing it with the United States.

It is important to recognize clearly the psychological process at work. Events in Soviet Russia have acted merely as stimuli, exciting reactions in the American mind to what, consciously or unconsciously, it has been concerned about at the moment. No other explanation seems to illuminate three significant facts. First, there have been the thousand faces of self-interest which have sneered at anything Russian. Secondly, the quality of such hatred must be linked to the realization that what happened in Russia aroused in Americans a personal, intimate reaction to what occurred here. The result was a kind of emotional transference to Russia of passions generated by developments in the United States. This transference made it possible to become even more intense about Soviet Russia, as though both halves of the emotion were directed at one target. A third significant fact, of particular concern to this study, is explained through a proper appreciation of the psychology involved. How could opinion be formed from an inadequate and amorphous mass of stray news items, vague reports and mere impressions? It is already obvious that the reporting has not in itself made up a body of analytical and integrated reflections. On the contrary, it seems that each report about Russia has struck a metallic prejudice composed of America's attitude toward domestic problems, foreign affairs, religious differences, political traditions, etc. Out of such a welter of feelings, any item of so-called information would serve to catalyze a set of sentiments which would be regarded at a given moment as an opinion of Russia.

The method of bringing information to American readers must be borne in mind. In this study—drawing opinions together, giving them a certain order, and summarizing them systematically—the impression may arise that such opinions have been presented to the reading public in the same clear form, and that well-developed concepts have been shaped accordingly in the mind of the average citizen. That is far from being the case. Magazine articles have appeared from time to time, but often widely separated. They have treated different aspects of Russia, for the most part inadequately, seldom with relationship to other aspects and even more rarely to the picture as a whole. Newspaper items have appeared either sporadically as some event stood out, or with casual inconsequence. Occasionally, it is true, a book has become a best-seller.

But it is equally true that there is a great gap between what is published and what is read. The habit of the majority of readers is to peruse material irregularly and at long intervals. Only a small number read books on Russia at all, and very few indeed can be expected to read many book or articles. Perhaps still fewer are willing or equipped to read reflectively. An alarming conclusion is thereby reached. Since the published information has been quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate, even if all of it had been read the total sum would still have constituted less than is sufficient for clear and creditable public opinion. And there remains the strong likelihood that most people have read very little even of what has appeared.

The labor organs have not had an enviable record. Each has suffered from some cardinal fault. The *American Federationist*, official voice of the American Federation of Labor, has been consistently hostile in attitude and narrow in facts. Though favorable to Russia, *Advance*, publication of the Amalgamated Garment Workers Union, has not made clear enough to its readers the mixed elements of its attitude: approval of the Soviet Government because it seemed to represent an advance for labor, but disapproval of Communism as such. The editors of *Advance* urged recognition of Russia because it would stimulate trade and thereby help American workers. The International Ladies Garment Workers' organ, *Justice*, has opposed both Bolshevism and the Soviet Government, yet advocated recognition of Russia for business reasons. A similar stand has been taken by the *Locomotive Engineers' Journal*.

For objective accounts of conditions in Russia, the business and financial magazines have been fair-minded and informative, though they have failed to deduce any ideas that can be considered accurate or profound. Their articles have always been in terms of what American business can get from Russia. The chaos of the earlier period, the developments under the New Economic Policy, the expansion under the Five Year Plan—each was reported with stress on the short-term profits to be gained from the specific situation. Judgments on Russia were expressed by implication; for example, there was the unconscious admission that if conditions had not improved under the Bolsheviks, there would not have been any possibilities for trade. On nearly every occasion, various business publications have expanded the slightest report into a general attitude toward Russia. The same magazine would often report items pro and con with that traditional business manner of "give me the facts," only to view them skeptically after they are obtained. Yet it is this group of magazines, despite the shortcomings indicated, which best reveals how American opinion has changed. The unconscious way in which new opinions were formed, item by item, with no attempt to re-examine and summarize past attitudes, is quite noticeable.

Trade journals have here been analyzed from the standpoint that the technical and industrial aspects of Sovietism might produce new reactions. Did Russia's peculiar technological problems evoke a special response in magazines devoted to the problems of individual industries? The expectation was to find a sustained interest in the task of production in a controlled economy, in a new industrial psychology, in factory organization, in the handling of new materials, in the methods of co-ordination. Such attention has not been found. Trade journals have seen eye to eye with business magazines. They have described Russian industrial developments in terms of what business it would offer or what future competition could be expected. Because of their specialized interests, they have overlooked many aspects of Russian economic life, though they have been more adequate than the business magazines in describing the improved exploitation of natural resources and the wide expansion of industrial activities. But the meaning of a gigantic and complete centralization of industrial life, the technical aspects of control and planning, the effects of attempting a thorough co-ordination of an economy—these have not interested the trade journals. They have remained semi-communicative publications for a semi-competitive business world.

Most disappointing among the magazines have been the economic publications—the *American Economic Review*, the *Journal of Political Economy* and the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. These organs of learned economic thought published only one article on Russia between 1917 and 1921, twelve from 1921 to 1929, and but slightly more in the last period, 1929 to 1933. Coming from publications of such standing these articles never fulfilled expectations. Except for a few suggestions which belatedly appeared in a supplement of the *American Economic Review*, these periodicals have not properly emphasized the fact that Russia is a country whose economy has differed tremendously from the one in the back of the minds of their readers, even though the latter were trained economists. Points of contrast between the American and Russian economy have not been made clear. For these journals to discuss an economy so different, without pointing out the essential variations, can only mean that they have not been aware of all that has been involved. It is true that in the period 1929-1933 there appeared some discussions of Russian institutions, with a more technical appreciation of their fundamentals, but these articles were inadequate in that they were not concerned with actual comparisons and did not offer deductions that were particularly significant or profound. Russia's experiments did not evoke any real response to the theoretical and practical challenge directed at prevailing economic doctrine and practice.

The record of the learned magazines on the whole ranks considerably

above that of the economic magazines, despite the latter's dispassionate appraisal of intangibles. *Current History* presented fully the situation in Russia. Often, however, it prefaced its articles, especially during the earlier years, with editorial comment which did no honor to its prestige as an historian's manual. But the major fallacy was that its straight reporting, mostly without comment, often left a darker picture than actually existed. With many countries undergoing tremendous changes, the sum total of simple description portrays an apparent decay which often turns out, when interpreted, to be a period of constructive effort. This was particularly true of Russia. The *Annals*, likewise, despite its careful presentation of both sides of the issue, failed to give a balanced picture. This happened largely because the advocates did not in many cases really represent both sides, and because often the spokesman for Russia introduced reservations emphasizing a negative tone.

The only source of opinion which thoroughly and truthfully reported Russia were the liberal weeklies. They portrayed developments in Russia with a deep understanding of the secular trends because they gave consideration to the spirit, sincerity and philosophy of its leaders. They also published much significant technical material. Both the *Nation* and the *New Republic* emphasized the social aspects of Soviet economic activities, a factor which had to be properly analyzed in order adequately to appraise the whole Russian scene. Their criticisms of many events in Russia were never used as merely a means to proceed toward complete condemnation, actual or implied, nor as opportunities for sudden shifts of attitude and abandonment of previous positions.

It can be said of the liberal weeklies that they alone have made long-term judgments, that they alone have drawn a complete picture, because they alone have recognized the potentials of Russia's political reformation, economic reorganization and spiritual reorientation. Their success indicates that it is essential that a more determined effort be made to isolate and estimate "non-economic" factors.

The *Saturday Evening Post* has, as we have seen, unalterably opposed everything Russian, and the reluctant admission in the later years that some progress had taken place resulted only in greater vehemence subsequently. The general monthlies—*Scribner's*, *Forum*, etc.—were, aside from the quantitative inadequacy of their reporting, completely antagonistic during the early years. Then, in the last period, they abruptly began striving for more impartiality. The definite shift in *Harper's* was obvious: 1917-1921, a few vague articles, all anti-Bolshevik; 1921-1929, only three articles, also anti-Soviet; 1929-1933, nearly all, in some sense, pro-Soviet. Apparently the monthlies followed opinion, instead of leading it. It may be said that, on the whole, the readers of the better-

known monthlies have been the least informed about Russia.

The majority of the books on Russia were equally unsuccessful. Greater space merely allowed them to make their arguments more elaborate, but their contents were not more substantial. Toward the middle of the second period and during the third, a few books appeared which sought to give a critical analysis of the Soviet economy. Some of these, such as the reports of the British Trade Union Delegation and the American Trade Union Delegation, were milestones in the change of opinion. The books on Russia from 1917 to 1933 most clearly demonstrate the conclusions of this study in the shift and nature of opinion. Yet, with few exceptions, these books were not complete or analytical. Moreover, it must be remembered that very few Americans read many of them, inadequate as they were.

It is difficult to summarize the newspapers with equanimity. As on most subjects, newspaper opinion of Soviet Russia was characterized by a certain superficiality. In most cases there was a great show of common sense and a practical appreciation of day-by-day adjustments. But the average merely reacted to events and displayed a conspicuous failure to interpret them. The growing acceptance of Russia, never enthusiastic, was based on the purely practical grounds of trade possibilities and the stability of the Soviet regime. It is almost impossible to determine the influence which "straight reporting" has exercised upon the American public mind. It is almost equally impossible to say that there has been any substantial amount of such reporting.

Mixed feelings about Congressional hearings cannot be avoided. It seems only natural that legislators should investigate before they legislate. But Congressional hearings concerning Communism, Soviet Russia, and the Third International exhibit many objectionable features. Often they become trials by ordeal in which the accused is assumed to be guilty and obliged to prove his innocence. On three occasions during the years of this study, such was found to be the nature of related investigations which Congress undertook. Ironically, the findings were quite different from those seemingly desired. Only indirectly did various implications indicate that the picture was changing from one of Russia suffering economic collapse to one of Russia as a world power, capable of vast and effective production.

The executive pronouncements on Russia would be amusing in many respects if they had not been taken seriously by many people. Written in pontifical English, these documents have offered fascinating evidence of the transference of the emotions previously described. But as trade developed with Russia and pressure increased for practical relations, if not recognition, the official statements mirrored a growing awareness of the realities involved. Until the genial exchange of notes took place in

November, 1933, no administration had failed to use every occasion to proclaim the belief that the Russian economy was un-American.

Bearing in mind the evaluations and conclusions herein presented, a summary may be offered of what are likely to be the chief characteristics of any opinion which Americans will have of Soviet Russia:

It will be largely determined by the events of the moment in the United States.

There will be an air of uncertainty and distrust revolving around:

The knowledge of Russia's vast natural resources.

The unfamiliarity of Russia's political traditions, which are believed to be oriental or Slavic, yet significantly new and un-Western.

The average American's ignorance of power politics generally, of Russia's problems, of the nature of its internal politics, of the nature and significance of its internationalism.

A vague respect for Soviet Russia's fundamental approach to economic and social problems.

Identification of Russia and revolution with anything disturbing the economic, political and social scene.

Information about Russian economic life will be so loose that only a low order of speculation will result.

The literature will contain all the important ideas about Russia but so qualified, improperly estimated and prejudicially presented as to nullify it as adequate material for the formation of judgment.

The opinion will be furnished by a handful of men, each of them only partially qualified to make an objective judgment.

If past performance is a future guide, business and financial magazines will talk about the immediate effects on trade; labor journals will hold a business point of view, varied by their feelings of Russia's influence on labor's destiny; economic magazines will fail to probe the basis, and will publish too little, though some of it will be good; learned magazines will be fair and balanced; general magazines will follow opinion, publishing little; the liberal weeklies will guess correctly because of their sympathies, tolerance and long-term estimates. There will be a few good books, many tirades. Newspapers will react to the event, interpret practically nothing, cultivate a seeming prudence. Congress will order hearings of no real analytical result. The executive pronouncements will state the elements of its position in rhetoric which tends to hide them. All in all, the sum total of published opinion will be of a low intellectual order, inadequate in analysis, in quality and in dissemination.

In brief, the American people are not likely to get a clear picture of anything which happens in Soviet Russia—neither of its significance for

Russia nor as a possibly profitable social experience for the United States. Add up the failings one by one: the deficient service rendered by scholars and intellectuals, the inadequacies of published information, the immense proportions of the subject and the lack of intellectual and emotional preparation of the people in the United States. These factors lead to this fatal conclusion: America is not getting the benefit of another nation's experience. The American people are not being given the necessary information with which to make the decisions that are expected of them and that they have to make. They are left continuously unprepared and uninformed.

THE FUTURE

THE conclusions of this study are not optimistic. Appraisal of opinion from 1917 to 1933 and the application of the results to a recent event clearly prove the fact that the American people have not been adequately informed about Russia. The question is not one of approving or disapproving of Sovietism. Important developments have taken place which should have been fully and plainly reported. They were not. There is no doubt that the quality of opinion can be improved. But the process of doing so must be clearly understood. For that task we need experts trained in comparative economics and perhaps several institutes devoted to that field. The barriers of language must also be considered, and these specialists will need linguistic equipment and complete source materials. They will need the proper background in order to follow and interpret developments in these unfamiliar economies. There will have to be many of them so that all viewpoints will be represented and enough of them so that the vast subject will be properly covered. And this is a task we must perform not only with reference to Soviet Russia but for each part of the world.

Much work must be done to familiarize the average citizen with the essential similarities and the basic differences which distinguish these new arrangements in Germany, Italy and Russia from the American economy. So great an obligation cannot depend merely upon the accidental interests of a few scholars. Nor is discussion in itself enough. Objective truth is not rescued by means of miracle from the clash of

violent opposition. A hundred and thirty million people cannot be adequately informed by a handful of creditable books and articles.

At the time of this writing, most men are interested in taking sides, not in weighing them. In the near future, it is, unfortunately, not likely that we will be able to carry out our obligation of properly informing the American people on national and international problems. Yet much of the present world chaos can be explained by this failure—a fatal defect for a democracy. We must make every effort to prevent the recurrence of the tragic results of misinformation.

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*The personnel of the Committee was as follows: Curtis Bok, chairman, Thomas W. Lamont, William Scarlett, George H. Houston, David B. Robertson, Professor Frank Taussig, Professor Jacob Viner, Roland S. Morris, Paul D. Cravath, Dean Roscoe Pound, Professor Walter W. Cooke, Allen Wardwell, General William N. Haskell, J. H. Rand, Jr., Thomas A. Morgan, Esther Everett Lape, Thomas S. Gates, James D. Mooney, Dr. Walter C. Alvarez and Colonel Hugh L. Cooper.

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SECTION IX

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PART FOUR

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